Does this indicate multiple, potentially conflicting meanings, or a single, clear meaning?
🚨 Evidence from WHO teams' use
2014: IPC of epidemic & pandemic-prone acute respiratory infections in health care
'The spread of an infectious agent caused by the dissemination of droplet nuclei that remain infectious when suspended in air over long distances and time. (9)'
🚨 Reference 9 from the 2014 WHO IPC guideline: source
@Don_Milton: when writing this 2004 perspective piece triggered by proven airborne transmission of SARS, DID NOT seek to question the meaning of the word 'airborne'.
And in 2014, WHO teams were happy using it too.
🚨 July 2020 SARS2 IPC Scientific Brief
'Airborne transmission is defined as the spread of an infectious agent caused by the dissemination of droplet nuclei (aerosols) that remain infectious when suspended in air over long distances & time.(11)'
'aerosols' = only diff from 2014
🚨 Reference 11: source?
The 2014 IPC of epidemic & pandemic-prone acute respiratory infections in health care: WHO Guideline
Getting boring isn't it?
WHO teams are soooo comfortable with their use of the word 'airborne' w.r.t. IPC, that they keep quoting their own definition.
🚨 SARS-CoV-2 & the role of airborne transmission: a systematic review (v2, 6th Sept 2021)
[You know, the one sponsored by WHO & denying airborne transmission, rejected due to reviewer concerns over flawed methodology.]
🚨 'Airborne transmission is defined as the spread of an infectious agent caused by the dissemination of droplet nuclei (aerosols) that remain infectious when suspended in air over long distances & time(1).
IDENTICAL to the July 2020 Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 Scientific Brief
@gabbystern I respectfully suggest that the evidence above demonstrates a consensus on 'airborne' terminology dating back to 2004, with WHO teams consistently using near identical wording in multiple publications, most recently Sept 6th 2021.
Given this consensus:
'Airborne transmission is defined as the spread of an infectious agent caused by the dissemination of droplet nuclei (aerosols) that remain infectious when suspended in air over long distances & time'
WHY suggest the need for 'a consensus on terminology'?
‘Healthcare leadership has lost its way. Its foundation should be in love, not lies. We are truly sorry for what we have done’
** ‘testimony’ 🙃
/🧵
‘We knew SARS2 transmission was airborne in Jan 2020, but instead of showing love to healthcare workers & being honest with them about the RPE shortages, we lied to them & kept on lying’
‘…we are truly sorry for what we have done’
/2
We knew AGP-only aerosol risk was a smokescreen - a thinly disguised rationing tool for RPE - but instead of being honest with HCWs, in love, we lied to them & kept on lying’
If you missed what Prof Sir Chris Whitty said on IPC & PPE, or just couldn't carry on watching after the amazing @Kevin_Fong [God bless you sir, & thank you for all you do 🙏]
TL/DR
/1
Sir Chris worked shifts on the wards in every wave
Wore FRSM mainly - as per IPC guidance, he said
HCID declassification had no bearing on IPC guidance
"I am not an expert on IPC'
/2
On national IPC guidance:
'quite a lot of people had partial responsibility'
Now we've seen IPC Cell minutes from 22/12/2020 & the plea from 'CB' for wider FFP3 use because:
'Our understanding of aerosol transmission has changed'
🚨Would you like to know whether very late 2020 was when *all* 🇬🇧Gov departments knew of the importance of aerosol risk?
/1
Obtained via FOI request
🚨From the Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy
🦺Working safely during coronavirus (COVID-19)
10 July 2020 update
'You should ensure that steps are taken to avoid people needing to unduly raise their voices to each other...
/2
'This includes...refraining from playing music or broadcasts that may encourage shouting, including if played at a volume that makes normal conversation difficult. This is because of the potential for increased risk of transmission, particularly from aerosol transmission.’
Over the last 2 days at @covidinquiryuk the NHS has shown its dark & ugly side
There was never going to be an apology from IPC guidance authors whose guidance drove disproportionately high rates of death & COVID19 in non-ICU HCWs & huge rates of nosocomial SARS2, but…
/1
the level of obfuscation, evasion & incompetence on display from those tasked with keeping HCWs safe, is jaw dropping
I was one of the lucky ones: my NHS Trust ALWAYS provided HCWs with FFP3 when caring for those with COVID19 - my IPC remained precautionary
As a result…
/2
by Dec 2020 the number of consultant staff working on Covid wards testing positive was: 0
🚨The ONLY deviation from national guidance was universal FFP3!
The last & most vital line of defence - FFP3 - *is life saving* @SMHopkins
TL/DR in evidence to @covidinquiryuk, CH stated SARS2 transmission is via large droplet & fomites
But:
Following peer review triggered changes 6 Jul 2022, CH's own work stated that SARS2 transmission is via 'fine aerosols & respiratory droplets, & to a lesser extent...fomites'
Why omit the empirical truth that SARS2 transmission occurs importantly via the airborne [aerosol inhalation] route?
Why do this, particularly as David Heymann's 13th Oct 2023 evidence to the PI clarified the @WHO position:
WHO knew SARS2 transmission was via aerosols, Jan 2020
'Arguably the most fundamental misstep in the UK response was the presumption that covid would be an unstoppable flu-like wave'
This
underpinned the early (Chris Whitty) position on T&T, & the Vallance view on 'herd immunity' (later air-brushed)'
Aside
Early SAGE minutes clarify the UK rationale for stopping community SARS2 testing: it was deemed unnecessary because with rapidly increasing case numbers there was no point in testing, as there were insufficient personnel to contact trace
Good to know whose plan this was
'But there was an alternative'
'This led us to question...though we found ourselves quietly dismissed as not understanding the science'
'Ironically, the pride in our science & our capabilities, slowed our ability to learn lessons from other countries'