New crackdown on online streamers?
CCTV News reported today two cases of tax evasion by two Chinese online streamers, who were respectively fined 65 & 27 mil RMB.
The cases are interesting for 3 reasons:
1. They were caught by the tax authorities using "tax big data analysis" by the Hangzhou tax bureau. I guess that's one reason why big data is getting so important in China.
2. Their alleged wrongdoings were converting what they earned in the streaming business from personal income to the business income of the sole proprietorship. I'm not a tax expert, but if I remember correctly this is a widespread practice among China's celebrities and
is more of a grey area rather than outright illegal.
Interestingly, when in 2000 China decided to suspend corporate income tax on sole proprietorships and partnerships, and only levy individual income tax on their investors’ business income, it was hailed as a big benefit
for entrepreneurs to encourage individual investment, fair taxation, improve the income tax system, and create favorable conditions for the development of the enterprises.
But that policy was made at a time when the corporate tax rate was higher than the individual tax rate.
When the corporate tax rate was reduced in 2008, high-income individuals discovered that they can save a lot by shifting the income to sole proprietorships, as the higher brackets of personal income taxes are much higher than the corporate tax rate.
3. The two were fined 100% of the tax they evaded, even though they cooperated with the tax authorities and paid part of the tax before the investigation was concluded.
So what's the takeaway from all these? 1. Expect more tax crackdowns coming in China as the state tries to fill its coffers amidst an economic downturn; 2. Confucius is proven right once again: "In this world, nothing is certain except death and taxes".
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Xi’s Feb speech to private firms is finally published—and it confirms everything I predicted before the meeting:
Private firms must fully align with China’s strategic competition vs the US.
Xi says private firms’ problems stem from external shocks (tech revolutions, trade restrictions) or internal missteps (over-diversification).
To Xi, the Party is not the problem, it is the solution.
Thus, firms must “unify their thoughts and actions with the Central Committee.”
Xi was even more explicit on measures to boost private firms: they should lead national science & tech projects, access major research infrastructure, and join state-led initiatives.
Exactly what I predicted 3 years ago in my @CIGI essay: private firms must be integrated into
What’s the biggest threat to China’s economy in the 2nd half of 2025?
It’s not the trade war, nor any new government policy. It’s a judicial interpretation from the Supreme Court.
On July 31, the Court issued Interpretation on Applicable Law in Trying Labour Dispute Cases (II).
Article 19 states:
“If the employer agrees with the employee, or the employee promises the employer, that there is no need to pay social security premiums, the people’s court shall find the agreement or promise invalid. If the employer fails to pay social security premiums in
accordance with the law, and the employee requests the termination of the labour contract in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 38 of the Labour Contract Law and demands economic compensation, the people’s court shall support the claim.”
The new tariff numbers confirm what I wrote 4 months ago in my @commonplc piece “The Art of a Trade Deal”:
1. I stressed that these negotiations aren’t just about trade-security alignment would be a key factor. This is now explicit in the executive order, which repeatedly cites
security considerations in setting final tariff rates.
2. I predicted countries would be grouped based on key criteria. That’s exactly what we see: broadly speaking, there are three groups—friends (10–15%), enemies (30%+), and frenemies (19–25%).
3. I anticipated aggressive transshipment controls targeting China. The executive order includes just that.
4. Perhaps most tellingly, the order hints what China—the last holdout from the Liberation Day Tariffs—is likely to face: at least 40%, matching the rate applied to
The US-UK trade deal is out—and it confirms most of my predictions in my @commonplc piece “The Art of a Trade Deal” 4 weeks ago:
1. Tariffs: The 10% tariff remains in place for now, but contrary to some interpretations, this doesn’t mean the UK failed to negotiate it down. The
Agreement explicitly states that both sides will enter negotiations to reduce tariff rates. As I noted, the likely landing point is around the US’s 3.4% rate-if the UK is willing to match it.
2. Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs): Just as I anticipated, NTBs is central to the next phase
For a developed country like the UK, the focus is on overregulation—technical barriers to trade, SPS measures, and similar restrictions—all explicitly referenced in the Agreement.
3. Supply Chains: I flagged this as a key issue, and the Agreement confirms it. It addresses supply
Today’s front page of People’s Daily features the Central Peripheral Work Conference—a major development, given this is only the second such meeting in the PRC’s 76-year history.
The first such meeting was in Oct 2013, when Xi launched the BRI, which
was elevated to a national strategy at the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee held the following month.
As I argued in this @trade_review article 3 years ago, the BRI was China’s strategic response to US containment through the TPP, where the cambridge.org/core/journals/…
@trade_review US tried to “make sure the US—and not countries like China—is the one writing this century’s rules for the world’s economy.”
But the TPP was killed.
Now, as @realDonaldTrump tries to rewrite the rules of global trade through the Reciprocal Tariff Policy, China is striking back.