Thread by @MidOfficer

As a post command & staff college guy who unexpectedly finds himself scheduling job interviews this week, I have some thoughts on retention, so way too long of a 🧵digging into the current state of the CAF, beyond the headlines and sound bites, and some suggestions...

https://twitter.com/Murray_Brewster/status/1452960810976915459

For the record, I think the media and subsequent comments regarding the A/CDS' statements in October were unfair, especially on soldier forums. The Gen has seen the detailed numbers and knows the chronic & acute problems, but I digress, let's start at the start:

Let's go back to '91. The USSR collapses, 4 CMBG is disbanded and distributed back to Canada, and the Force Reduction Program (FRP) follows in '95

Keep these numbers in mind for total CAF RegF Establishment:

1987: 87,000
1995: 76,500
1998: 66,700
2021: 71,500

Estab is a ceiling, how many people you're allowed to have. Understand that you don't get extra spaces for people in training, or hurt, so 71.5k has to include that. Between trg and holding list, you lose almost 9k, so the best case for the CAF is 62,750 effective members, or 89%

But our actual strength is 65k, and more untrained than usual (COVID) so we're really closer to 55k effective members, or 77%,

So when we talk about the missing middle, it's around 7500 mbrs who aren't there plus another 2500 posns that are empty, so it feels like 10k missing

The big problem is it's not at the entry level, but leadership. MCpl, Sgt, WO, Capt, Maj, LCol (& RCN equivs) are on average 14% understrength.

So what is causing that? Well, here's some thoughts on what's going on inside the Army.

Look back at what happened in the 90s...

You can't cut 20k ppl without impact. There's a struggle to balance field force with the basic bones of an institution - recruiting, training, equipping, etc. Army ends up short changing schools to keep units full, but this means they can't run crses w/o tasking in xtra help

If you run the numbers, as high as 60% of the available (Total NCOs x total working days) for a field unit get tasked out to run courses, tasks, or training. For NCOs, this means that up to 60% of their time is spent away from home and family. What does release data tell us?

25% of mbrs quitting say impact of mil lifestyle on family & spouse is a main reason. 21.5% say job dissatisfaction. Don't forget we're still working with the Afghan generation - those who fought or joined in the shadow, who have a specific idea what they wanted from the Army

A thesis: no more 'combat tours,' and constant tasks away from home, while still training in Wainwright up to 90 days away from home for combat tours that aren't coming has been a primary driver of NCO releases from the Army. Also the Cpls who would have been the next NCOs.

The Army knows this, but the school training system is geo dislocated from the field force, limited resources to run courses locally, and key staff like standards are posted to the schools anyways, so its a challenge. A permanent solution would mean understaffing the field units,

But that risks the Army's operational outputs. It's a frustrating problem. With unlimited money and infrastructure, centralizing would solve, but...not really realistic. So mostly the Army is getting better, where it can, at running distributed courses at home station.

So what about officers? Junior Os get tasked too, but usually more like twice ever rather than twice a year. Also generally younger and less likely to have children, so less impact to family life. I believe O retention is more ideological than quality of life...

First, Os generally have different post-Army career options. We still have an Afghan bubble, as well as the last of the 20 year pension club. As you progress, you're less a solider than a staff officer, and the chances of excitement dwindle. Some see their 'last tour' and then...

can't see any difference between their staff desk and a public or private sector desk. Others can't give up that feeling, and try to chase excitement somewhere else. I've seen a crazy number of LCols quit immediately post CO, always chasing some meaning or excitement...

But I've also seen toxic leadership and bullying take down a shocking number of good officers. Without the chance to lead soldiers, or deploy, then it's just an office job in a toxic environ, so they leave as soon as they are pensionable. Lots of RMC types here, 16 yrs after grad

A huge frustration is succession planning. Promotion is a transparent system, but selection for opportunities that lead to key promo requirements is a black box. Same for selection of COs & Bde Comds, who have some of the biggest impacts on quality of life for soldiers.

Almost every officer wants to be one, but the selection of who and for what unit is archaic at best, and open to criticism of nepotism and bias. So what? Good Os quit because they didn't get opportunities, then troops end up quitting due to questionable Os who did...

So am I just some bitter dude who can be dismissed?

Maybe. But then again, the US Army now has a formal assessment and selection program for Battalion Commanders, and is expanding to Sergeant-Majors and Bde Comds as well.

army.mil/article/229500…

These are just two issues, and it's an overly simplistic analysis. There are tons of factors impacting CAF retention, and not all within its control. We can't control whether or not we have a war to fight, and some people will always be looking for one. Then there's the economy,

Many people have pointed out that the CAF's posting system worked in a single-income era, but now with cost of living and housing driving dual-income as a norm, it's not sustainable to ignore CAF partners in the career management process. Geo cost of living differences too...

One of the big things we can do though is to be fair to people, both in quality of life, and in leadership. We owe it to our people to minimize time away from home & to modernize training so we're not chasing a standard of readiness that is beyond what is really required.

Leaders, and planners, need to account for every day they separate their soldiers from their families. No callousness, no "that's just the Army way," but a genuine commitment to respect their time, energy, and commitment. Respect for work-life balance is a COA comparison criteria

On the same token, snr lrs need to respect the hard work and commitment of aspiring ldrs, and build an open, transparent, objective, and defendable succession management and selection program. The black box can't survive our current credibility crisis, and with good reason.