Chelsea used a 3-5-2 structure with two high number eights in N’Golo Kanté and Hudson-Odoi. Hakim Ziyech acted as a number 10, often moving away from Christian Pulisic, who stayed high as the main centre-forward... 🧐🧵
In the first half, Hudson-Odoi and Chilwell rotated well, with Ziyech moving over to provide support on the left. Here, he proved more difficult for Juventus to pick up because their midfield line often narrowed to prevent direct access into Ziyech between the lines... 🧐🧵
Ziyech then made more movements out to Chelsea’s right, and the home side found space to attack in the left inside channel, with Rüdiger frequently stepping out of defence to progress around the visitors’ central midfield three... 🧐🧵
With Chelsea constantly breaking into the final third, Rüdiger’s high position almost made him a second pivot alongside Jorginho. Juventus then defended extremely deep, leaving only one player high in the attack... 🧐🧵
Allegri moved Rabiot inside from their out-of-possession midfield four to create a temporary midfield three. This allowed one of the two central midfielders to drop and support the centre-backs during deeper build-up, and also to help combat Chelsea’s higher pressing... 🧐🧵
Bonucci often helped Juventus break into midfield from a central positions. With Rabiot coming in off the left, one of the centre-forwards dropped in to add another player to the midfield unit. As a result, Chelsea were forced back into a mid-block, and Ziyech withdrew... 🧐🧵
A change to 4-2-3-1 ensured a permanent three in the Juventus midfield. However, Chelsea responded by pressing high, with single pivot Jorginho jumping out to press more. Whenever Ziyech pressed aggressively alongside Pulisic, Juve struggled to penetrate centrally... 🧐🧵
Juventus made a string of changes, with Arthur introduced in the double pivot, and Dybala as a number 10 underneath Kean as the centre-forward. Juventus’ full-backs still provided the attacking width, attempting to build around Chelsea’s converted 5-3-2 defensive block... 🧐🧵
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Spain used a 4-3-3 structure and built play patiently from the back, despite Germany pressing aggressively from their 4-2-3-1. They moved the ball around the back line to isolate Thomas Müller, before a centre-back stepped out with the ball into midfield... 🧐🧵
Olmo continued to move inside and Asensio dropped deep, in the process pulling Süle out of his position in Germany’s back line. This helped Spain to build out from the back and get around Germany’s increasingly effective high press... 🧐🧵
Traditionally, full-backs are the widest players in a back four, and as a result they attack and defend mostly in the wide areas. However, full-backs who move inside into central spaces are known as ‘inverted full-backs’. This movement adds an extra presence centrally... ↩️🧐
Although Pep Guardiola is the coach most associated with the inverted full-back, Johan Cruyff used them with Barcelona many years before. Then, he often converted the 4-3-3 into a 3-4-3 diamond, with one full-back inverting into central midfield... ↩️🧐
Manchester United were set up in a 4-2-3-1 shape, but Fred pushed forward from the double pivot to become a number 8 and give them a stronger attacking presence in central midfield. Bruno Fernandes then adapted his positioning, moving into the left inside channel... 🧐🧵
The hosts eventually pushed both full-backs higher, primarily working around the outside of Tottenham’s wing-backs. United’s wingers then came inside, with the freedom to rotate with Fred and Fernandes, as long as both inside channels were always occupied... 🧐🧵
Barcelona were set up in a 4-3-3, against a Madrid 4-4-2 defensive block. Torres moved inside to support centre-forward Aubameyang. De Jong and Pedri widened to support through the inside channels, with Busquets left as the single pivot ahead of the two centre-backs... 🧐🧵
Busquets dropped into defence to draw one of Madrid’s central midfielders up, and Pedri drifted wider to drag the other out. This often left De Jong as the free man to receive in the inside channel when Barcelona’s back line could access him... 🧐🧵
4-4-2 is made up of three distinct lines. The back four including two centre-backs and two full-backs. Ahead of them, a midfield four features two players in the middle and one on each side. Then the front two in attack who provide both height and goalscoring threat... 4️⃣4️⃣2️⃣🧵
In the 1950s, Viktor Maslov developed another variation of the 4-2-4, in which the two wingers dropped back alongside the two central midfielders. So originated the 4-4-2, which worked to overload opposition midfields with traditionally fewer numbers... 4️⃣4️⃣2️⃣🧵