Today's personal consumption data gives the most detailed picture of where consumers are now.
And the answer is: overall consumption is back, the goods-services disconnect is still large, but mostly that is because goods are high and rising even while services partly recover.
Here is real spending on goods and goods. Note that real services spending has been *rising* even while services spending is recovering.
Look at spending on sporting equipment, guns & ammunition vs. membership clubs and sports center. The former is high and the later is low. But the goods spending is still rising even while the services is roughly flat.
Same story with personal care products vs. personal care services.
And my favorite, people kept buying a lot in supermarkets even as their restaurant spending returned to normal. I've tweeted about that before.
Also remember that the biggest shortfall in services is health. This isn't quite the same as people choosing not to go to gyms or manicures. And may not have the same obvious micro substitution. Although even ex health and nonprofits (which are in PCE), services below trend.
So overall the composition shift is clearly part of the story (people buying goods instead of services). But it's only part--as goods spending keeps rising while services is flat or recovering. So there is also a big demand increase (is screamingly clear in the nominal data).
We do still have an issue with the composition of consumption in our economy. As it shifts we're likely to see some falloff in goods inflation and some rise in services inflation. I expect that will mean lower inflation overall but is not obvious.
In fact, in Q3 the biggest shortfall in the economy was not consumption (which gets most of the attention) but business investment. With new orders so high this investment gap also may be closing rapidly.
Finally, here is a full table about what is up or down relative to trend in the consumption components--and how those contribute to the overall numbers. Enjoy!
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Strong jobs report. 177K jobs added. Unemployment rate steady at 4.2% but participation rate up and U-6 down. Hours steady. A slowdown in hourly wage growth.
Federal employment was down a bit but state and local more than made up for it. The trend in private jobs is basically the same as total.
Unemployment rate very slowly drifted up for the last year and a half.
Wednesday's Q1 GDP # will have a lot of economic noise, a lot of measurement noise, and could generate even more political noise.
A technical🧵on one aspect: what period does it reflect?
The answer is a combo of pre- and post- 1/20 because of the weirdness of quarterly averages
When I (and most people) look at things like CPI or jobs, we look at something like a three month average. That would be growth from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025. Which is also the (geometric) average of the growth rates in Jan, Feb and Mar. It tells you what happened in those 3 months.
But GDP is not reported monthly (fortunately, would be really volatile). So the numbers are the growth from the average of Oct/Nov/Dec to Jan/Feb/Mar. If there is weak growth in Nov or Dec that lowers part of Q4 but all of Q1 so lowers overall growth.
Core PCE inflation came in a little above the already high expectations in Feb. The pattern is the opposite of what you want to see--the shorter the window the higher the annualized rate (and still high at 12 months):
Here are the full set of numbers. They were uniformly ugly in February.
If you're looking for some slivers of reassurance, market-based core (which excludes imputed items like portfolio fees) was only up 2.4% over the last 12 months. And "only" 3.0% annualized over the last three, less than the regular core.
Income taxes are distort trade by reducing purchases of imports. At least they do so as much as VATs do. Which is to say not any more than they reduce purchases of domestic goods.
A hopefully irrelevant thread.
A simple toy example.
Consider a person in Spain with 100€ in income that they use to buy oranges. Absent taxes oranges cost 1€. They must spend all their income this year.
In this case they could buy 100 total oranges--imported plus Spanish.
Now assume there's a 25% VAT.
VAT raises the cost of imported oranges to 1.25€, this is the way it is supposed to be like a tariff.
Of course, also raises the cost of Spanish oranges to 1.25€. This is not a tariff & is trade neutral.