Thread by @Gilesyb

Kate Bingham's speech (link found here ox.ac.uk/news/2021-11-2…) is much more interesting than some of the more OTT, civil-service-hating coverage would have you believe. Some points 1/

First, for everything that follows, the monumental scale of what Covid has wrought needs this dramatic reiteration. Note: this is a conservative estimate of global deaths. Very few policy situations occur against such an extraordinary backdrop ...2/

and it could have been worse: SARS' slow-mutating nature allowed the prospect of a vaccine-exit from the nightmare 3/

A strong theme is the contrast between the "wartime" situation of 2020 and the steady-state "peacetime" of normal times. This cannot be emphasised enough. Normally, policy impacts emerge over years/decades, vs "visible in next month's @jburnmurdoch graph" timings of 2020/21 4/

KB usefully makes clear that the role of the Vaccine Taskforce wasn't the discovery of vaccines, but choosing them, helping their mass-manufacture - and getting them for the UK specifically, given how small we are 5/

And for those (including, sometimes, me) who struggle to see what an investor or "strategic customer" can do to enhance the whole industry they are in, these are the essential paragraphs. This is a speeded up version of what UK industrial strategy has tried to do in places 6/

KB also generously points out the strong performance of parts of the bureaucracy, such as the rapid and effective recruitment of volunteers for testing, with the NHS 7/

In terms of her lessons for government - the bit where @instituteforgov and thinkers like @AlexGAThomas are generating ideas - she appears to cite three positives: great senior civil servants in places; clear PM authority; single decision-making structure 8/

The result, clearest seen in this chart: about 6 months where we were 10-25 percentage points more vaccinated than, say, France - which given our horrendous infection levels, might have saved thousands of lives 9/

So what about the negatives? They are summarised as:
- lack of scientific skills in officials and politicians
- risk-averse culture *at the very worst time*
- lack of commercial nous/good relations with industry

Going through them: 10/

The first and third reflect a long-standing, anti-industrial strategy bias in political Whitehall: why would officials be expert in who's who in biosciences? It is one that Lord Heseltine banged on about in his 2012 report 11/ assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…

I would observe that this does not come cheap. Having officials familiar and networked into major industries means having them just doing that, not whatever else you may want them doing. Good ones are attractive to industry too, so expensive. Doesn't survive austerity... 12/

Moreover, the problem is with the politicians too 13/

The issue of risk aversion is the real poser. Clearly, in pandemic circumstances, cavilling about proprietry/due process is mad- but it is *everyone*s job to fix this. If the media and the rest of us bang on about costs, politicians are forced to care 14/

Ultimately, if they want their officials to take decisions that go well beyond the comfort zone, they have to somehow insulate them from future Death By Select Committee - and that is difficult promise to make in a time-consistent way 15/

This is why I think "Adopt a venture capital mindset" is so much easier to write than carry out. I also think (for another piece, you'll be pleased to know) the VC mindset isn't right for *every* policy problem. Pandemic-ending drugs, sure. Social care? you show me 16/

Anyway, the whole speech is worth reading, if only to correct some of the cruder caricatures of KB that may have emerged from the spin of before. 17/17