1. The Afghan population is suffering from economic crisis & drought. Rural people are especially vulnerable: they lack functioning markets for legal cash crops, public sector employment has collapsed, & the private sector-once buoyed by international spending- is imploding.
2. Many are trying to escape, leaving the country in large numbers via Zaranj in the SW. The exodus began as early as May 2021 when Biden announced the US withdrawal, & increased exponentially with the Taliban takeover. In October, as many as 12K people left the country each day.
3. In the past, smugglers talked of the heyday of 2014-15 when W. Europe was “open”. Now they say business has never been so as good. The numbers departing have fallen with the onset of winter, but there are still more than twice as many people leaving as 12 months ago.
4. Nobody knows if this pace of departures continues but there’s no reason to think migration will slow if the Afghan economic crisis worsens. Significant numbers are entering Iran, & many migrants want to continue toward Europe in spring 2022 when the mountains become passable
5. Others remain in Afghanistan. But how will they survive? In the past, rural households had at least one member with a trade or job in the city. Now families have lost this income & have more mouths to feed, increased food prices, & some (not all) are experiencing drought.
6. Drug crop cultivation seems an obvious choice. High-value, low-weight crops, with almost guaranteed markets & traders who purchase at the farm gate, poppy is a low-risk crop in a high-risk environment, perfectly suited to the current economic & political climate in Afghanistan
7. As we get further into the planting season there are already signs of increasing poppy cultivation. Some portray the rise of opium production as a function of the Taliban’s rise to power, interpreting this as a failure to control the industry.
8. The reality is different: in rural Afghanistan power is negotiated, markets are thin, & the rural population is an important political constituency. Conflict, closed borders & drought have impacted on the few profitable crops that provided opportunities for farmers in the past
9. Reports of the felling of pomegranate trees-a longterm productive asset-in the Arghandab & their replacement with poppy shows growing levels of stress even in better-off areas, & signals the potential for much higher levels of poppy cultivation in 2022. nytimes.com/2021/11/21/wor…
10. Of course the relationship between drought & poppy is complicated, particularly when wheat prices have risen dramatically & border closures are fresh in farmers’ minds. Opium is reliable during drought: it needs more water than wheat if it is to get a good yield, but …
11. ……will yield at least something in dry conditions whereas wheat might fail. Still, you can’t eat opium. Farmers usually set aside some land for wheat, should conditions allow.
12. It will not be possible to truly assess this season’s poppy crop until mid-March 2022 at the earliest. Only then are we able to properly differentiate between wheat & poppy using high-resolution satellite imagery. Before then, everything is just speculation.
13. Opium will not be the only thing to watch. Over the last few years things have changed & there are new options for drug production available for rural households in Afghanistan in the form of the ephedra-ephedrine-methamphetamine economy emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/p…
14. This provides income to rural households harvesting the wild ephedra crop in the high mountains of Afghanistan (where poppy doesn’t grow) but also to those households processing the dried crop into ephedrine in what is a growing cottage industry in the SW.
15. Despite the claims that ephedra is bulky or even, as some suggest, running out in Afghanistan, there is no evidence of a shortage on the ground. Abdul Wadood the market hub for the meth industry in the SW is booming.
16. Imagery @AlcisGeo shows new shops, an extended storage area for dried & milled ephedra, & more inventory than ever before. There is also an expansion of the catchment area.
17. In Bakwa, ephedra is now sourced from the mountains of Helmand, Ghor, Badghis, Farah & Ghazni, with the higher yielding coming from Ghor & Badghis. There is so much available, prices have fallen to only $0.63 kg in November 2021 compared to $0.84/kg the same time last year.
18. This drop In the price of ephedra is particularly advantageous as other input costs for ephedrine production have risen dramatically, with most imports required doubling in price including salt, diesel, caustic soda & sulphuric acid.
19. At the same time the price of ephedrine has fallen from $60/kg to $51/kg, thereby squeezing profits to less than $10/kg, compared to $35/kg a year ago. The price of meth has taken an even more precipitous fall, from $305/kg in April 2020 to $200/kg at the end of November 2021
20. The returns are so low & import costs so high that the use of OTC - cough mixtures & tablets - is now unheard of in meth production. With such low margins ephedrine & meth producers need to increase volumes just to maintain their income.
21. Moreover, production will
need to rise further to offset the rising cost of living & the loss of non farm income. Perhaps this is the reason for such large amounts of ephedra & increased activity at Abdul Wadood.
22. Certainly imagery analysis @AlcisGeo supports reports from the ground and shows a growing capacity for ephedrine production, with a 34% increase in the number of ephedrine labs identified over the last year, & those labs that were already there appear to be producing more.
23. All this points to a crisis in Afghanistan with much wider impact: increasing levels of migration, meth & probably opium production, all as a response to the rapidly deteriorating economic situation.
24. Some believe the various border walls & fences constructed en route will contain these supply chains. However, there are sufficient gaps in these structures, corruption, & alternative routes (including catapults) that large numbers of people and drugs still get through.
25. As such, while Afghanistan’s assets are frozen in the U.S, its liabilities will be borne directly by Afghans, the region, & also by European nations. More needs to be done to alleviate the economic crisis not just for the Afghan population but for those further afield.
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1. I’ve had a lot of emails from governments, institutions and individuals following UNODC’s recent report on methamphetamine in Afghanistan. unodc.org/documents/data…
2. Most are sceptical of the findings & UNODC’s claim that OTC & bulk pharmaceuticals are the primary precursors for meth in Afghanistan & what they see as a corresponding lack of evidence. Further confusion is expressed over the press coverage that has accompanied the report.
3. Particularly the claim that methamphetamine trafficking is rising in response to the Taliban ban. reuters.com/world/asia-pac…
1. Warning - “anorak” thread: Having read the Taliban finance section of the latest UNSMT report it would seem to contain a lot of confusing lines, many because there isn’t a clear indication of time, others because the team have been drawing on dated data or ideas.
2. The most obvious errors relate to the failure to engage with a timeline on agricultural seasons for drug crops & therefore address what can realistically be done by the Taliban authorities re drug control. A common error that has become a bit of an issue in wider reporting.
3. The current 2022/23 poppy season began in Nov/Dec 2022 when the primary crop was planted in the fall. The harvest of that crop is largely in April/May 2023. This fall planted crop typically constitutes about 90% of the annual poppy crop in Afghanistan
1. Ok, so here is an interesting story in the Times about opium production in Afghanistan. It centres around an anonymised opium trader “Habibullah”, & a farmer “Ahmadullah” both of whom reside in the province of Uruzgan in SW Afghanistan. thetimes.co.uk/article/cash-s…
2. Ahmadullah is a bit of a sideshow to the story but he owns 4.5 acres of land which he typically dedicates to wheat & poppy, but in the 2022/23 growing season has planted a much smaller amount of poppy within his compound walls.
3. The reader is left with the impression that Ahmadullah & other farmers in SW Afghanistan will persist with poppy in the current season, on the basis that they’re poor & the Taliban will not impose a ban for fear of a backlash from its supporters in the rural heartlands.
1. A thread: Now the planting season has begun there is a lot of debate about what the next poppy season brings. A reference point for many commentators is how little was done about the 2022 crop, which @UNODC reports covered 32% more land than the previous year.
2. What is not considered is the action taken against ephedra based methamphetamine over the course of the summer where the Taliban closed the primary market hub & surrounding labs in the SW.
3. Further ephedrine labs were closed in a variety of districts across the country revealing just how extensive production has become. Meth prices rose by more than three-fold following these closures but there were also significant reverberations across the opium economy.
1. You ever feel your life is a little too much rinse repeat? Crop substitution with an emphasis on replacing poppy with wheat? Now I am sure we’ve been here before? Oh yeah, there was HFZ 2008-2011) and before that again (2004-2005) but hey why not go round the buoy again?
3. “From a drug control point of view, the Helmand Food Zone took the form of a crop substitution programme-the kind abandoned in the 80s due to a systemic failure to address the wider market, infrastructural & social factors that led to widespread drug crop cultivation”
1. There are growing reports of eradication in SW Afghanistan. It has caused some confusion, particularly the sight of tractors ploughing fields of emergent poppy, next to a neighbouring field of undamaged poppy ready to harvest.
2. Such scenes have been met with understandable scepticism: accusations that “this is all for the cameras”, “surely if it were otherwise the entire crop would have been destroyed regardless of its size or maturity?”This is not an unreasonable response.
3. There is a long history of exaggerated reports of eradication in Afghanistan & not just by those in the Afghan govt also by USG. With eradication used as a measure of CN commitment there are often theatrics that accompany crop destruction that need to be charted & understood.