Amid the discussion about Kingspan's sponsorship deal with Mercedes, here's a brief run through of what the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has revealed about them 🧵
Kingspan's K15 insulation product was only a very small part of the cladding system on Grenfell, and was only there because of a product substitution. But Kingspan's relevance to the story is larger than that. Lawyers for the families say the firm 'set the precedent'...
... for the use of combustible insulation on high rises.
In 2005, English regulations changed to allow cladding systems to be used on buildings if they passed a 'large scale test'. This opened up a potential backdoor route to use combustible insulation in these systems.
Kingspan passed a test with K15 in 2005, as part of a system that used heavy cement fibre outer panels. This is not representative of a real world system. The test only covered that exact system. Nonetheless, it marketed the product as being suitable for use on high rises.
It then changed the chemical formula for the insulation to make it more efficient. When it ran new tests using the new insulation an internal report said it burned like a "raging inferno" and said the insulation was "burning on its own steam"
Kingspan kept these results secret, even from other parts of the business. It obtained certification from respected third party bodies that supported its claim that the product could be used on high rises. It was sold for use in hundreds of tall buildings.
One of these certifiers (the LABC) incorrectly said K15 "may be regarded" as being a material of limited combustibility. But when an internal Kingspan manager saw it he wrote FANBLOODYTASTIC. He would later boast that we "didn't even have to get any real ale down him"
Kingspan were occasionally challenged by industry figures who queried the fire safety claims. On one occassion, a manager wrote internally that a firm raising questions “go fuck themselves” or the firm would “sue the arse [off] them”
When the largest building control firm in the UK (the NHBC) threatened to stop accepting K15 for tall buildings, Kingspan called in its lawyers and threatened to sue for defamation in 2015
Grenfell largely used Celotex RS5000 as an insulation. This was a new product which a competitor had launched specifically to catch up with Kingspan's dominance of the high rise market.
While it is the aluminium cladding panels made by Arconic that were the "primary cause" of the rapid fire spread at Grenfell, the insulation is believed to have contributed to the fire and released a large quantity of toxic smoke including cyanide.
Even after the fire, Kingspan continued to lobby against a ban on combustible materials on high rises - instructing expensive PR firms to lobby MPs, wining and dining them and presenting evidence to select committees to show non-combustible options could also be dangerous
All of these revelations are a matter of public record thanks to the work of the inquiry. They would surely have appeared in any due diligence carried out by Mercedes before agreeing to the deal.
For completeness, Kingspan emphasises that it played no role in the design of the Grenfell cladding system. It says it has redone testing to support its prior fire safety claims. It has apologised for "process and conduct shortcomings" in its UK business.
As an addendum (if anyone wants more) I actually left out the fact that the firm achieved another fire classification by testing the foil facing attached to the insulation, instead of the insulation itself.
“So on your technical reading of [the building guidance] you could staple a foil facer to a stick of dynamite and put it on a building of above 18 metres and call it Class 0?” asked the inquiry's lawyer.
Discussing this over text, two employees then had this conversation. "Alls we do is lie in here"
And if anyone wants more of this sort of info, my wrap up of the monstrous corporate scandal covering the testing and sale of the cladding materials used on Grenfell is here: insidehousing.co.uk/insight/insigh…
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On Monday the Grenfell Tower Inquiry will hear opening statements covering the failures of government in the years before the fire.
Here is some of what we already know about one of the most appalling failures of the British state in modern history 🧵
We can start the story in the 1980s, with the government of Margaret Thatcher and the decision to deregulate the building industry with a sweeping piece of legislation that introduced new headline 'standards' instead of local prescriptive rules.
The purpose was clear: to strip away restrictions on industry to allow them to maximise profits. “Maximum self-regulation, minimum government interference,” was how then secretary of state Michael Heseltine sold it.
The commissioner of the London Fire Brigade today described hearing a colleague refer to Somali residents they had rescued from a fire as 'P**is' and saying they 'breed like rabbits'
Andy Roe was being questioned about an interview he gave the Guardian in which he said people "come back to the station and express themselves in casually racist terms". He was asked to give a concrete example.
Government officials amended national firefighting guidance to include passages on abandoning ‘stay put’ advice after the LFB officers who first drafted it omitted any reference to doing so, inquiry hears
This one, by the way, is not about the 2000s/10s industry and government balls up of cladding, it's the 1960s/70s industry/gov balls up of large panel system construction. And not dealing with that despite knowing about it for 50 years (plus)
But a very tough day for an east London community who now face upheaval, home loss and uncertainty about whether they can stay in their community. The one consistent thing with badly built buildings: people suffer.
Any fire risk assessor who does not make the increased risk to disabled high rise residents clear is not making a "suitable and sufficient" assessment, says expert
A large part of this morning spent on the issue of evacuation plans - and what should have been done for residents who were unable to use the stairs to evacuate
As we now know, at Grenfell no specific provisions were made for many disabled people in the tower, and reliance was placed on 'stay put' (something that was and remains true of many other tower blocks)
I think a question left hanging a few times on Newsnight last night was: Is the current building safety remediation effort an overreaction?
Here's a thread trying to answer it. In a nutshell - it's more a case of trying to solve the wrong problem in the wrong way (1/?)
You have to go back to the beginning a bit to explain how we ended up here. Grenfell was clad in an extremely combustible material called 'ACM'. For the first 18 months or so after the fire, that's all the government was focused on remediating.
But then in autumn 2018, things started to change. Civil servants were sent some testing showing a popular non-ACM system failing pretty badly. There was mounting concern about other materials which were also very flammable.