Willie Powell & my blog on today's (confusing) jobs numbers. We put the last year in context. Contrary to widespread belief, job growth has been near expectations--as surprisingly strong labor demand offsets surprisingly weak labor supply. A 🧵 piie.com/blogs/realtime…
To understand what was expected we use the median forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Other forecasts were similar. Overall, has slightly outpaced. Here is avg monthly jobs for 2021:
Nov 2020 forecast: 432K/month
May 2021 forecast: 562K/month
Actual: 555K/month
Similar story for unemployment. Back in May (the first forecast that incorporated the American Rescue Plan) the SPF expected the UR to be about 4.9% in Nov, instead it was 4.2%.
(Note, they don’t forecast labor force participation but likely would be worse than expected.)
But not everything has played out as expected, there have been two big surprises: a decline in labor supply and an increase in labor demand. They've roughly offset each other for employment but both have led to higher nominal wages.
(Technical note: we think of labor supply/demand as functions of *real* wages. I'm showing nominal due to a combo of wage illusion and expectation of transitory inflation. Both assumptions becoming increasingly untenable.)
Willie and I decompose the 1.5 pp decline in LFPR since COVID hit and find it is roughly one-third due to population aging, one-fifth due to ongoing weakness, and nearly half is "other." That "other" is both men and women, working age and retirement age.
At the same time there were 0.6 unemployed per job opening, a very tight labor market by that metric.
Different labor market indicators sending different signals. EPOP is still relatively slack, UR more balanced, & U/V and quits very tight. Which is right? The latter two have a lot of merit and worth taking seriously as Willie & I discussed before piie.com/blogs/realtime…
The net result of this is nominal wages well above trend, something unusual if all you looked at is unemployment. Overall, those gains are being eaten by inflation—except for lower-wage workers who are seeing real gains, albeit at a slower pace than before COVID.
Overall, the economy is 5 million jobs short of where it was expected to be prior to COVID. The gap is closing but fiscal and monetary policy should still be accommodative—as they are very likely to be. FIN.
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I will be enthusiastically supporting faculty legislation to cap the number of A's at Harvard at 20% (plus a bit). The collective action problem that has driven grades higher & higher over time is increasingly problematic. I hope other institutions consider similar steps.
I've talked to numerous colleagues & students about grade inflation. Almost all of them see it as a a problem. I've also heard about as many different ideas for solutions as I've had conversations. I would tweak this proposal in various ways. But would support it over nothing.
One place the current system fails--and it's not the only place--is honors. I'm on the Committee to recommend honors in the economics department. It's increasingly hard to distinguish excellence with so many A's. I believe that now even two A-'s makes you ineligible for Summa.
Depending on how you look at it growth in Q3 was very very strong or very strong or just possibly merely strong. Annual rates:
GDP: 4.3%
Real final sales to domestic purchasers: 2.9%
Average of GDP & GDI: 3.4%
GDI: 2.4%
A big part of the story was consumer spending up at a 3.5% annual rate. Started the year looking weak but new data and revisions have made consumers very strong.
Business fixed investment a bit weaker but also very heterogenous. Equipment investment and IPP up but non-residential structures down for the seventh straight quarter.
Several thoughts on that piece by @nealemahoney & @BharatRamamurti in @nytopinion.
1. They claim price controls are good politically. I'm very open to this being true, I'm under no illusion that what I think is good policy is particularly well correlated with good politics. But I am genuinely interested in more evidence beyond the brief observations they make.
2. They claim that even if you think price controls are a bad idea they can help you pass supply-increasing legislation that is on balance good. Once again, I'm open to this. And in government I've often done 3rd, 7th or 12th best policies because of constraints.