Willie Powell & my blog on today's (confusing) jobs numbers. We put the last year in context. Contrary to widespread belief, job growth has been near expectations--as surprisingly strong labor demand offsets surprisingly weak labor supply. A 🧵 piie.com/blogs/realtime…
To understand what was expected we use the median forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Other forecasts were similar. Overall, has slightly outpaced. Here is avg monthly jobs for 2021:
Nov 2020 forecast: 432K/month
May 2021 forecast: 562K/month
Actual: 555K/month
Similar story for unemployment. Back in May (the first forecast that incorporated the American Rescue Plan) the SPF expected the UR to be about 4.9% in Nov, instead it was 4.2%.
(Note, they don’t forecast labor force participation but likely would be worse than expected.)
But not everything has played out as expected, there have been two big surprises: a decline in labor supply and an increase in labor demand. They've roughly offset each other for employment but both have led to higher nominal wages.
(Technical note: we think of labor supply/demand as functions of *real* wages. I'm showing nominal due to a combo of wage illusion and expectation of transitory inflation. Both assumptions becoming increasingly untenable.)
Willie and I decompose the 1.5 pp decline in LFPR since COVID hit and find it is roughly one-third due to population aging, one-fifth due to ongoing weakness, and nearly half is "other." That "other" is both men and women, working age and retirement age.
At the same time there were 0.6 unemployed per job opening, a very tight labor market by that metric.
Different labor market indicators sending different signals. EPOP is still relatively slack, UR more balanced, & U/V and quits very tight. Which is right? The latter two have a lot of merit and worth taking seriously as Willie & I discussed before piie.com/blogs/realtime…
The net result of this is nominal wages well above trend, something unusual if all you looked at is unemployment. Overall, those gains are being eaten by inflation—except for lower-wage workers who are seeing real gains, albeit at a slower pace than before COVID.
Overall, the economy is 5 million jobs short of where it was expected to be prior to COVID. The gap is closing but fiscal and monetary policy should still be accommodative—as they are very likely to be. FIN.
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Jobs report uniformly weak: 92K jobs lost (with job losses in almost every industry), household survey employment down too, unemployment rate up to 4.4%, participation down, avg weekly hours flat.
Main sign in the other direction was strong wage growth.
The dynamics for private employment look just like overall (86K lost in private with govt basically flat.
Unemployment rate still stable or slightly rising. Breakeven job growth is in the 25-50K range so negative jobs months will be more common and normal going forward. Note 3-month moving average of jobs is 6K so a bit below this range.
More than *all* of the jobs added over the last year have been in private education & health services.
Total jobs: 359K
Private education & health services: 773K
All other sectors: -414K
This might look surprisingly unbalanced. It's actually the opposite.
A 🧵
Here is percentage job growth across sectors over the last year. Dropping the two most extreme they range from 0.8% for leisure & hospitality to -1.5% for information, a 2.2pp difference.
(Note this post generally uses 3 month moving averages to smooth otherwise volatile data.)
This is job growth in 1996. It looks more balanced than 2025 because every industry added jobs. But actually the gap between the second highest (professional services at 5.1%) and second lowest (mining at 0.4%) is 4.7pp. Much more dispersed than this year.
Core CPI inflation rose during the month of January. But it fell and was relatively muted over longer periods of time--although still some concern the numbers a bit lower due to shutdown-related quirks.
On the surface a strong jobs report (130K jobs & unemployment falls to 4.3%).
And just about every detail makes it even stronger: participation up, involuntary part-time down, hours up, wages up.
The mystery of strong GDP and weak jobs is being resolved in the direction of GDP.
The job growth happened despite further cuts in federal jobs. Private employment was up an impressive 172K.
Note, breakeven job growth is currently about 25-50K because of reduced net immigration & also more fully recovered participation. So job growth has slowed but the unemployment rate now seems to have stabilized after slowly and steadily increasing since mid-2023.
I will be enthusiastically supporting faculty legislation to cap the number of A's at Harvard at 20% (plus a bit). The collective action problem that has driven grades higher & higher over time is increasingly problematic. I hope other institutions consider similar steps.
I've talked to numerous colleagues & students about grade inflation. Almost all of them see it as a a problem. I've also heard about as many different ideas for solutions as I've had conversations. I would tweak this proposal in various ways. But would support it over nothing.
One place the current system fails--and it's not the only place--is honors. I'm on the Committee to recommend honors in the economics department. It's increasingly hard to distinguish excellence with so many A's. I believe that now even two A-'s makes you ineligible for Summa.