Thread by @chernayakoshka

A DAY OF INFAMY!

80 years ago today, the japanese bombed pearl harbor. the attack and the war that followed is a well known story, but what logic lead to it?

this thread is about two thinkers, alfred thayer mahan and sir julian corbett, and their views on naval strategy!

“the influence of sea power on history” was written in 1890 by mahan, a US navy officer, and immediately influenced the nature of sea power soon after. almost directly responsible for the naval arms race preceding world war I, it was translated and read by every major power.

“some principles of maritime strategy” was written some 20 years later by corbett, a british lawyer and strategist, and provided a different view on the essence of good naval strategy. although it is fashionable to contrast the two, in many ways their works are complementary!

both had an eager international audience, britain, america, france, germany, japan, keen to assert themselves on the global stage or maintain their hegemony through control of the sea. though it began in the first, it is the second world war that truly tested their theories.

the two parallel the titans of land strategy as well, mahan’s ideas drawing from the works of jomini, corbett mirroring the thoughts of clausewitz. applied to the sea, their own unique views are the basis of all modern naval strategic thinking.

both agreed on this: naval supremacy, control of the sea, is absolutely essential to the power of great nations in times of both war and peace. commanding the sea enabled commerce, protected lines of communication, and amplified the effect of land forces.

the difference? implementation: mahan believed that control of the sea is resolved in a great decisive battle, like trafalgar, manila bay, tsushima. once the enemy fleet had been destroyed in entirety, the navy was free to operate and execute all other components of sea power.

to achieve this, he advocated great capital ships be built, that could stand toe-to-toe with the enemy, trade blows, and dominate the opponent through superior firepower, armor, and most of all, crew discipline. thus the great 20th century navies were born.

corbett held a more nuanced view: decisive battle is great when possible, but command of the sea is only a local, timed affair. good naval strategy depended on being everywhere for as long as could be managed. power must be constantly exerted, not singularly resolved.

concentration of force was not his most singular strategic imperative, and the focus of naval assets in one location prevented their use in others. for large maritime empires, like britain, this weakened their sea power instead of maximizing it.

further, sea power exists to enable forces on land, that command of the sea is only ever a component of total victory, and cannot itself win the war. man lives upon land, not the sea, and while trafalgar prevented britain’s defeat, it was waterloo that toppled napoleon.

WHO WAS RIGHT?
pearl harbor and the pacific war!

the plan for pearl harbor was quintessentially mahanian: destroy the US pacific fleet and enable the japanese free movement, secure indochina’s resources, and take european bases and colonies. one decisive blow for victory.

RETALIATION: the american plan, although not as explicit, was fundamentally corbettian. interdict japanese supply lines, exert naval power locally to island-hop ever closer to japan herself, and enable land forces to regain lost possessions and enemy bases.

outcome: corbett’s strategies win the day. even with the large naval engagements, such as guadalcanal, midway, and leyte gulf, no battle was singularly decisive. it was the constant exertion of power across the whole pacific that lead to american victory.

guerre-de-course of american submarines on japanese shipping, naval bombardment behind the army and marines as they landed, and ultimately, strategic bombing campaigns from captured airfields, culminating in the atomic destruction of hiroshima and nagasaki, won the war.

it is not as simple as one verses the other! the pacific once again grows hot, and new powers seek to exert themselves on the global stage. success depends on careful analysis and robust strategy; these principles are found in both mahan and corbett. ignore either at your peril!