Thread by @EveKeneinan

A lot of things need justification.

As an irrational feeling, empathy tells us almost nothing. Ethics is about action, about what should be done, should not be done, or is permissible to do or not do. There are no ethical systems that appeal to empathy *as* a justification.

https://twitter.com/hannahstuecker/status/1468475925725646850

There is no action A that would be made right by or justified by “I feel/felt empathy.” At best, empathy could be a partial motive for a right action — but even then the rightness of the action would not be a question in which empathy figures.

Empathy can easily (and commonly does) lead to wrong actions. Empathy can be evoked by storytelling, for example, and one can tell a story that paints someone not or little deserving of empathy as deserving of it.

It is easy enough to feel empathy for the grief of the mother of a murderer, for example. Or even the murderer himself, if his suffering is dwelt upon, rather than his evildoing.

This is not hypothetical. Empathizing with someone can become a substitute for clear reasoning. One starts to believe, on scant evidence, that the object of one’s empathy *must* be innocent, since otherwise one would be making a mistake in one’s feelings … and one does feel …

When this kind of idolatrous worship of empathy is combined with postmodern insistence that there is no objective truth, but only rival “narratives”, this becomes a formula for “Empathy tells me which narrative to believe.”

The problem with this should be evident.

“J is accused of a heinous crime. Some tell a narrative in which J is a moral monster that did the heinous crime. Some tell a narrative in which J is an innocent falsely accused. I have empathy for J, especially insofar as J is a suffering innocent; THEREFORE J IS INNOCENT."

There is a kind of empathy-fetishism in this area, stemming from the phenomenon of *sentimentality*. In sentimentalism, one enjoys feeling certain feels, superficially “about” certain things, but the object is actually more or less irrelevant to the feels. They are the point:

We see this all-too-commonly among the advocates and activists for “social justice.” Many of them couldn’t give two shits about justice, but care very, very deeply that their (performances of) empathy *shows* them to be good, righteous people.

“I have (performatively) more empathy than *them* — therefore, I am a better person than (the deplorable) *them*.”

This syllogism makes them pant and their souls sweat.

Needless to say, performative empathy-fetishism of this sort requires validation — but this can be, and usually is, circular.

That is, it takes the form, “If you validate what a good person I am for my performative empathy, I will likewise validate your performative empathy.”

Or it can be parasitic, since the empathy-fetishist latches onto things that can and does engender feeling of empathy in normal persons — and the empathy-fetishist is validated by his excessive performative empathy here.

Even though sentimental-empathy is a false feeling.

One clear sign that one is dealing with an empathy-fetishist is the way they make very sure to announce to you just how much empathy they have, and their efforts to make sure you understand that this makes them a very good and righteous person.

“The more empathy a person has, the better of a person they are, and me? I have *so much* empathy, certainly much more than you, and, well, I needn't draw the conclusion out loud — due to my great modesty of course ...”

“I have *so much* empathy!”
“Really? I do too!”
“You must be *such* a good person, then!”
“Yes, I am. You must also be *such* a good person!”
“Yes, I, too, am a wonderful person!”

It is wise to take it with a grain of salt when a person waxes eloquent about their own virtue.

Likewise, it is wise to take it with a grain of salt when a person praises himself for his great empathy, which (he will add) is probably a virtue, if not the root of all virtue.