For the first time, we use a large-scale controlled study of O&G #methane emissions to answer a basic question: How effective are commonly used Leak Detection & Repair (LDAR) programs?
EPA has proposed regulations to reduce #methane emissions from O&G sector. If global energy sector methane were a country, it would be the third largest emitter behind only China & US.
LDAR program are where O&G operators survey their facilities with IR cameras to find and fix leaks (see NYT article for videos).
But, we didn't really know if these LDAR programs are effective in reducing #methane, beyond anecdotal evidence. Until now! 3/ nytimes.com/interactive/20…
Why? Because it's hard. Need to meet 5 conditions:
1. Control group where leaks are not repaired 2. Treatment group where leaks are repaired 3. Measure all emissions incl. vents, not just leaks 4. Repeat measurements 5. Avoid selection bias (select only low emitting sites) 4/
But that's what we did.
We randomly selected ~180 O&G sites in Alberta.
We split them into 4 groups - 1 control (C) & 3 treatment (T1-3) - with ~45 sites each.
Control - operators not informed about leaks.
Treatment - operators asked to fix leaks.
Survey schedule below. 5/
To track emissions over time & across surveys, we put physical tags on leaks. When operators fix leaks, they note a 'date of repair' on tag (that's how we know leaks were fixed).
No tags were left on leaks at control sites.
Based on these tags, we have 4 treatment effects. 6/
We find repairs are highly effective. Look at comparison between tagged leaks that were not repaired vs. tagged leaks that were repaired.
Gray: initial survey
Pink: follow-up survey
1) After repairs, emissions ~0. 2) Even if not repaired, emissions do not grow with time. 7/
At treatment sites that were repaired consistently, average number of leaks reduced by 50% (5 to 2.5).
At control, little change (2.2 to 2.0) - slight decrease possibly from voluntary maintenance.
At treatment sites where repairs were *not* done, leaks went up (1.3 to 1.6). 8/
What does this mean?
First, high survey frequency + repairs ➡️fewer leaks.
Second, voluntary inspection many reduce emissions, but reductions much smaller compared to LDAR programs➡️importance of regs.
Third, consistent repairs after surveys key to reducing emissions. 9/
Not all operators are created equal. You can see ~2 orders of magnitude difference in average site emissions across 18 operators. We can speculate why:
1) Different asset portfolio (more oil production, more emissions) 2) Different maintenance practices 3) Super-emitters 10/
Not all sites are created equal.
Oil sites emit, on average, 2x that of gas sites.
Sites with multiple wells emit, on average, 2x that of sites with single wells. 11/
Venting is a much bigger problem than leaks. Part of the reason is the way we classify many emissions as vents even though they can be fixed (e.g., open thief hatch on a tank).
This is why LDAR surveys can help find anomalous vents even if they are only targeted at leaks. 12/
Last thing: Tanks and pneumatics are the biggest sources of emissions. Look at distributions of tank and non-tank emissions and how they changed over the course of the year!
In 2019,
Avg. tank emission = 105 kg/d
Avg. non-tank emission = 14 kg/d, order of magnitude smaller. 13/
There's a LOT more in the paper! I was a @Stanford post-doc when this start, now I'm faculty at @UT_PGE! And big congrats to @Lyra_Wang, who led the analysis!
These are preliminary results. We are releasing all data so others can conduct more analyzes! /End
Let's get into one of the most far reaching pieces of regulatory action from @EPA. 3 areas stand out:
1) Comprehensive - every possible #methane source is covered, no loopholes 2) Embraces tech innovation even under uncertainty 3) Acknowledges & corrects for EPA blind spots
🧵
All O&G #methane sources are covered, including low producing sites & often owned by small, independent companies. Research has show these type of sites can be a significant source of emission, and until recently, was exempted from all regs.
Changing definitions: This may be in the weeds but a huge shift in accounting for #methane. Policy stringency now depends on physical number of equipment on facilities and not arbitrary baseline emissions.
This significantly improves policy effectiveness & compliance monitoring.
With the US Senate passing the historic #InflationReductionAct, I want to tell a story at the intersection of fossil-fuel infrastructure and climate goals.
It's a story that touches on emissions, globalization, supply chains, energy security, costs, and the labor market.🧵
This story involves the natural gas transmission network & and compressors that move the gas. Here's why it's important:
The Tennessee Gas Pipeline (blue) supplies >80% of gas to North East & New England & represents one of the most critical energy infrastructure for the US.
To maintain pressure & move gas, you need compressor stations every 60 - 70 miles. You can also use these pipelines as storage by adjusting pressure (higher pressure = more volume) - this is called line packing. A typical station can have 1 - 8 compressor units.
- $850M to EPA for methane monitoring/mitigation
- Fee at $900/t in 2024 going up to $1500/t in 2026.
- EPA methane regs compliant facilities exempt if equivalence can be demonstrated
- EPA required to update inventory estimates in 2 years
Near-term (<~2035)
LNG expansion aligned with Paris goals since there is more coal than LNG
Long-term (>2040)
a) Not compatible with 1.5/2°C goals: less coal globally to substitute with LNG
b) Compatible with business-as-usual 3°C trajectory as world still has lot of coal 2/
Caveats: Much of the LNG infrastructure is yet to be built. 1) Large-scale CCS can significantly extend utility of LNG infrastructure. 2) Low supply chain #methane leakage (<1%) critical to maximize benefits of LNG.3/
First, why is #methane fee a great idea? Recent data show that #methane emissions from operators vary by many orders of magnitude. So it makes sense that under a fee, responsible operators will be rewarded and those with high emissions will be penalized.
Good summary of what went wrong with the TX grid. I am going to try to explain what happened on the natural gas supply chain.
TL;DR: Combination of extended cold, unique basin properties, old pipes, and gas/electricity dependence. Thread. 1/ bloomberg.com/news/features/…
First, here's the natural gas supply chain. The parts that failed were in 3 areas:
1) oil & gas wells 2) Gathering lines 3) Equipment malfunction at power plants 4) Outage cut power to compressor stations that moved gas
+Other long-term issues like limited storage in TX. 2/
1) Why did O&G wells fail?
Permian basin is a liquids-rich basin. In addition to gas, wells also produce oil & water. For e.g., for every barrel of oil produced, you bring up 2-3 barrels of water.
In extended cold, water freezes and blocks the flow of gas from the well.