Trent Telenko Profile picture
Dec 10, 2021 26 tweets 14 min read Read on X
The subject of this thread is the IJNAS C3I system behind the destruction of Force Z.

(I'll be using clips from Angus Konstam's book to illustrate this thread)
ospreypublishing.com/store/military…
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The anniversary of the sinking of Force Z is on the minds of many #twitterhistorians

For example, @ArmouredCarrier has three really nice videos on YouTube about the sinking of HMS Repulse
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youtube.com/results?search…
Konstam's book is wonderful for most of the journalistic "Who, What, Where, When, How, & Why" on Dec 10, 1941, but it leaves out how the command control, communications & intelligence worked for the IJNAS Rikko Kokutai and why it came into existence in time to destroy Force Z.
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This is _NOT_ a knock of Konstam's book. Osprey books are extremely focused in format & there isn't space for more.

The glossing over of the IJNAS C3I has a price, missing that PoW & Repulse were as much the victims of Adm Isoroku Yamamoto as the USN battleline at Pearl
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Harbor.

In WW2, the Imperial Japanese were a fell high technology power punching in terms of naval & air power with the USA & UK until combat attrition exhausted the Japanese of the skilled air crew in 1943 without adequate replacements.
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The Yamato class battleships, the Zero fighter, Betty torpedo bomber and Type 93 "Long Lance" torpedoes were all examples of cutting edge Japanese military innovation before Pearl Harbor.

The man who guided IJNAS technological development as Japan transitioned from a
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challenging military power - that is a military which copied to keep up - to an innovating military power that built it's military technology to fit its own warfighting concepts and doctrines was Adm Isaroku Yamamoto.

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The time of Yamamoto's planning that led to the execution of Repulse & the Prince of Wales dates from the 1929 - 1934 period when he was chief of the Technological Division of the Naval Air Corps and participated in the London Naval Treaty delegation.
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pacificwrecks.com/people/veteran…
In that period Yamamoto had a role in getting night flight pay instituted for naval flyers in 1932 plus both adopted and deployed a Japanese Empire wide radio direction finding navigation system with grid square maps. The Grid Square map
(Western Approaches grid in photo)
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was so fleet scout planes operating near Japanese possessions or land based direction finding array could quickly give quick coded reports as to where enemy fleets and commerce raiders were, especially at night with aerial scout radio direction finding gear.

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USN wartime intelligence stated that the "Model 2 Aircraft (Hi) Mk 1 Direction Finder" found on the G3M Nell & G4M Betty bombers was a copy of a Telefunken RDF system (closest match at link).

No mention was made of the associated M/F homing beacons.

cryptomuseum.com/df/telefunken/…
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This "Yamamoto C3I system" of grid maps & medium freq. (M/F) beacons were in wide spread service in 1937 and perhaps being tested as early as 1932.

They were the target marking sword of the IJNAS Rikko Kokutai compared to the Dowding System's shield for Fighter Command.
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The failure of Western intelligence, & particularly by UK Royal Navy to catch this Yamamoto System during IJNAS air operations over China 1937-1941 lead to the loss of Force Z.

Radio Beacon ops were central to Rikko Kokutai radio procedures (Chart 79) bombing of Chongqing
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The USN also shares blame here, but to a lessor extend than the RN by reason of American civil aviation politics & tech

1930's era US civil aviation did not use light house style non-directional beacons Europe & Japan did. Radio range beacons created beams that airlines flew
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...like aviation railroads.

There was simply no such excuse for British Naval Intelligence in 1941, given that Luftwaffe used non-directional beacons that were jammed by the RAF in 1940 during the Battle of the Beams.
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Returning to this Yamamoto radio beacon/grid map system, it allowed for multi-airfield, time on target, air strikes with massed torpedo bombers.

Especially at night, when the medium frequency/AM radio band had a much longer range.
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For Force Z, it was the Yamamoto C3I System's ability to rapidly mass widely dispersed Rikko Kokutai to arrive at the same grid coordinates over the ocean _simultaneously_ that doomed it.
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Too many well coordinated Japanese torpedoes and bombs from too many directions at once overloaded PoW & Repulse's anti-aircraft defenses and made jinxing to avoid them futile.
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The Yamamoto C3I system was pulled apart and analyzed by US are very well documented in the following:

SRH-289 THE EMPLOYMENT OF MOBILE RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT BY COMMANDS AFLOAT DURING WWII

SRH-309 PACIFIC OCEAN MOBILE RADIO INTELLIGENCE UNIT REPORTS 1945 Parts 1, 2 & 3
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All told, these Ultra histories recorded 854 times that USN mobile "Radio Intelligence Units" (RIU) AKA the 'On The Roof Gang' intercepted the IJNAS aerial scouts calling out grid locations in their scouting of the USN carrier battle groups 1943-1945. 20/
The USN captured the master grid reference map for the entire Japanese Empire when IJN Fleet headquarters in the Marianas was overrun.

The first operations where RIU's made use of this captured IJN geographic grid map started in Dec 1944 when Adm Halsey took TF 38 from
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Ulithi into the Great South China Sea raid in early January 1945.

When you read the War Diaries of that raid. You find that Halsey was using the cover of a typhoon to move through the South China Sea to avoid IJNAS aerial scouts.
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British Naval Intelligence was fully appraised of the grid maps used by the Yamamoto C3I System in 1945 when RN signals officers from the British Pacific Fleet were posted with RIU Task Force 58.

The names of those RN officers were deleted from Ultra histories clipped below.
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As far as I've been able to determine. There has been no reference to this IJNAS radio beacon/grid map system outside USN Ultra histories.

/End
P.S.

How the Yamamoto C3I System effected the Guadalcanal Campaign -- it's where the slides for this tweet thread came from -- was premiered on @ww2tv YouTube channel

The Horseshoe Nail of Victory of the Guadalcanal Air Campaign
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More from @TrentTelenko

May 29
Oh My!

The electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) of these jammer mountings has got to suck.

How many "nulls" this jammer throws (AKA where no jamming energy transmits) will be substantial.

1/
I did a thread on this in 2024 when the first turtle tank jammers appeared.

2/
The basics of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) studies of antenna mounting have been around since 1944.

3/
Read 5 tweets
May 29
This is a development I have been expecting, once the AI truck hunting drones started hitting the main roads in occupied Ukraine.

Mining roads by air & rocket was late Cold War NATO doctrine after all.

1/
Deploying lots of anti-tank and anti-personnel land mines with Gator cluster munitions dispensers was one of the major themes of the 1980's Follow On Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine.

The doctrine was highly effective, hence Ukraine using it in 2026.

2/
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The major issue with Gator is it ran a fowl the never sufficiently cursed out Ottawa Treaty banning AP land mines.

Despite the USA never having signing the treaty.

It generates international NGO lawfare accusations of "War Crimes" every time the USA uses the munition.

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Read 5 tweets
May 29
Regarding this:

>>The intensification of strikes against Russian 🇷🇺 logistics (150 vehicles, 30 trains, 400 warehouses) is a real game-changer in the war.

The 30 trains represent far more logistical tonnage than the trucks.

1/
Carrying capability 🧵
A Russian train with 30 box cars/wagons carries 1,800 to 2040 metric tons of cargo.

Per @grok Truck Equivalents for ~2,040 tons of cargo:

3-axle Kamaz tactical truck only (at ~13 t each): ~157 trucks (2,040 ÷ 13 ≈ 157). Range: 136–204 trucks depending on 10–15 t

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4-axle Kamaz tactical truck only (at ~20 t each): ~102 trucks (2,040 ÷ 20 = 102). Range: ~82–127 trucks for 16–25 t

Mixed fleet (e.g., half 3-axle at 13 t, half 4-axle at 20 t): Roughly 120–140 trucks total

3/ Image
Read 7 tweets
May 28
I called out the Chinese invasion requirements for Taiwan in May 2023 complete with a prediction they would have to be building satellite detectable 1944 invasion of Normandy Mulberry style infrastructure.

Chinese JLOTS req'ts link⬇️
x.com/TrentTelenko/s…

1/ x.com/johnkonrad/sta…
And this is the link to my prediction of what later became their "Corvis Mulberry" shore connectors.

The prototypes for which were under construction when I made my May 2023 prediction.

2/
In that thread I connected classic "irrational regime" Chinese 'Wolf Warrior diplomacy' as a behavior indicator of how they would view the world wide maritime trade and financial collapse invading Taiwan would cause as advantageous to China.

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Read 10 tweets
May 26
Ummm...no. @grok said 10K Truck Movements, not trucks.

A truck making two movements a day within 150 km of the Russian border for 30 days is 60 truck movements out of the 10K, or 0.6%.

@grok's estimate was based on mirror imaging Western Mechanized logistics.
Truck Intel🧵
1/
I did two further @grok analytical passes which reduced the truck movements, first to 3K to 8K truck movements:

"Revised estimate: Likely 3,000–8,000+ effective military/logistics truck movements per month on key southern routes (e.g., M-14 segments, Mariupol–Taganrog/T-0509, Berdiansk/Melitopol spurs), potentially higher in gross passages but far lower in productive throughput than Western equivalents due to systemic non-mechanized constraints."

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And then down to 2.5K to 7K truck movements, See:

"Likely 2,500–7,000 effective military/logistics truck movements per month on key southern routes (M-14 segments, Mariupol–Taganrog/T-0509, Berdiansk/Melitopol spurs), with gross passages potentially higher to offset massive inefficiencies—but productive throughput remains severely constrained by non-mechanized realities, supplements like rail/barge, and systemic intelligence blind spots."

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Read 10 tweets
May 25
This⬇️

>>In total, I have more than 100 mapped hits on russian logistical means.

...means a lot in terms of truck attrition.

100 killed out of a truck fleet of projected 2,500 on this route is 4% of the total.
1/
Ukrainian military intelligence estimated Kamaz made 15,000 trucks from Feb 2022 to early 2026.

Call that period 49 months, and that's a Truck production rate of 300 a month.

100 trucks killed in a couple of months is "normal wastage."


2/
A hundred Russian trucks, with a high proportions of fuel tankers and wreckers concentrated on one or two supply roads or a single road junction in a couple of weeks is a horse of a different color.

That is anti-access area denial (A2AD) on a stick.

3/
Read 5 tweets

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