Thread by @davetroy

Observation:

We are spending a massive amount of time on stuff that’s already happened—Jan6, Epstein, Maxwell, Assange.

We may want to deliberately allocate additional focus to what’s happening now.

Yes, sorting out the past is important to block bad actors…

But it has also been my experience that we are terrible at blocking operations occurring in real time. And tactics and threat vectors shift.

This requires a much, much deeper mapping of current threat networks, better counter-intelligence, and understanding of “why.”

Everything happening now can be tracked back to 1) oil/gas industry trying to survive, 2) gold/crypto trying to overthrow fiat in order for oil/gas to survive, 3) geopolitical realignment around oil/gas.

So climate is the central issue.

With this in mind, what are the operations happening NOW that we will be shocked over later, and trying to sort out in 2025—assuming we don’t disrupt them?

And let’s try to disrupt them! Obviously the shenanigans around crypto manipulation is one area of concern.

Capturing the Supreme Court, gerrymandering, killing off voting rights, are other areas of concern. But we need to get out ahead of this stuff, because the attacks occurring right now are damaging and in some cases irreversible.

And obviously rule of law and punishing past bad actors (to the extent we can) are important for all kinds of reasons. But we also need to recognize that sorting the past is a necessary but insufficient condition for addressing the present and the future.

And we are likely not doing enough to address active, current threats. 1) because we don’t understand them very well, 2) because media has not reified them into coherent narratives yet, 3) we are simply accustomed to dealing with problems retrospectively.

We can’t afford to wait around for today’s operations to run to completion, and then wring our hands, and sort out what happened—as is our custom. We must now, in real time, identify what’s happening and disrupt it with prejudice. See my pinned tweet for my efforts in this area.

But we must all be developing this threat detection and disruption capability, and we need to pursue that within the limits of the law. That means lots of sunlight, applied in real time. Looking at actors from past operations and seeing what they’re doing now can be helpful.

But we also have to find new operators and assess their networks, intentions, and activity, placed in full historical context. That’s an arduous ongoing task but one from which we cannot shrink.

We don’t want to be looking back in 5 years saying “if only we’d known.”

Anyway, just a heads up that as horrible as all our recent history has been, it’s not over; the same operations are ongoing and evolving with new threat models, new actors, and new, innovative attacks. We need to keep our eyes on the road ahead even as we fully sort the past.