To understand international politics, you need to "think about thinking."
That was a core lesson from the great Bob Jervis.
[THREAD]
I'm referring to a key insight from his 1976 classic, "Perception and Misperception in International Politics" (BTW: his 2017 New Edition is absolutely worth the purchase, just for the author's Preface alone) amazon.com/Perception-Mis…
This book is important because of how it explicitly speaks to (at least) four other books that were prominent at the time.
The first book is Kenneth Waltz's 1956 book, "Man, The State, and War" (which itself has gone through multiple editions). amazon.com/Man-State-War-…
As I discussed in another thread, a key lesson of Waltz's book is to introduce three "levels" of analysis: the individual, the state, and the international system.
Critically, in that book and his later work (notably Theory of International Politics, which would be published 3 years after Jervis' book), Waltz de-emphasized the first image (the individual) and made the case for focusing on the third image (the system) amazon.com/Theory-Interna…
In "Perception and Misperception", Jervis does not question the validity of studying international politics using the "system" level. But that level is not useful for understanding foreign policies of individual states (and Waltz would agree)
Here is footnote 7 of ch 1
Instead, Jervis wants to explore the decision-maker because, at the end of the day, going to war requires someone to make a choice to authorize the use of force (that "choice" is the "proximate cause").
What does it mean to focus on the individual and their choices?
This takes us to the second book addressed by Jervis: Hans Morgenthau's "Politics Among Nations" amazon.com/Politics-Among…
Morgenthau also focused on the individual, but used human nature to explain why war occurs: people have arms because they deem it necessary to fight.
Jervis didn't want to make a "human nature" argument...and didn't think it was necessary: international politics was about "tragedy" not "evil" (from page 66 of "Perception and Misperception")
Jervis thought a useful way to make this point was to delve into a key debate at the time (this was written during the Cold War): arms racing and deterrence.
Schelling's work argued that the key means by which the USA and USSR could avoid all out nuclear war was to deter one another: to keep the peace, prepare for war.
This is the heart of what Jervis calls "the deterrence model" (page 58 of the book)
Stated more formally (in language used by both Schelling and Jervis), the actors think they are in a game of chicken.
Since neither side wants to appear weak, both sides arm. The result is an arms race...but no direct war.
This brings us to the fourth key book: Lewis Richardson's 1960 book "Arms and Insecurity" amazon.com/Arms-Insecurit…
Richardson says that arms racing in the way described above (by the deterrence model) is what "people would do if they did not stop to think"
Jervis latches onto this idea!
Jervis introduces an opposing view to the deterrence model: "the spiral model" (page 64)
Rather than being stabilizing (as predicted by deterrence theorists), acquiring arms and preparing for war, because it can be perceived as menacing, can actually provoke war (page 64)
This is why the "security dilemma" is a common feature of international politics
Stated formally, international politics is more like the Prisoner's Dilemma, not Chicken
But why do states end up in this situation? Why can't they know that the arms are intended to deter, that nobody wants war?
Because you misperceive your perception!
You know that you only want peace and you think that others know that you only want peace. So your arms aren't a threat. But if you see others arm, then it must be that the other doesn't care that you want peace and they, instead, want war. They are planning on being aggressive.
To emphasize, the key to the spiral model is that there is an inherent difference between how actors perceive their own actions and the same actions by others.
Why? Because of a defining feature of international politics: anarchy (and the fear it generates)
In other words, looking into the psychological factors that drive arms racing and conflict is not SEPARATE from studying the system (anarchy), but helps to explain exactly HOW the system can lead to war (why it produces fear rather than, say, apathy).
The levels work together!
To be clear, Jervis doesn't say that the spiral model explains all conflict. He acknowledges that the deterrence model is sometimes more useful.
Indeed, he holds that you need both models to explain the world wars
But for Jervis, the key is to determine why leaders PERCEIVE themselves in a spiral world or a deterrence world -- and whether than perception is correct!
In sum, Jervis taught us the importance of thinking about how leaders think. Because anarchy is a constant, we need to look at differences (and changes) in how leaders perceive the consequence of living in anarchy.
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Which of these two men is most responsible for World War II?
Short answer: not Churchill
Long answer: [THREAD]
To be clear, in this thread I am dealing with the onset of the war in Europe. The War in Asia was just as important and obviously connected to Europe. But that is for another thread. For now, I do highly recommend Paine's book "The Wars for Asia"
Solving the "Europe Problem" has vexed US foreign policy since the beginning.
[THREAD]
As I wrote last week, a key trait of US "grand strategy" since the founding of the Republic was "Go West" either by expanding US territory west or seeking to maintain trade with China.
Since the founding of the republic, US foreign policy has been about one thing:
Go west (and don't let Europe get in the way).
[THREAD]
I'll write more about "don't let Europe get in the way" in another 🧵. This one will focus on the "Go west" part (which will also touch on the Europe part).
One could go so far as to argue that the Republic itself was founded because of a desire to go west. Specifically, the colonials were forbidden to go west of the 1763 Proclamation line.
When you hear "Liberal International Order", just think "the G-7, for better and for worse"
[THREAD]
While some scholars and policy makers like to speak of the "Liberal International Order" as the collection of post-World War II international institutions.... cambridge.org/core/journals/…
...the phrase itself is much more recent in origins, largely a product of the mid-1990s.
As I wrote in my latest for @WPReview, shifting patterns in population growth will inevitably influence international politics. worldpoliticsreview.com/global-demogra…
This isn't a new idea. It's one found in classic works on change in world politics.