@VirginOrbit#SPAC filings reveal the most insane market assessment ever. IDK who these 'Prophesy' guys are, but in 2019 the total launch market was 8B$ in value. The launch market for satellites <500kg (up to 'Mini') was <1B$/year in the past 5 years. 1/ sec.gov/Archives/edgar…
I don't know if anybody will be held accountable for such a blatant overestimate of the small satellite launch market value, but luring investors in believing this business is 8B$/year is incredibly dishonest IMHO, particularly in light of the usual mantra of 'reduced costs'. 2/
If that market value was correct, the average price of launching 42t of mini satellites (<500kg) in 2019 would have been close to 200k$/kg. A preposterous value: we know that small launch is expensive, but not THAT expensive! 3/
If the management of @VirginOrbit really believes it is operating in a small launch market segment worth 8B$ in 2019 I think we should really worry for the company. If management knows this value is #bullshit then we can wonder why it is found in the SEC filings for the SPAC. 4/
Of course if 1B$ can be "approximated" to 8B$ all this is fine. Similarly if by "small satellite" @VirginOrbit management consider any satellite under 15 tons, the statement is also correct. But let us recall that @VirginOrbit can only launch satellites (way) below 500kg. 5/
In view of this I think that $NGCA Shareholders should think twice before approving the merger, and at least raise a few concerns on management ability to estimate the current market, and/or to proof read an important document. 6/
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
With @NedhirSahli we are regularly updating our launch events database, and today we had a closer look at the Falcon 9 Transporter missions. Let's share our findings in a little thread. #spacex #falcon9 #transporter
1/
When the Transporter missions were first proposed by SpaceX I was intrigued by the pricing system, and I was wondering whether the missions were able to yield a profit at all. My original 2021 post is here. 2/
Now that there have been 12 Transporter missions already, what are the stats?
First we note that the total mass deployed is not really improving, and, with the exception of T-1, is usually well below 3 tons/launch. A very small load for Falcon 9. Is it a demand problem? 3/
“Northrop was uncertain that the commercial market existed beyond guaranteed contracts to house NASA astronauts, and this is likely what led to its decision to drop a bid.”
I share this view. 1/
Moreover I believe that all these NASA “newspace” type of procurement contracts (COTS/CRS, CLD, CLPS…) will be a major disappointment for suppliers in the long run. 2/
Rather than creating a healthy new business environment for space system suppliers, they will hardly create a profitable market and will eventually drive vendors under water. 3/
Interested in some @RocketLab #Electron launch data?
I've been compiling the last 3,5 available years of data from the 10-Q and 10-K reports, and have found a few intersting facts.
TL/DR:
- average unit price >6,1M$
- average mass launched: <90kg
- average price/kg: <70k$
1/
First, the general trend for Electron price is increasing.
See here the average unit price per launch per year.
Note that 2023, includes HASTE, a suborbital launch. 2/
The trend for price/kg seems to stabilise, at the very high value of >70k$/kg. Even considering the notion that Electron offers a bespoke service of high value, the cost/kg for customers is very high. Must be hard to close a business case with this (Note: 2023 excludes HASTE). 3/
I have this bad habit of looking into financial statements of space companies. Today I found it interesting to compare side by side the financial statements of @RocketLab USA and its NZ subsidiary.
1/
The NZ subsidiary of RL provides exclusive services and products to its USA parent. While goods are sold 'at cost', for services the NZ sub applies a 'margin to cost of 5 to 10%'. 2/
As a result, the NZ subsidiary cannot lose money, since all it does is work for RL USA with a guaranteed coverage of costs. At the end of 2022 it even made a profit before tax worth 77 MNZD (50M$), and 24 MNZD in 2021. 3/
Let's do some simple math to compare broadband satellute systems then. The main metrics will be capacity/kg in orbit. I will also consider the useful satellite life expectancy to be complete. 1/
Assumptions on Starlink useful capacity are many. There seems to be consensus between 15 and 20 Gbps/satellite (V1). This would equate to up to 0,08 Gbps/kg/year (assuming 250kg) and 0,4 Gbps/kg over 5 years of usage. 2/
Now lets' compare to recent broadband satellites launched in GEO. Eutelsat Konnect VHTS claims 500Gbps for 6,4 tons. That's 0,078 Gpbs/kg, like Starlink, or 1,17 Gbps/kg over 15 years of usage. 3/ thalesgroup.com/en/worldwide/s…
So we have a new space SPAC breeding. Last year I worked with a master student on a toolbox to analyse the SPAC thesis. Let's see how Intuitive Machines performs on our indicators. 👉This is NOT investment advice. 1/
First the source: the analyst day presentation is here: intuitivemachines.com/_files/ugd/7c2…
There is one first red flag. The complete financial statements for 2021 and 2020 are not included in it. They should.
2/
Instead we are treated with the value of sales 2018-2021, that shows an impressive ramp-up. Nice, but how much loss was accumulated in the period? And since 2013? Would be nice to know. 3/