1/9
An influential Beijing think tank says in a recent article that the PBoC will have to cut interest rates in order for China to achieve GDP growth of at least 5% next year.
scmp.com/economy/econom… via @scmpnews
2/9
Authorities need to boost domestic demand, the authors say, including consumption and investment, to counter the property slump and any slowdown in exports, or else GDP growth will remain low.
3/9
If China’s problem were that Chinese businesses are eager to expand production facilities to meet surging demand, but are unable to do so because borrowing costs are too high, this would make sense, and the resulting growth would be sustainable.
4/9
Given Beijing’s eagerness in recent years to boost private sector investment, however, I’d be really surprised if that were the case, and anyway analysts like those at @ChinaBeigeBook seem to have trouble finding these investment-hungry businesses.
5/9
So how will lower rates work? According to the article they enhance asset valuations in the private sector and can significantly lower debt burdens, thus freeing up household and business income for additional spending.
6/9
That’s true, but it’s important to understand how that affects the economy. Instead of boosting productive investment, lowering interest rates in this case is simply a way of allowing rising debt to boost demand. It encourages debt both directly, and indirectly by eroding...
7/9
bank margins, which effectively increases the contingent liabilities of the banking system. The resulting growth is no different, in other words, from the “inflated” growth that comes from borrowing to fund non-productive property and infrastructure investment.
8/9
We are still stuck with the three options Beijing faces that I have been writing about for several years: because China cannot rely on an ever-expanding trade surplus, Beijing must ultimately choose between rebalancing income, more debt, or lower growth.
9/9
China has been unable yet to rebalance income, so if it does not want much lower growth, it must choose more debt. This means that if it reins in debt in the property sector, it must expand debt somewhere else. That's probably what will happen.
carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancial…

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More from @michaelxpettis

15 Dec
1/10
According to “Japan’s Policy Trap (2002): “The first wave of bankruptcies appeared among firms that speculated in land and stock, beginning with the sensational collapse in September 1990 of Itoman, a trading company turned property developer." Image
2/10
"The Itoman saga," it continues, "unrolled like a third-rate potboiler, with revelations of massive fraud, gangster connections, prison sentences, and a suicide, making it easy to dismiss as a one-off event. But such complacency did not last long."
3/10
"Within a few months," the passage concludes, "a string of other developers and speculators were either bankrupt or the subject of massive rescue operations.”
Read 10 tweets
15 Dec
1/4
JPMorgan has raised its GDP growth forecast for next year from 4.7% to 4.9%. I think that is way too low. I expect that they will ease up on the property sector and accelerate infrastructure spending so as to get something much closer to 5.5%.
reuters.com/world/china/jp…
2/4
A 5.5% GFP growth rate will probably also cause China's debt-to-GDP ratio to rise by at least 4-6 percentage points. As I see it, for a GDP growth projection to be meaningful for China, it should also be accompanied by a leverage growth projection.
3/4
This is because as long as it has debt capacity and is willing to use it, Beijing can pretty much achieve whatever growth target it decides is politically necessary, so the quality of growth is a function of both GDP growth and leverage growth.
Read 4 tweets
15 Dec
1/7
November turned out to be a bad month for rebalancing. Retail sales – a proxy for consumption – were up by 0.22% month on month, for an annualized 2.7%, while industrial output was up 0.37% month on month, for an annualized 4.5%.
scmp.com/economy/econom… via @SCMPNews
2/7
The gap between consumption and GDP widened, in other words. Looking at things more broadly, in the first 11 months of this year industrial output was 10.1% higher than in the same period last year and, more usefully, it was 6.1% higher a year than it was in 2019.
3/7
Retail sales for the first 11 months of this year were 13.7% higher year than in the same period last year and, again more usefully, they were 4.0% higher a year than in 2019.
Read 7 tweets
14 Dec
1/8
Interesting Caixin editorial on Beijing’s policy goals: “For 2022, top leaders have required that policymakers do everything in their power to reach these goals”, i.e. “ensuring stability on six fronts” along with “maintaining security in six areas”.
caixinglobal.com/2021-12-13/edi…
2/8
For those who have trouble keeping up, “ensuring stability on six fronts,” first introduced as a policy objective in 2018, refers to maintaining stability in employment, the financial sector, foreign trade, foreign investment, domestic investment and expectations.
3/8
“Maintaining security in six areas”, first introduced in 2020, refers to maintaining security in jobs, basic living needs, operations of market entities, food and energy security, stable industrial and supply chains and the normal functions of primary-level governments.
Read 8 tweets
12 Dec
1/4
According to Paul Nantulya, from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “China’s policy banks have grown increasingly concerned about borrowers’ ability to repay loans and grown wary about extending finance.”
scmp.com/news/china/dip… via @scmpnews
2/4
I've long argued that the rapid expansion before 2015 of Chinese financing in developing countries had far more to do with its lack of experience than with any superior financing model, as so many claimed even 3-4 years ago.
3/4
This was nothing new. Many other countries with burgeoning trade surpluses had previously done the same thing, with similar levels of confidence and enthusiasm, and soon enough, as losses began to mount, they all retreated, as China inevitably would too.
Read 4 tweets
11 Dec
1/4
Puzzling article. I am not sure why, if Beijing is indeed worried about China's vulnerability to changes in US monetary policy (as it should be), that “China should waste no time in diversifying from US dollar assets”.
scmp.com/economy/china-… via @scmpnews
2/4
Beijing is reportedly concerned that a US rate hike could cause outflows from emerging markets, including China, and could strengthen the value of the US dollar against other currencies, including the RMB. They're right to worry. The Chinese economy is indeed vulnerable.
3/4
But if a US rate hike causes outflows, China's financial markets will be affected whether or not Chinese entities hold dollar assets, and if the dollar rises, dollar assets would in fact be the best thing to hold.
Read 4 tweets

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