Theres a big debate over reforming net metering for residential solar in California happening right now. Its a complex issue, but there are real equity concerns with the current system and – at least in principal – we could find a more effective way to subsidize solar.
A thread:
Its pretty clear the current system has some major problems – its subsidizes higher-income households at the expense of poorer renters and those who cannot afford solar. energyathaas.wordpress.com/2018/03/26/why…
Specifically, the way net metering works is that as a residential solar producer I get to effectively run my meter backwards, getting paid for any generation at my average electricity price (say, at 18 cents per kWh).
This was not an issue a decade ago when solar was a small part of our grid, and the value of solar was similar to all other energy sources. Today, however, solar is close to a quarter of total California generation, and closer to 60% at times during the middle of the day.
This results in frequent near-zero or even negative electricity prices during the day. The value of solar in California – relative to other generation sources – has fallen by around 40% since 2014: thebreakthrough.org/articles/quant…
But with residential solar this solar value deflation does not really affect me, due to net metering. While a utility scale solar plant down the road might get 1 cent per kWh during the middle of the day, any solar I sell back to the grid from my home panels earns me 18 cents.
So where does that 18 cents I'm paid come from? Ultimately, it comes from all other ratepayers. Everyone's electricity bill goes up to support net metering payment, which no longer reflect anywhere close to the actual real-time value of solar to the grid.
This is a problem because utility rates are, fundamentally, quite regressive. Low income households pay a much larger portion of their income for energy, and are disproportionately impacted by higher rates. And most folks receiving subsidies for solar are higher income.
Residential solar is a good thing, and we should incentivize its deployment. But we need better incentives than net metering. Higher upfront subsidies for installing panels – paid for via progressive taxation rather than regressive utility rates – are much better solution.
Households should still be able to sell electricity back to the grid, but they should be paid at the locational marginal price – the actual, real-time cost of electricity – rather than being allowed to net-meter.
Households should also get greater incentives for installing storage, so that they can bank extra solar generation during daytime hours when its worth less, and use it to offset costly evening demand (which, today, is primarily met by burning planet-warming fossil gas).
The way we design rates matters. We need to subsidize low-carbon tech (and, when possible, penalize high-carbon tech). But we need to do it in a way that is just and equitable. The current system that subsidizes richer households with higher rates for poorer ones is clearly not.
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Tornadoes are, unfortunately, one of the extreme events where we have the least ability to attribute specific occurrences (or even long-term trends) to climate change. The absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence, but some caution is warranted: carbonbrief.org/tornadoes-and-…
For example, there is little detectable trend in the number of notable (F1+) tornadoes over the past 70 years.
There has been an increase in the number of tornado clusters, but the link between that and changing climate conditions is unclear: science.org/doi/full/10.11…
Mining is an unavoidable part of a clean energy transition, but impacts can be minimized. All energy alternatives come at a cost: biofuels displace farmland / drive deforestation.
The question should not be "is there an impact", but "is it substantially better than fossil fuels"
"Mining is not a ‘clean’ business and by its very nature, there will always be some alteration to the environment. The real question is this: what are the trade-offs between the damages associated with mining for decarbonization and the damages of not reducing emissions?"
Climate models are complex physics-based simulations run on the worlds fastest supercomputers.
But there is a quick hack to get results similar to climate models that you can calculate in Excel. Its called the transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE). 1/9
TCRE is the amount of warming as a function of cumulative CO2 emissions. It turns out that warming over time is – to a first order approximation – linearly proportional to cumulative CO2 emissions, as this figure (SPM.10) from the recent IPCC AR6 demonstrates: 2/
As the AR6 notes, "Each 1000 GtCO2 of cumulative CO2 emissions is assessed to likely cause a 0.27C to 0.63C increase in global surface temperature with a best estimate of 0.45C."
Essentially, if you add up CO2 over time and multiply it by 0.45C, you get warming. That simple. 3/
This sort of language is deeply problematic. A flatting of emissions does not result global warming stopping.
Rather, if emissions are flat global warming continues at its current rate, resulting in a significant rise in global temperature of around 3C by 2100 vs preindustrial.
The only way to stop the world from warming is to get all emissions to (net) zero. The only way to meaningfully cool the planet back down during the next few centuries is to remove more carbon from the atmosphere than we add to it.
So while its good news that high-end scenarios where global emissions double or triple are much less likely in a world of falling clean energy prices and a global coal industry in structural decline, emissions still need to fall dramatically to avoid significant future warming.
These are subject to a number of assumptions (and uncertainties), of course. Allowing net-negative emissions expands remaining budgets, while more convex (or concave) emissions pathways would change the date at which zero emissions needs to be reached:
Assumptions around non-CO2 GHG emissions and aerosols also matter. The IPCC provides a best estimate (and uncertainties), but more pessimistic or optimistic assumptions for non-CO2 forcings would reduce or expand the remaining carbon budgets accordingly. 3/
This is thankfully not true. As we reported in the recent IPCC 6th Assessment Report, scenarios that limit us to around 1.8C (with a 66% chance of avoiding 2C) require getting to net-zero emissions by around 2070, not 2030 as this tweet and article inaccurately imply.
Climate change is a big enough problem to solve that we really don't need disempowering hyperbole like this. Yes, the window to limit warming to 1.5C is rapidly closing, but at the same time below 2C is increasingly within reach.
For reference, here is the SSP1-2.6 scenario that limits warming to ~1.8C by 2100. If you were to exclude the net-negative portion of emissions you would end up closer to 2C by 2100 (or would have to get to net-zero closer to 2060). Either way its a far cry from 2030!