بیش از یک دهه است که بر بحران هسته ای ایران تمرکز کرده ام. در این سالها انواع اتهامات به من زده شده: از داماد زاهدی گرفته تا کارمند سیا، از لابی ج.ا. و مشاور ظریف گرفته تا هزاردستان و کارمند سوروس. هرگز اهمیتی به این حرفها و هجمه ها نداده و نمی دهم. اصل مواضع فرد است 1/
مهمترین مواضع من و گروه بحران در سالهای اخیر به این شرح بوده است:
- مخالفت با اقدام ترامپ در تضعیف برجام حتی پیش از خروج آمریکا 2/
- مخالفت با فشار حداکثری و یکی از رساترین صداها در مخالفت با تحریم ها و لابی های مربوطه
3/
- تشریح اقدامات ایران در پاسخ به سیاست فشار حداکثری 4/
- توصیه به یافتن راهکار برای مقابله با تأثیرات سوء تحریم ها در میانه پاندمی کرونا 5/
- سرپرستی جامع ترین پروژه پژوهشی تا به امروز در مورد آثار سوءتحریم ها، شامل تبعات اقتصادی و غیر اقتصادی آنها بر جامعه و محیط زیست ایران 6/ rethinkingiran.com/iran-under-san…
- هشدار به ایران و آمریکا در شرط و شروط گذاشتن برای بازگشت به برجام و زمان را به نفع خود پنداشتن، چراکه زمان و فرصتهای گرانبها را هدر خواهند داد و هر دو با تبعات سوء مواجه خواهند شد. 7/ crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
- ایراد جدی به دولت بایدن برای نپذیرفتن مسؤلیت آمریکا در بدعهدی و اقدام برای جبران مافات با توجه به خسارت عظیم مالی و جانی سیاست گمراهانه دولت ترامپ 8/
-در مثل مناقشه نیست، ولی انتخاب واژه "صاحبخانه" در مثالی که استفاده کردم بدسلیقگی بود، چرا که آمریکا را طرف قرارداد می دانم، نه صاحبخانه/کدخدا. اما همانطور که هر وقت آمریکا با آتش بازی کرده هشدار داده ام، وقتی هم ایران رویکرد غیرسازنده ای را دنبال کند، دلیلی بر سکوت نمی بینم.
9/
- اصولا خاکستری دیدن دشوار است. مفاهیم سیاه و سفید/ شر و باطل کار تحلیل را ساده تر می کنند. ولی من به رویکرد میانه خود ادامه خواهم داد چرا که تاثیرگزاری ام نتیجه همین رویکرد است، نه اعتبار و یا خدشه ای که جزر و مد فضای مجازی تولید می کند.
پایان/10
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After the June war, the Islamic Republic took away several lessons.
Unfortunately, they're almost uniformly the wrong ones. 1/
2/ By any objective measure, the 12 day war was a lopsided affair: Iran's defensive capabilities were AWOL, its missiles and drones mostly repelled, and its intelligence failures were massive.
Yet the IRI's narrative is that the conflict was a victory.
3/ This narrative is based on a couple of elements - the ability to maintain command and control despite opening strikes against senior military leadership, U.S./Israeli request for ceasefire, and the fact that the system was, at the end, still standing.
For nearly two weeks, protests sparked by Iran's economic turmoil have spread into the latest wave of nationwide anti-regime unrest.
A system already struggling to contend with unprecedented setbacks in its foreign & regional policy now faces major new challenges from below.🧵
2/ 2024 was annus horribilis for the Islamic Republic and its "Axis of Resistance": Hamas & Hizbollah were severely degraded by Israel's post-7 Oct campaigns, Bashar Al-Assad was toppled in Damascus, the two exchanges with Israel showed limits of offensive/defensive capacity.
3/ 2025 was even worse.
Negotiations with the US were fruitless, sanctions increased, and in June Israel launched a major attack that set back its nuclear/missile programs, and revealed substantial intel vulnerabilities.
Ten years and ten weeks after the adoption of UNSCR 2231, the implementation of snapback completes the paperwork for burying the JCPOA.
It's a milestone confirming, legally and bureaucratically, what has for 3 years been a diplomatic and technical reality. 🧵
2/ @CrisisGroup has been following this file for 20+ years. The 6 resolutions that return at midnight GMT are the revived legacy of the first decade of the nuclear crisis - an era of deepening standoff between Iran and the (somewhat but not always aligned) P5+1 powers.
3/ That was followed by what could be broadly termed the JCPOA decade - U.S./Iran backchannels, an interim deal in 2013, followed by the agreement itself - which is what UNSCR 2231 unanimously endorsed in 2015.
Iran's nuclear program is at the most advanced point its ever been. Breakout time is under a week. Transparency is limited.
Yet we're still debating dismantlement vs rollback/restrictions as though it's not an issue with a pretty conclusive track record.🧵
2/ Successive U.S. administrations have all agreed on one thing: The Islamic Republic having a nuclear weapon is bad for U.S. national security interests.
That premise leads to two possible approaches: Dismantle it, or work to minimize the proliferation risk.
3/ The former has an unblemished record of failure over a period of decades. The possibility of that record changing now is nil.
This week, the Trump administration issued NSPM-2, laying out the economic and diplomatic tools of a renewed "Maximum Pressure" campaign, while POTUS @realDonaldTrump called for a "Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement" with Iran.
🧵 on reading the early tea leaves.
2/ In 2018-20, "Max Pressure" post-U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA put a massive dent in Iran's economy. Iran retaliated with a two-pronged counter-pressure campaign: nuclear escalation and regional provocation. There was little substantive engagement/diplomacy between the two sides.
3/ Under the Biden admin, talks in 2021-22 to revive the JCPOA came to naught. De-escalatory understandings in 2023 collapsed after Hamas's 7 October attack against Israel. U.S. focus turned to avoiding widening of conflict, and defending allies and interests.
When President @realDonaldTrump takes office in January 2025, the #Iran his administration will face will be, relative to four years earlier, weaker on several fronts, and changed on several others. 🧵
2/ Domestically, absence of major protests for ~2 years cannot obscure deep gap between state and society.
Social, cultural, political and economic discontent persist, while government's default remains repression over any meaningful reform to address them.
3/ Regionally, setbacks to Hamas & Hezbollah have weakened parts of IRI "Axis of Resistance", though others continue to pose a threat to Israel/U.S. interests. Meanwhile, prospect of retaliation for Israel's 26 Oct attacks - and counter-strikes in response - remain significant.