Today Russia appears to have named its price for not launching the largest land invasion since World War II: Getting in writing two things it didn’t get in writing in the 1990s.
Following the fine example of @ProfPaulPoast, a teaching...
First, Putin wants a binding written agreement that NATO won’t expand eastward. Secretary of State Baker made hypothetical remarks to this effect to Soviet leader Gorbachev in 1990. But as Russian Foreign Minister Primakov later regretted, Gorbachev didn’t get it in writing.
Second, Putin wants a binding accord mandating the removal of any military forces and weaponry in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet states not present on May 27, 1997.
The Russian president in May 1997, Boris Yeltsin, tried to portray this Act as legally binding, in order to sell it to domestic critics. He wrongly claimed that it gave Moscow a “veto” over NATO expansion (see conversation between Primakov and Secretary of State Albright):
The result was a wide divide between reality and what Yeltsin said.
From Sophocles: “a man of sense judges the new events by the past.” What historians may one day call the wars of Soviet succession might be about to escalate over whether Putin can get a do-over for Gorbachev and Yeltsin—and get “not one inch”and a veto in writing after all.