what does balance sheet of central bank w deeply unconventional approach to financial globalisation look like?
@CentralBank_TR Turkey: no capital controls/interest rates to contain non/resident outflows, instead burn fx reserves and failing to contain TRY depreciation 1/n
asset side looks familiar to students of EM:
the action in foreign assets, while traditional business of central banks - issuing reserves to banking system - around 15% of assets, and outright ownership of TRY sovvies negligible
the 'Foreign Assets' rubric is a big black box:
other EM cbs typically report Net Foreign Assets so things like cb fx swaps are accounted but clearly not here
any EM central bank w large fx reserves would accumulate them by purchasing USD/EUR from local exporters/banks (large capital inflows) & pay in local cb reserves or base money
so it's liabilities side would have either bank reserves or sterilization instruments
not Turkey cb
Turkey's cb borrows USD/EUR from banks, state and non-residents (unclear if official like Emirates or private).
quite remarkable how much of TRY defence effort is conducted with local banks' fx reserves (and how vulnerable to residents withdrawing deposits CBRT is)
if @Brad_Setser were active here he'd clarify mystery of negative open market operations (OMOs) position
really struggling to get my head around negative central bank liability - is it accounting for CBRT's fx swaps?
but why negative if on asset side it increases fx reserves?
OMOs typically conducted to adjust supply of bank reserve:
- repo loan increases reserves
- sterilizations of fx interventions trigger adjustments on liabilities side: lower reserves account, increase reverse repo/cb debt, certificate of deposits etc
but negative OMOs???
you'll say accounting tricks, but every accounting trick needs some conceptual reasoning behind, and I cannot imagine how I'd explain negative liabilities to my students
a promise to pay that is actually promise to receive but not an asset? one for @i_aldasoro & BIS colleagues
also, how do counterparties to those negative OMOs record them on their balance balance sheet?
a negative asset?
of course, balance sheets alone wont tell you much about daily fx management strategy - but it does tell us something about structural vulnerabilities (and crazy accounting)
Jay Powell/ Fed have quietly caved to Trump. US central bank independence is now a smokescreen.
not because the Fed lowered interest rates yesterday, as Trump demanded.
Less publicised, but more important, is the Fed decision to purchase USD 40bn of Treasury bills monthly.
The Fed calls this Reserve Management Purchases but it's central bank support for government debt (and for Trump's policies more broadly), a form of monetary-fiscal coordination pervasive in the age of fiscal dominance after WW2.
How much is USD 40bn? Recall the recent hype around stablecoin issuers - the companies that Bessent claimed would strengthen US Treasury demand.
These bought USD 40 bn Treasuries over June 2024-June 2025. The Fed would buy in a month what Tether + Circle buy in a year.
Rentoul doesnt know it but his 'good grief' reflects a monetarist choice of Bank - government relationship.
popularised by Milton Fridman, monetarism wants central banks FULLY independent from democratic decisions.
before 2008, this divorce was fully operational
the monetarist divorce unravelled during the 2008 global financial crisis.
central banks HAD TO buy government bonds and stabilise the financial system because these bonds are the arteries of modern finance, without them, booom.
#WallStreetConsensus & its failure to mobilise trillions in @FT
4 things missing:
a) hegemonic dominance of 'mobilising private finance' in development/climate
b) asking why hegemony
c) mushrooming scaling up initiatives
d) do we want success?
a) Mobilising private finance remains global game - (Bridgetown, Biodiversity COP16, 4th Financing for Development conf) & national game (UK Labour gov, Brazil/Colombia/Chile decarbonisation).
*The world's most powerful political narrative that doesnt deliver
b) hegemonic not (just) because Big Finance is powerful, but postneoliberal, transformative state cant get rid of neoliberal macro - independent central bank dominating fiscal.
without macroinstitutional change- How do we pay for transformation- only one answer: private finance
when Big Finance occupies the state and takes over the social contract, nurses struggle, grandparents struggle, parents struggle, renters struggle, private equity flourishes.
no punches pulled on the Commission's Net Zero Industrial Act, the 2022 attempt to respond to Biden's Inflation Reduction Act with a lot of derisking talk but no money (ahem, European Sovereignty Fund)
Climate policy is industrial policy, and the other way around.
An important reminder that EU's climate policy was once ambitious, state-driven decarbonisation.
the Clean Energy Finance Authority would subsidize foreign demand for US cleantech - or derisk BlackRock renewable assets in say, Kenya with subsidies/guarantees.
nothing in this proposal from a top Kamala Harris advisor suggests US should enable technology transfers to countries wishing to pursue their own domestic cleantech capabilities.
in #WallStreetConsensus, Global South are consumers of American cleantech, with American dollars.