Adtech/data company "OpenX secretly collected location data and opened the door to privacy violations on a massive scale, including against children"
$2 million settlement b/c of COPPA and FTC Act violations, order to delete "all ad request data": ftc.gov/news-events/pr…
As of today, OpenX 'strongly recommends' app vendors to include the user's exact GPS location in RTB bid requests, and thus broadcasts it to many other data companies in an uncontrolled way.
The FTC's investigation, however, did not focus on harvesting and sharing GPS location data (which it should) but on a specific form of Wi-Fi location tracking.
According to the complaint, OpenX used a 'backdoor method' to circumvent Android permissions. ftc.gov/system/files/d…
The FTC ordered OpenX to collect future location data via SDK only if apps have 'affirmative express consent'. This goes beyond what is usually required in the US, doesn't it?
However, it covers SDK data only (why?) and I'm afraid the FTC's conditions for consent are too weak.
In 2019 we found that OpenX received personal data including GPS location during the use of the dating app Grindr in Norway. We filed a GDPR complaint against Grindr & OpenX. Grindr has now received a large fine. I hope, we'll see a decision on OpenX soon. forbrukerradet.no/side/complaint…
According to the FTC docs, OpenX claims that it stopped the BSSID/Wi-Fi tracking in October 2018. As this is already documented very well in the FTC complaint, it is certainly worth adding it to the GDPR case, or better, open up another one.
I took another look at Snowden docs that mention browser/cookie IDs.
It's breathtaking how the surveillance marketing industry has still managed to claim for many years that unique personal IDs processed in the web browser are somehow 'anonymous', and sometimes still does.
Another 2011 doc indicates that the GCHQ operated a kind of probabilistic ID graph that aims to link cookie/browser IDs, device IDs, email addresses and other 'target detection identifiers' (TDIs) based on communication, timing and geolocation behavior:
Btw. What inspired me to revisit these docs is @ByronTau's book Means of Control, which not only details how US agencies buy commercial data from digital marketing but also provides deep historical context, tracing back to early-2000s debates on Total Information Awareness (TIA).
Die digitale Werbeindustrie verkauft Smartphone-Standortdaten und Bewegungsprofile von Millionen Menschen in Deutschland, darunter Privatpersonen und sensibles Personal.
Große Recherche von und BR, die einen riesigen Datensatz als "Muster" erhalten haben. netzpolitik.org
Sie haben Menschen identifiziert, die Entzugskliniken, Swinger-Clubs oder Bordelle besucht haben, aber auch Personal von Ministerien, Bundeswehr, BND, Polizei.
Fast alle Smartphone-Apps sind heute mit zwielichtigen Datensammeltechnologien "verwanzt".
Völlig unkontrollierte Datenmarktplätze, u.a. die Firma Datarade mit Sitz in Berlin, bieten Standort- und andere Verhaltensdaten über ganze Bevölkerungen aus vielen Ländern zum Verkauf an.
So, Microsoft exploits activity data from Outlook, Teams, Word etc across customers for its own promotional purposes, including on meetings, file usage and the seconds until emails are read.
Microsoft states that the analysis on the seconds until emails were read excludes EU data. Activity data from Outlook, Teams, Word etc, however, seems to include EU data.
What's their legal basis? This is also personal data on employees. And, are business customers fine with it?
Should cloud-based software vendors exploit personal data on users of their services, including private persons and employees of business customers, how they see fit?
I don't think so.
Not even for public-interest research, at least not without academic process and IRB review.
Some more findings from our investigation of LiveRamp's ID graph system (), which maintains identity records about entire populations in many countries, including name, address, email and phone, and aims to link these records with all kinds of digital IDs:crackedlabs.org/en/identity-su…
Identity data might seem boring, but if a company knows all kinds of identifying info about everyone, from home address to email to device IDs, it is in a powerful position to recognize persons and link profile data scattered across many databases, and this is what LiveRamp does.
LiveRamp aims to provide clients with the ability to recognize a person who left some digital trace in one context as the same person who later left some trace elsewhere.
It has built a sophisticated system to do this, no matter how comprehensive it can recognize the person.
As part of our new report on RTB as a security threat and previously unreported, we reveal 'Patternz', a private mass surveillance system that harvests digital advertising data on behalf of 'national security agencies'.
5 billion user profiles, data from 87 adtech firms. Thread:
'Patternz' in the report by @johnnyryan and me published today:
Patternz is operated by a company based in Israel and/or Singapore. I came across it some time ago, received internal docs. Two docs are available online.
Here's how Patternz can be used to track and profile individuals, their location history, home address, interests, information about 'people nearby', 'co-workers' and even 'family members', according to information available online:
, a 'social risk intelligence platform' that provides digital profiles about named individuals regarding financial strain, food insecurity, housing instability etc for healthcare purposes.
"It calculates risk scores for each risk domain for each person", according to the promotional video, and offers "clarity and granularity for the entire US".
Not redlining, though. They color it green.
Making decisions based on these metrics about individuals and groups seems to be highly questionable and irresponsible bs.