Challenge yourself by reading Oliver Lewis' praise for his now-departed boss Lord Frost conservativehome.com/platform/2021/… and you find a link to Frost's lecture from February. Frost makes a particular claim about trade 1/
Attacking the (multiple, almost unanimous) studies saying Brexit makes us poorer, Frost says this, and in particular questions whether the decline in trade will really hurt productivity so badly. 2/
(He calls it "unproven" decline in trade, but the OBR can pretty much refute him - see charts).
Anyway, I have long read that lower trade lowers productivity, and it stands to reason. Trade and comparative advantage, the essence of what the market does - who questions that ? 3/
But it turns out that if you visit the OBR's immediate post-referendum forecasts (the EFO), obr.uk/efo/economic-a… you see a decided ambivalence and caution: 4/
HOWEVER, by last November, the OBR in analysing the risk of an impending No Deal Brexit appears to have abandoned its ambivalence 5/
When we emerge WITH a deal, something for the OBR to get its teeth into, it finds plenty of reason to continue to assume a 4% hit to productivity - notably, the loss of trade in services that will come 6/
When I try to find out what are the theoretical drivers for this, some excellent papers pop out of the footnotes, such as this 2017 one from the World Bank which nailed the likely drop in trade 7/ openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/hand…
I have no reason to doubt these findings - nor does Frost, imho. But I don't understand the journey the OBR has been on, from ambivalence and caution to nailed-on certainty. It may have encouraged sceptics?
9/
In my view, Brexit damages productivity for reasons any freemarketeer would struggle to evade. But the state of the literature is not as definitive as I expected to find on setting out, so anyone with anything better, show me! 10/10
PS Frost's complaint about these studies is also weak in pretending they try to "predict the micro-detail". No they don't, and see this tweet
Now suppose it is, in terms of hospitalisations, about as dangerous as Delta. That is - about 10 days after a case number, the daily hospitalisation number is 2% of that. You would expect two curves like this 2/
Now, just take out the lag and look at the ratio of day X's hospitalistions over that *same* day's cases, you get this (which is what we are appearing to see right now - 900 hospitalisations, 90,000 cases, a drop to 1%) 3/
Rereading Josh Lerner's 2009 book on failed attempts to help Entrepreneurship. On Venture Capital he notes that support is often subject to distortions, such as "pressure to 'spread the wealth': to ensure each region gets its fair share of venture subsidies..."
Just imagine 1/
Evaluating SBIR, he observes how congressmen successfully lobby for it to be in every state. The effectiveness drops drastically when the funds go to the places judged deserving rather than on merit ... 2/
Yes, the contrary force is the (wicked) "Matthew Effect" = "to every one who has will more be given" = or agglomeration.
Sometimes, it is successfully leaned against. Taiwan. Always Taiwan ...
3/
Kate Bingham's speech (link found here ox.ac.uk/news/2021-11-2…) is much more interesting than some of the more OTT, civil-service-hating coverage would have you believe. Some points 1/
First, for everything that follows, the monumental scale of what Covid has wrought needs this dramatic reiteration. Note: this is a conservative estimate of global deaths. Very few policy situations occur against such an extraordinary backdrop ...2/
and it could have been worse: SARS' slow-mutating nature allowed the prospect of a vaccine-exit from the nightmare 3/
The way I see it: VL were like your drunken mate who promised one bunch of people they could break a 5 minute mile, and another that they could throw a javelin 80m.
When confronted, the punchy answer is, "why can't there by sprinters with huge arms": 1/
So there are three claims. 1: we can deregulate significantly in a growth-boosting way. 2: we can seize state levers, direct resources around brilliantly and 3: you can do both.
Where Cummings is right: laughing at 3 is the least interesting attack (though still well founded) 2/
Take the first. Obviously, deregulate to grow is a looooongstanding agenda, pushed by DC's admittedly lower-calibre predecessors ft.com/content/94ba1a…
The fruits are always harder to pluck, the returns less impressive and the trade-offs more real than its advocates expect 3/
There are so many interesting and thoughtful replies to this; thank you. Some are unnecessarily, even childishly ad hom about HMT - no, seriously, they don't ask these questions as a devious way to evade net zero! 1/
Also, I don't think you get very far if you don't think the choice is meaningful. Borrowing will change whether it is a current or a future taxpayer that takes a hit. That is the point of it. Literally every time HMT once again postpones a fuel duty rise, this happens ...2/
I also have no doubt a bunch of people would like to make the problem easier by imagining massive stimulus growth. My assumption is that we are at economic capacity, and so climate goods displace other goods. No doubt that will make the usual sorts cross 3/
Something you learn when you step a little outside narcissistic government world: how businesses performs R&D is often little to do with the Government/universities. Mostly, it is about their competitors, their customers, their employees... Universities come 15th! 1/
This is important because the UK Government has a key target - to raise UK R&D spending to 2.4% of GDP in a few years' time (current level, 1.8-1.9%). Two thirds of that is normally *private* money. HMG's major tool is to pump in more public £££... gov.uk/government/new…
What UK public sector R&D does, and the business sector researches, is likely to be very different. And hence its low position in these rankings. But this is not necessarily a failing of policy 3/