Good morning, let's just see what's going on in Omicron infections & deaths. First, apparently they are already 75% of cases.
Below is change of US cases & deaths. Note that since end 2020, no lockdowns in the US despite cases/deaths going up & down on Delta and now Omicron.
The key difference is of course the news coverage of daily cases & deaths: despite being high, the news stops making it a big deal & actually focuses on the vaccinated/unvaccinated.
Meaning, instead of blaming politicians, they now turn on the unvaccinated.
Irrespective of who is to blame for this rise of cases (higher infectious nature/seasonality) & deaths, the key point here is this: We will not have lockdown in the US because that is just not the policy flavor at the moment.
There will be targeted shutdowns but no lockdown.
Note that narrative is important because the data doesn't lie (cases/deaths). What matters is people's APPETITE for such risks. And to manage that, you need to create NORM of what's acceptable. The way to do that is through the news as it creates perception of what's acceptable.
I believe that Omicron is the beginning of the END of Covid-19 because it is so infectious that it will ultimately take over & then we all will either be vaccinated & not get it or the unvaccinated will have antibody from being infected.
That's my silverlining of this chart here
Here is something for you to be OPTIMISTIC. Look at UK confirmed cases & deaths. Headline: CASES OFF THE CHART. Totally true.
Deaths very low. So no lockdown despite Omicron raging (everyone prolly has it now).
Btw, mobility NOT DOWN that much! Retail is -6% from baseline.
I can't get over how low the deaths are in the UK so far despite the insane case load.
Let me say this again: Omicron is more positive than it seems because it is infectious and not as lethal. This evolution means that we're heading towards the end.
Here is the European Union in case you are interested. Cases & deaths. Trend shows downward momentum. Either way, clearly a surge towards the winter, which has been bad in Europe due to Covid + gas issues.
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Okay, I want to talk about tariffs a bit because there are a lot of tariffs. On everyone:
1) Steel + aluminium +25% 2) Autos is 25% (and some auto parts except USMCA qualified) - but note that Trump has realized that steel & alum are INTERMEDIATE GOODS and when you tax that then you got a big problem so he's BACKTRACKING on that for the auto sector, as in, they don't get steel & alum on top of auto 3) 10% on everyone ex China on top of above until early July in Asia. 4) China gets embargo level of tariffs or >100% and some >200%. 5) Exemptions for semiconductor, energy, pharma, ICT (phones, laptops etc), commodities.
How bad is this?
Tariffs are a tax on investment so Trump is PUTTING A TAX ON INVESTMENT ABROAD.
Specifically: steel & alum & auto ex USMCA and specifically China.
More to come of course but this is now.
He is starting to understand that when you tax a lot of stuff, especially sectoral, especially intermediates, you are SHORTENING SUPPLY CHAINS AS THIS COMPOUNDS.
A car is made of thousands of parts. Steel is part of it of course. So he has to make exemptions to make sure things don't kill the auto sector that he is trying to rescue/prop up. But supply chains are complicated.
The US used to be almost tariff free. Low single digit of trade-weighted tariff. That means a lot of PING PONG OF TRADE.
As in you can ship intermediates back and forth and have things assembled etc. SUPPLY CHAINS LENGTHENED.
Tariffs SHORTEN SUPPLY CHAINS.
So this complex supply chains that is stretching across US-Canada-Mexico and Asia (ping-ponged across Asia from Japan to Malaysia/Thailand/China) etc is all going to get shortened.
So that is what tariffs will do. Supply chains will be more REGIONALIZED.
No matter what the negotiations will be - US w/ China for example, or US with other Asians or Europeans, the fact is that Trump tariffs are starting at MAXIMALIST positions and will settle at a MORE REASONABLE POSITION BUT STILL VERY HIGH TARIFF REGIME VS BEFORE.
And they will be very TARGETED to shorten supply chains to favor US/Canada/Mexico & maybe key allies in Asia and key allies in Europe.
US trade will China will ultimately be to serve rest of the world or to feed into the above. It will ultimately be cutoff. Because China and the US are strategically decoupling. They are putting a floor on that speed but the speed is towards decoupling.
I'm back in Hong Kong after being in Poland for two weeks. Poland is a country that is better every year (I have been going there every year since 2015) & a country that is very mindful of its geography and being next to two giants (Germany & Russia) that have historically invaded. Kaliningrad (Russia, which was a former Prussian or German town) borders the north & so the Pols are painfully aware the very thin line between peace and a potential invasion. The entrance to my husband's family farm marks several grave cites. One of them is the Tomb of Unknown soldiers from WW1 and we regularly find WWII remnants on the farm ground as well as rubbish from the communist collectivist era when it was part of the Soviet Union or Russian empire.
Poland is an interesting country for me to visit as it is am EM with world class infrastructure but at the same time you can see in the people the pain of the past. If you see older Pols, they look like they have had a hard life in their body and face. This is very similar to what you see in China or other parts of Asia where the impoverish past is very recent and generational differences in skin/look/aesthetic reflect not just time but also transformation of society.
What I find interesting about Warsaw is that brutalist of Soviet architecture - the Nazi invasion (Germany & German soldiers) leveled the city w/ extreme severity and so most of the city is newer than the "new world" as they were built post war or re-created post war. If you find an older building/neighborhood, it's actually pretty rare and very treasured, like the Polytechnic University neighborhood that looks like Paris while the rest look, well, brutal at best.
It is a marathon & not a sprint. Produce below costs & run losses & still produce & gain market share as your goods are much cheaper (selling below costs & hence running losses) & competition goes out of business.
Once you reach a critical mass of market share (monopoly) then the sector consolidates and u can raise prices.
These companies can survive because they are backed by state policy that want certain sectors to develop & not worry about profit margins.
This is why Chinese equities underperform Indian equities or American equities over a long period but China dominates global manufacturing.
Foreign companies find it cheaper to import products that are produced in China & resell at a much higher price & then in the process have high profit margins.
The issue here is that it vacuums out domestic industries as they cannot compete & eventually we are left with the US where it is.
It does not have the capacity to have self-sufficiency in strategy sectors required for defense.
This is the biggest flaw of globalisation, beyond of course the vacuuming out of industries.
The EU trade deficit with China is basically what the US trade deficit with China used to be. And as the US markets increasingly shut out China, imports from China will rise as goods are produced at a cheap costs. If u look at China industrial profits, they have been terrible but product has continued to rise. Why? All about gaining market share, the long game.
Profit margins for exporting are higher than domestic as competition is fierce so there is a strong desire to export vs selling onshore for diminishing return.
All this sets up for an unsustainable global trade picture & I suppose the question is whether Europe or others are happier with cheaper goods (the key thesis for global trade) or having to erect barriers to trade (protectionism like EV tariffs they imposed) beyond what they already have.
I was asked a question recently when I went on Fox on whether the global trade system is fair.
The thing is it is not about fairness. China is fighting with a state-led approach using the savings & will of 1.4bn industrious people to become self sufficient sector by sector.
It is not a listed firm in the US that cares about quarterly earnings. They operate at a loss for a long time and still churn out production because the state implicitly & explicitly supports by promoting that sector via capital, land, and subsidies.
So the question is not fairness but that this is not the WTO designed trade system. Countries that are smaller & weaker and also firms, no matter how big, cannot compete with state-level competition.
I'm going on Fox News at 240pm EST for the Charles Payne show to discuss tariffs impact on the US and Asia. Today, the US slapped anti-dumping duties on Southeast Asian solar with varying rates but they are essentially embargos on the import from the region, especially from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, and slightly less so Malaysia.
This is a result of the Biden administration probe that started a year ago that was initiated by a South Korean Hanwha Qcells, Arizona-based First Solar Inc and several smaller producers. South Korea is one of the countries that deployed a lot of capital to the US after the US imposed tariffs on solar on China a decade ago and recently Biden introduced industrial policy the IRA.
As the US gave Southeast Asia exemptions, about 70% imports came from the region. But now with anti-dumping duties, that is essentially done for US markets. But note that most of these exports are by Chinese producers that committed capital to arbitrage tariffs. They already started to halt production last year as the anti-dumping duty probe started.
Note that this is an interesting study because it is a bipartisan issue of using antidumping duties/tariffs to protect a domestic industry or foreign companies that have invested capital in the US (Korea's solar). Meaning, it raises costs and ultimately is targeting Chinese solar. Much of Cambodian solar is Chinese. Is this a big loss for the region? Well, even for companies that are not Chinese, the tariffs are a reminder that the costs of allowing Chinese investment leads to also domestic solar companies in Vietnam being smacked with tariffs.
While it is just solar, it raises the question of two issues: Where is Chinese solar moving next to avoid tariffs to the US? If that's not possible, then that means it will need to sell to wherever it can (Europe!).
For the Southeast Asians, the impact is two folds.
First, of course, selling solar to the US is done. But more importantly one should ask what is the real impact? If they were just merely rerouting exports, then not so much as the value add is not really Southeast Asia but rather Chinese.
That being said, not being able to sell to the US means that this particular sector faces risks itself onshore as it faces both more fierce Chinese imports (they were likely Chinese imports anyway) and any hope of moving up the value chain is now very difficult. This is especially the case of Vietnam.
And finally, it raises the costs of allowing rerouting/Chinese investment to arbitrage tariffs, especially in strategic sectors the US care about for the domestic sector because it risks having all producers having essentially no trade w/ the US on solar in particular. A cautionary tale so to speak ahead of negotiations w/ the US on reciprocal tariffs.
Let's talk about Trump tariffs. They are up, it's a question of whether how much, to whom, which sector rather than whether.
I want to clarify a simple fact that needs to be nailed home - trade and investment go together. Tariffs are a friction to trade & if you just take the idea that tariffs are going up (we'll discuss soon the details) then INVESTMENT IS GOING TO BE RESHUFFLED.
Half of global FDI is US driven. Global investment will be reshuffled. Okay, let's talk about first w/ who is LEAST TARGETED & we got to who is MOST.
Trump trade authorities come from 3 sources: 1) International Emergency Economics Power Act (IEEPA) to give the president the power to declare a national emergency & impose tariffs.
He did this w/ fentanyl for Mexico & Canada + Reciprocal tariffs.
2) Section 232 Tariffs that basically gives the Secretary of Commerce (Lutnick) the power to do a COMPREHENSIVE investitations to determine sectors that undermine US national security
3) Section 301 Tariffs - Basically to target a specific country, this one is a China tariff one and the power goes under USTR.
If power is given to the president and one can say whether he's abusing power or not or there's too much power concentrated in one (designed as such to address areas that Congress is too slow), can it be taken away?
Yes, but not by the Supreme Court because it would say that this is a political issue & to be solved politically.
So it would take Congress. But while there is something going on, this is very unlikely. Congress is too, well, I don't mean to say anything negative but you know what Mark Twain said about Congress, to deal with this.
So we are stuck w/ tariffs & unless tariffs call the house to fall down, tariffs are here.
Let's talk then big picture vs going down on Trump cards/flip flip because I think the chaos is by design & not an accident.
Okay, who hasn't been tariffed? Mexico and Canada but specifically only USMCA content.