Unfortunately, this oft-quoted Spectator tracker of COVID 'scenarios vs outcomes' seems at best muddled and at worst actively misleading. A thread on some weird comparisons - and how to do better critiques...
data.spectator.co.uk/category/sage-… 1/
First plot is comparison of scenarios for increased R values with later data. Crucially, these weren't predictions about what R would be (R estimate that week was 0.9-1.1, so pretty flat epidemic). Rather, report showed what could happen if R increased beyond current range... 2/
Not sure why they cut out the R=2 scenario from original plot (which would've made it obvious these were illustrative - assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…). TBF SPI-M plot could have included horizontal line to illustrate what R=1 looks like, but don't need a model to draw a flat line... 3/
In any case, the upper scenarios were not considered likely by members, as reported at the time: 4/
Next plot is July scenarios for July 19 reopening vs actual outcomes. Not sure why tracker cut out the crucial uncertainty intervals? Remember, uncertainty intervals aren't some superfluous addition to scenarios - they *are* the scenarios. 5/
The plot also focuses on bed occupancy, despite admissions being the metric shown across all scenarios. But picking this metric for comparison (rather than admissions, deaths etc.), it means several scenarios are omitted - including all of those from Imperial... 6/
And if bed occupancy was the preferred metric, why not show all the plots that show scenarios for this metric (e.g. fig below from assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…)? Why cut these ones out? 7/
Or even better, why not try and match up the parameters in the different scenarios (e.g. mobility, vaccine effectiveness, transmission) with subsequent known values from empirical data (or even re-run the model itself) to see how well things match up? 8/
Trying to extract the most relevant scenario would make it possible to flag any systematic biases in model estimates when using 'ground truth' parameters, allowing for better discussions about what aspects of scenarios are more/less reliable in future. 9/
It's also strange to cut off plot at the end of September, just as some scenarios start to dip below actual hospitalisations - which remained flattish for prolonged period in reality as caution persisted. Why pick this arbitrary cropping, rather than showing rest of autumn? 10/
Next plot shows modelling scenarios for 'nothing changes' in autumn 2020 vs what actually happened (i.e. two lockdowns). So fundamentally a redundant comparison, because models weren't trying to estimate impact of a lockdown scenario... 11/
I mean, the report was pretty clear that these weren't predictions (assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…) - that would have meant trying to predict policy decisions, which doesn't make sense for analysis designed to inform decisions... 12/
But if we did compare totals in the plot, we'd find central model estimates between Oct and April ranged between 100-230k deaths, compared to 75k in reality (after lockdown, Alpha & vaccination). Think about that for a moment... 13/
If I asked you to estimate how many deaths control measures & vaccines averted last winter, what would you say? Above totals suggest control measures & vaccines prevented at least 25-155k deaths last winter (because models weren't accounting for higher impact of Alpha)... 14/
Next plot compares reopening scenarios with hospitalisations in 9 June report. Again, uncertainty intervals have been cut out for some reason. 15/
And looks like something odd has happened with the data extraction, e.g. compare middle estimate (left) with model output (blue line, right). Also, again strange to cut off plot at end of July, immediately after reopening - why not show later dynamics? 16/
TBF on data side, would be helpful to have more routine release of underlying values behind plots (as in UKHSA technical reports). Also, see earlier point about extracting scenario that matches now-known parameters to get a better idea of underlying model performance... 17/
Next plot is simple case scenario vs outcome from Sep 2020. In reality growth was indeed not sustained at fast level, likely influenced by incoming measures and underlying behaviour change (as we've seen repeatedly during pandemic)... 18/
However, it's odd to only quote the scenario for cases, rather than the accompanying warning of 200 daily deaths by mid-November - which actually turned out to be optimistic... 19/
I get that any visualisations have to make some design choices, but it is strange that pretty much every single choice made above ends up making models look artificially overconfident and pessimistic... 20/
Models need proper scrutiny and challenge, especially as COVID dynamics are influenced by feedbacks between population behaviour & policy - unlike weather, where analysis doesn't change the outcomes. But muddled comparisons don't help anyone, they just sow confusion & anger. /End

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Adam Kucharski

Adam Kucharski Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @AdamJKucharski

21 Dec
Any writer who claims 'UK models always overestimate COVID numbers' is either lazy or trying to mislead their readers. A few illustrations... 1/
A surprisingly under-reported example is early UK scenario models (although @anthonybmasters & @d_spiegel correctly flag it in 'Covid by Numbers'). Some point estimates from initial 'recurrent lockdown' scenarios were lower than what actually occurred:
2/
Then there’s the July 2020 report from @acmedsci, which used Imperial modelling. It was designed to be a plausible worst case scenario, not a forecast, but ended up strikingly close to reality (with Alpha increasing risk & vaccines decreasing it): 3/

Read 7 tweets
27 Nov
A lot of Twitter currently seems to be a split of either fatalism about Omicron variant, or advocacy for retweetable-but-flimsy measures that are unlikely to suppress transmission of a genuine threat. Discourse needs to be much better - for this situation and future pandemics. 1/
This piece is one of the few I’ve seen IMO asking the right sorts of questions. If we need to update vaccines (still a big if), how much time do we need to buy? What will the scientific, logistic and regulatory challenges be?
thetimes.co.uk/article/how-lo…
2/
And, of course, if we need to update vaccines, how do we get them to places most affected in equitable way? 3/

Read 4 tweets
26 Nov
Reminder that reactive travel bans typically slow but don’t stop importations. If new B.1.1.529 variant genuinely more transmissible/can evade immunity to some extent, reasonable to assume already undetected cases in other regions... 1/
For example, Israel had multi-pronged efforts to keep Delta out (which bought time for more vaccination), but even so the rise was only a couple of months behind UK: 2/
Countries should therefore have plan to deal with local outbreak. Recent reintroduction of control measures across Europe may be helpful coincidence (in short term at least), reducing contacts & making it harder for imported cases to establish... 3/
Read 7 tweets
25 Nov
Quick collation of threads worth reading if you want to know more about the new B.1.1.529 variant identified in South Africa... 1/
Perspective from frontline of analysis: 2/

Summary of South Africa MOH briefing earlier: 3/

Read 6 tweets
23 Nov
A few thoughts on current COVID situation in Europe… 1/
Any proposal to reduce COVID transmission that doesn’t now have vaccines and rapid tests front-and-centre is not a proposal that’s had much thought go into it. Booster data looks very good - roll-out of these is likely to play a large part in how well countries do over winter. 2/
I think any country reintroducing lockdown-type measures needs to outline very clear criteria for lifting them. What’s the exit strategy? When will these disruptive last-ditch measures finally be off the table? 3/
Read 8 tweets
22 Sep
A question I often see: if COVID transmission continues, when will it reach a stable ‘endemic’ state? One way to look at it: the dynamics of endemic infections are typically driven by emergence of new susceptibility. A few thoughts… 1/
Many endemic infections continue to circulate because new susceptibility is gradually accumulated as unexposed children are born: 2/

For other pathogens (like seasonal coronaviruses) new susceptibility can also come from waning of existing immunity, or antigenic evolution of the virus - which has the effect of making previously immune people susceptible to infection again: 3/

Read 4 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(