“‘Not one inch to the East,’ they told us in the 90s. So what? They cheated, just brazenly tricked us!”
— Putin during his Dec. 23, 2021 press conference.
Following @PaulPoast’s fine example again, here is a teaching thread, a.k.a. #PoastPost
reuters.com/world/europe/r…
— Putin during his Dec. 23, 2021 press conference.
Following @PaulPoast’s fine example again, here is a teaching thread, a.k.a. #PoastPost
reuters.com/world/europe/r…
Putin claims that Western leaders promised Moscow in 1990 that NATO would not move one inch eastward, that is, stay frozen on its eastern Cold War front line. What did Westerners want in exchange? Moscow’s permission to let divided Germany unify after the Berlin Wall opened. 
Why did Moscow have to give permission for Germany to unify?
Because Moscow still had roughly 380,000 troops in the east of, and extensive legal rights over, divided Germany in 1990—all thanks to Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender in 1945.
Because Moscow still had roughly 380,000 troops in the east of, and extensive legal rights over, divided Germany in 1990—all thanks to Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender in 1945.
For Germany to reunite, Moscow had to give up those troops and legal authority.
It did, and Germany unified on October 3, 1990.
It did, and Germany unified on October 3, 1990.
Why did Moscow give that permission?
Because, Putin claims, the West tricked Moscow: it promised no more expansion in 1990, then didn’t live up to its half of the bargain.
Because, Putin claims, the West tricked Moscow: it promised no more expansion in 1990, then didn’t live up to its half of the bargain.
But the leader in Moscow in 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev, told an interviewer in 2014 that the events described by Putin never happened. NATO expansion “was not discussed at all”...
Since Gorbachev was a direct participant in the events, if he says they didn’t happen, he must be right, correct? Case closed?
No.
No.
Here’s more from the same 2014 interview: Gorbachev, referring to himself in the third person, attempts to dictate to his interviewer what to write, in order to avoid a portrayal that makes him look naïve.
Is there another way investigate what happened other than relying on the memories of participants interested in shaping coverage of their historical legacy?
Yes, by using primary evidence—that is, sources produced at the time by participants.
Yes, by using primary evidence—that is, sources produced at the time by participants.
There’s a lot of this evidence. Talks between heads of governments and states, for example, generate a mountain of paperwork. Much of that mountain ends up stored in archives. Some of it gets declassified by requests and appeals...
nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/…
nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/…
What does the publicly available evidence from the key dates show?
That “Gorbachev 2014” contradicts “Gorbachev 1990.” In his own 1990 notes, Gorbachev records a speculative conversation with US Secretary of State James Baker about a “not one inch” agreement.
That “Gorbachev 2014” contradicts “Gorbachev 1990.” In his own 1990 notes, Gorbachev records a speculative conversation with US Secretary of State James Baker about a “not one inch” agreement.
Here’s their conversation as summarized by Gorbachev in Russian…
...and by Baker in English:
Other evidence captures various leaders discussing the future of not just of NATO, but also of the Warsaw Pact.
On Nov. 24, 1989, US President George H.W. Bush and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher discuss that the Pact will fall apart, so “NATO must stay.”
On Nov. 24, 1989, US President George H.W. Bush and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher discuss that the Pact will fall apart, so “NATO must stay.”
In mid-1990, Thatcher even argues for keeping Central and Eastern European countries in a “ghost Warsaw Pact,” as a “fig leaf” to protect Gorbachev from a coup by hardliners.
Bush agrees that Gorbachev needs cover, but wants to find a different solution.
Bush agrees that Gorbachev needs cover, but wants to find a different solution.
Bush finds one, in cooperation with the West German chancellor, Helmut Kohl. After months of negotiation, Gorbachev agrees in September 1990 to let Germany unify—in exchange for extensive financial support organized by Kohl.
This means Gorbachev concedes in fall 1990 without formalizing a prohibition on NATO’s eastern movement—even though, by then, he understands that the issue of NATO’s future involves more than East Germany. Here’s an English translation of one of his notes from May 1990:
Due to the collapsing Soviet economy and his need for the financial aid the West is offering, however, Gorbachev goes ahead nonetheless. He approves signature of the Final Settlement of September 12, 1990, allowing Germany to unify.
But here’s the crucial detail: that settlement expressly permits some NATO forces and weapons—albeit with extensive restrictions, and only after all Soviet troops withdraw—to move eastward across the Cold War line into eastern Germany.
Moscow signs this settlement.
The upshot: there was speculative discussion of a “not one inch eastward” pact in the course of 1990. But, in the end, Moscow created the exact opposite precedent: it signed a legally binding treaty allowing NATO to move east of the Cold War line.
Sequel: Gorbachev sowed the seeds of a future battle, once NATO offered membership to countries east of Germany. Russian President Boris Yeltsin claimed that the Final Settlement on Germany should have allowed the alliance only into eastern Germany, not beyond.
That fight culminated in the 1997 battle that Moscow wants to revisit with the draft treaty it circulated Dec. 17…but that would take another thread to explain.
In closing: @paulpoast, respect! These "Poast Posts" are a lot of work, and you’ve done a ton of great ones!
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In closing: @paulpoast, respect! These "Poast Posts" are a lot of work, and you’ve done a ton of great ones!
[END]
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