Thread by @TrentTelenko

The subject of this thread will be the electronic warfare history of the Battle of the Bulge.

This history is almost unknown in military history circles, let alone the public, because there have been exactly two articles on it in 75(+) years.
1/

STRATEGIC JAMMING IN PERSPECTIVE.
Long range jamming platforms have been the focus of air campaigns against integrated air defense system (IADS) since WW2. There have never been enough of them and their allocation is a strategic level concern in every war fought since 1945.
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The 8th Air Force's 36th Squadron was its heavy jamming unit. It supported 8th AF bomber streams forming up to attack German with VHF band barrage jamming to prevent the Luftwaffe hearing formation chatter & it had a jamming major role during the D-Day invasion of Normandy.
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Where the 36th HBS gets involved in the Ardennes involves ART-6 through ART-11 "Jackal" series communications jammers. The photo below shows one of a series of six jammers targeted against German tank radio traffic.
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aafradio.org/countermeasure…

The "American Jackal" jammer was a piece of kit that duplicated a British tank radio jammer used in the Western Desert to cover 8th Army in Wellington twin engine bombers.

The Luftwaffe sent Me-109's after them and it didn't turn out well.
5/
spitfirespares.co.uk/radio%202l.html

Despite the highly classified nature of the 36th Jamming Sqd’s capabilities, their were liaison teams of the British Branch of the American MIT Radiation Laboratory (BBRL) all over North West Europe from two months before D-Day to the Ardennes offensive.
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Starting in April 1944 BBRL was briefing every senior US Army staff officer it could catch. The flag rank briefer was named John Trump, the uncle of Pres. Donald J. Trump. So Ninth and Third Army senior staff would have been well aware of the capabilities of
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...the British build Jostle and American built Jackal tank radio jammers in the 36th Squadron’s B-24’s.

The problem with this 36th HBS Jackal tank radio jamming capability was the 8th AF bomber generals hated it.

They didn't want to share B-24's penny packet with the Army.
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Spaatz, Doolittle etc wanted to pass this mission to Ninth AF medium bombers.

This wasn't practical for the simple reason training up & equipping a medium bomber sqd to the 36th's capability would take too long.
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Now that we have the context established, lets get to the meat of the 36thJamming Squadron's involvement with the Ardennes offensive.

Short form: Everyone in Allied high command knew where the German Ardennes offensive attack force was.

With one exception, everyone
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...thought it was a _DEFENSIVE_ counter-attack force waiting for an allied attack.

The sole exception being 1st Army's G-2 intelligence officer Colonel Benjamin "Monk" Dickson.

 As  Jörg Muth author of "Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the
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...German Armed Forces, 1901–1940" recently put it on the H-War e-mail list:

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The full story of Colonel Benjamin "Monk" Dickson's Intel report 37 has to await another Ardennes thread, but it gives context to US Ninth Army's G-2 not only identifying 6th Panzer Army's assembly area, but also convincing  Lt. Gen. William Hood Simpson to request the 36th
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Heavy Bombardment Squadron (RCM) to fly sorties to jam their radios days before the attack.

 A request which was "officially" denied by 8th Air Force because of the German IADS heavy Flak gun threat B-24 to jamming planes. 
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This is how Maj. Richard Riccardelli's 1985 article "Electronic Warfare in WWII" described the process by which Ninth Army asked for and was denied jamming support.
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The word that jumps out is -staffing-. The Ninth Army request for jamming had to be well staffed to make it through the approval process to get to 8th AF & get rejected there on the grounds of vulnerability to German Flak gun concentrations in the proposed jamming orbit of
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...Sixth Panzer Army radio emitters.

This staff work for requesting the 36th Jamming Sqd's support was akin to a request asking for the Operation Cobra type carpet bombing and had to include as a minimum the following:
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So, to be clear, LTG Simpson & staff, General Bradley & Staff, General Eisenhower's SHAEF staff, and 8th AF all knew where the Sixth Panzer Army was and its capabilities.

LTG Simpson wanted to do something about it and was denied.
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After the German's attacked, things changed.

General Patton's 3rd Army asked for the 36th HBS (RCM) to provide support. The 36th flew jamming missions on the 28th & 31st of Dec 1944 near Bastogne.

Three more jamming missions were flown 2 - 7 Jan 1945 supporting Patton.
19/

The biggest reason the EW history of the German Ardennes Offensive is unknown has less to do with the esoteric nature of EW than the light it places on the Allied command decisions before the attack.

The surprise of the attack wasn't intel failure. It was command failure.
/End

Article P.S.

Maj. Richard Riccardelli, "Electronic Warfare in WWII", Army Communicator, Winter 1985, pages 40 - 49
ibiblio.org/cizewski/signa…

Article P.P.S.

William Cahill, "The Unseen Fight: USAAF radio counter-measure operations in Europe, 1943 to 1945," Journal of Aeronautical History June 2020
aerosociety.com/media/15088/20…