1/ I recommend everyone interested in how the Finnish NATO membership process could happen to read the following thread by @HenriVanhanen (translation is mine).
👇👇👇
2/ Membership application is, first and foremost, a political choice. However, the process itself is a central part of it and cannot be ignored. Below, you can find some comments concerning the issue.
3/ Keeping the NATO door open is an integral part of 🇫🇮 security policy. The (unlikely) scenario that Finland applies, but is not granted the membership would be disastrous for the country.
4/ It would leave Finland in an extremely vulnerable position and look like the country must go on without Western support. The main point: there is only one try when it comes to "playing the NATO card".
5/ The decision-making process of NATO is based on unanimity. Thus, every member state must be consulted in advance. There cannot be any "weak links" or opposition.
6/ Usually, the process takes several months or a year. Due to high level of technical compatibility, it would probably be shorter in the 🇫🇮 case. However, negotating a "fast-track" would be beneficial.
7/ The shorter the process, the less external pressure & risks. Good for NATO & Finland.
8/ Finland should also try to negotiate security guarantees (the US and/or France/Germany) to cover the period before the application is approved. It would create a deeper sense of commitment to the process.
9/ It would be beneficial if 🇸🇪 applied, simultaneously. Coordination between the neighbors should take place, further deepening the mutual commitment to ensure regional stability & security.
10/ Finland should strengthen social & political & military reselience to face Russian pressure. Especially, borders must be secured.
11/ It would be good to coordinate these actions in advance with the EU & NATO. Their support should be available when needed.
12/ One should not forget that NATO requires citizens of the applicant country to support gov't pro-NATO policy. However, no exact method of measurement is defined. In practice, it is for the candidate to decide. Ideally, both citizens & parliamentary parties would be in it.
13/ Thus, the political leaders should decide how the support will be measured based on democratic principles. Referendum is not obligatory and would include significant risks, but deep internal divisions must be avoided.
14/ Finland should also consider how to communicate with Russia. No permissions are needed, but an attempt to minimize negative effects caused by the application would be wise.
15/ To support this goal, emphasizing the national security dimension and willingness to continue dialogue could make sense. The "Norwegian model" (no military bases, no nuclear arms, no duties to accomodate foreign troops) might work for Finland, too.
16/ Summa summarum: applying for NATO membership requires much planning & Finland cannot afford to fail after such a decision is made. The road to membership exists, but is not without risks. It requires a strategic approach.
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1/ Olen pitkään kannattanut @lustraatio ta, kylmän sodan ajan itätiedustelua koskevien asiakirjojen julkaisua ja analyysia. Tie on jo pitkällä, muttei lopussa.
Heikko menneisyydenhallinta on ollut osasyy #turpo -debattimme ongelmiin.
2/ Nyt puhutaan paljon siitä, kuinka @TarjaHalonen ja @TuomiojaErkki osaltaan vaikeuttivat Suomen Nato-polkua, täysin tietoisesti.
On kansalaisten oikeus saada heidän sidonnaisuutensa selville. Halosen kampanjassa keskeisesti toiminut Riitta Juntunen oli Stasin värvätty.
3/ Odottelen kuitenkin "koko tarinan" paljastumista.
Sitä odotellessa ei nykyisten päättäjien tulisi piiloutua sen taakse, että "juna meni jo". Jos näin on, jotain olennaista on jätetty suomalaisille kertomatta. Muuten Natoon ehtii vielä.
I have no information whatsoever about potential fraud or proven crimes.
All I know is the Finnish officials have declined to publish many citizenship documents and that GT is generally believed to be a KGB agent.
3/ Investigative journalists should dive deep into Finnish side of the so-called Oil-for-food programme of St. Petersburg & comparable projects. Already in Dec 1991, Putin's supervisor Anatoly Sobchak discussed about food aid with Mauno Koivisto, then President of Finland.