Starting on 22 December, European gas prices experienced - shall we say - a bit of a "rug pull". Within 10 days they crashed by 60%. Is the gas crisis over?
Thread 1/n
TTF (EU equ. of US price Henry Hub) crashed from a record $59/MMBtu down to $23/MMBtu within 10 days. Today, the price is back at $29 (left axis; $168/boe) or >7x (!) the price US consumers pay for their heating bill.
So no, the crisis is hardly "over". It gets worse.
2/n
Why did TTF (or it's UK equ. NBP) come crashing down in late December? Chiefly b/c Europe had an unusually warm weather patch. Warm weather meant less gas withdrawals.
3/n
High EU prices earlier in Dec H1 also meant a wide-open EU-Asia LNG arbitrage for US exports.
The new headline: "LNG flotilla" is heading to Europe. Narrative: Crisis solved. Well, not really. The "flotilla" couldn't move the EU gas market "dial".
Less gas withdrawals & more LNG importing was the recipe which crashed TTF from its "demand destruction levels". But did net EU injections of 3.5TWh for 2.5 days made a diffence?
5/n
Of course NOT. Overall EU gas storage fill is now at 55% (chart below) or where it was on 29 December 2021. The "flotilla" fixed 2-3 days of gas shortages, warmer weather another 4-5 days. Meanwhile, the EU remains 30 days "short gas", subject to weather!
6/n
Meanwhile, lower TTF prices stopped LNG shipments from the US into Europe. This is b/c the price arbitrage for shipments to Europe (as opposed to Asia) is now closed again. What hasn't changed however is Europe's need for more gas, urgently so.
Worse, high TTF prices forced some industrial output to be shut-in. After all, high commodity prices are supposed to do exactly that - reduce marginal consumption.
And now? Below seasonal consumption is roaring back up (chart: EU gas withdrawals (blue line) vs 8y-avg)
8/n
Consumption was already at record levels when compared to past 8y (as shown in chart above) as EU needs more gas for everything, but certainly for electricity generation. With a below-average cold temperature outlook (chart for 18 days; North-West EU), that will not change.
9/n
For more background on why Europe is in short supply of gas (the #hydrocarbon that provides power & heat) check this past thread. Upfront, the EU has structural supply issues, the alleviation of which need policy changes.
The Forward market however does not count on such policy changes. Instead it prices in a tighter EU gas market for years to come, as we illustrate below...
Finally, if somebody acuses you, @biancoresearch, that you are "clueless" or "if only media bothered to look at the numbers, it would have found out that #GAZPROM deliveries to EU are stable as a rock" - be careful b/c research is not their strength.
To be clear, the EU gas crisis has many reasons. But of course, Gazprom is one reason. It delivered 38% LESS gas into the CEE pipeline system when compared to 2019 levels (pre-Covid consumption). That is 600TWh of gas missing (net of S2M)!
How did he say, clueless!
13/13
β’ β’ β’
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
In this episode, we discuss China's 2nd of 5 economic paths it can follow.
This episode will also focus on Xi the leader. To understand Xi means to better understand China's economic path forward.
1/n #China
Can China replace malinvestment with more consumption?
Answer: Maybe a little bit & over a long time frame, but President Xi does not want to focus on this path. Instead, he wants to implement his socialist utopia.
2/n
Yes, Chinaβs rising entrepreneurs were welcomed by the Communist Party for at least two decades. But all of that is in reverse.
Under Xi Jinping, China has moved full circle: from low growth & low freedom in the pre-reform era back towards something similar today.
In this episode, we discuss China's investment-led growth model & the first of 5 economic paths China can follow.
As you would expect, also this episode is full of Chinese characteristics!
1/n #China
Starting in 1990s, Chinaβs economic engine has been fueled by capital investments.
Its central planning bureau defined GDP targets, picked winners and drove growth from debt-driven capital formations (green line).
2/n
Has any other nation tried this before, ever? Not to our knowledge.
We checked at ALL G20 economies and their respective growth models for past 70 years. 45% capital formation share is a unique experiment in economic history.
Over the past 3 years, we made some controversial calls in commodities. We decided to exit our oil holding in Aug 2022, we went short natgas in early 2023 or called for copper to go lower in May.
Why? Because we have an egde on China.
1/n #China
Yes, mainstream media picked up pace on important issues facing China today.
Most came to understand that the property bubble burst, that the economy is slowing, that geopolitical frictions are emerging, that there is too much debt.
But do they understand the underlying forces that drive these issues?
2/n
While the majority of these facts are known, most Western observers, investors & industrialists do not fully appreciate their interdependence & the structural changes that are unfolding in China today.
Pre-2020, Gold had one marginal buyer, that being gold-backed ETFs.
Today, gold has at least 3 marginal buyers that can overlap or alternate each other. They are:
- Gold backed Western ETFs (which buy, sell or hold based on US real rates);
- Central Banks seeking higher gold reserves (China; India; Thailand; Vietnam; Qatar, KSA or even Poland) for geopolitical & other reasons;
- Chinese & other Asian wholesale or retail market participants and professional speculators;
Who bought most last? India!
Why? The government cut import duties on gold by 9% at end of July, triggering a renewed surge in demand. βThe impact of the duty cut was unprecedented, it was incredible,β said Philip Newman, managing director of Metals Focus in London. βIt really brought consumers in.β
At least for now, there seems to be always somebody.
1/n
Note however that Chinese retail buying has slowed down recently, as best illustrated by the Shanghai gold premium over international prices.
I will elaborate on the Chinese retail clients more soon.
2/n
However, professional Chinese speculators have increased their futures positions somewhat again. Who is the better indicator of what comes next, retail or the pros? IDK
In 2023, I said I will tweet less about oil and I will stick to this promise but today I make an exception and will break the promise as we enter a period of more volatility for oil...
So let's talk about OPEC and Saudi market share. It's decision making time.
The Saudis decided to keep oil from falling <$75 for 2y by cutting overproportionally in their OPEC+ quota context.
They have cap for 12mbpd but produce 9mbpd. It was 10.5mbpd in 2022. Pick a number but they are 15-20% below their fair share.
2/n
Why did they do so?
Likely because of bad advisers. There is a whole crew of supply gloomers out there charging clients money to claim the Permian or US shale is about to roll over.
Let me share some real time data on the EU natgas market that are hard to get.
European gas consumption for 28 countries matches last's years to the cubic meter (Oct 2022 - Oct 2023 = Year 2022).
However, consumption remains 17% below 2019/20 season.
Is there a supply issue? Rubbish. The global LNG market is oversupplied from every corner; EU storages will be filled by end of Aug where we sit. We have too much gas.
#TTF 1/4 (in mcm/day and YTD)
Three factors matter why there is less consumption vs 2019/20 season:
1) Milder weather: 70% of total consumption is temperature related. Temperatures are milder, thus Europe consumes 14% less vs 2019/20.
Is that permenant? It sure looks like a trend where I sit. But climate scientists can answer that best.
Households Consumption; 2/4
2) Less power generation: Europe replaces more and more natgas in the grid with solar & wind and in the case of France with better capacity utilisation of its nuclear fleet. That adds up...!