A closer look at inflation in services excluding energy, this accounts for about 60% of the CPI and 75% of the core CPI.
Over the last three months up at a 4.6% annual rate compared to 2.9% annual rate pre-pandemic.
That excess is adding ~1.2pp to annualized core CPI.
Overall core services are still below trend--but is moving up more quickly so converging towards/above trend. You could look at that and say that our only inflation problem is goods. Or you could look at that and say we have another shoe yet to drop.
Leading candidate for yet-to-drop shoe #1 is housing prices. These are still up relatively slowly for *all* housing as compared to the large increases we're seeing for new leases. All should catch up to new.
Potential yet-to-drop shoe #2: pandemic-related prices. We're still in a pandemic. It has been constraining services demand and service prices. If we return to more normal then expect higher prices for airfare, hotels, events, etc.
Potential yet-to-drop shoe #3: there is some evidence from @jimstockmetrics and Mark Watson that service prices are more sensitive to labor market slack than overall prices. And labor markets much tighter now than they were a year ago. nber.org/papers/w25987
But who knows. I expect an undoing of the abnormal rotation to reduce inflation the question is how much--is it enough to get us to 2%? Does it leave us at 3%? And if it leaves us at 3% is the Fed OK with that (as I think they should be) or do they feel they need to fight it?
BTW, here is the same multiple period picture for durable goods that I showed you for core services.
And repeating the durable goods vs. services comparison over the last 24 months that started this discussion in the first place.
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Jobs report uniformly weak: 92K jobs lost (with job losses in almost every industry), household survey employment down too, unemployment rate up to 4.4%, participation down, avg weekly hours flat.
Main sign in the other direction was strong wage growth.
The dynamics for private employment look just like overall (86K lost in private with govt basically flat.
Unemployment rate still stable or slightly rising. Breakeven job growth is in the 25-50K range so negative jobs months will be more common and normal going forward. Note 3-month moving average of jobs is 6K so a bit below this range.
More than *all* of the jobs added over the last year have been in private education & health services.
Total jobs: 359K
Private education & health services: 773K
All other sectors: -414K
This might look surprisingly unbalanced. It's actually the opposite.
A 🧵
Here is percentage job growth across sectors over the last year. Dropping the two most extreme they range from 0.8% for leisure & hospitality to -1.5% for information, a 2.2pp difference.
(Note this post generally uses 3 month moving averages to smooth otherwise volatile data.)
This is job growth in 1996. It looks more balanced than 2025 because every industry added jobs. But actually the gap between the second highest (professional services at 5.1%) and second lowest (mining at 0.4%) is 4.7pp. Much more dispersed than this year.
Core CPI inflation rose during the month of January. But it fell and was relatively muted over longer periods of time--although still some concern the numbers a bit lower due to shutdown-related quirks.
On the surface a strong jobs report (130K jobs & unemployment falls to 4.3%).
And just about every detail makes it even stronger: participation up, involuntary part-time down, hours up, wages up.
The mystery of strong GDP and weak jobs is being resolved in the direction of GDP.
The job growth happened despite further cuts in federal jobs. Private employment was up an impressive 172K.
Note, breakeven job growth is currently about 25-50K because of reduced net immigration & also more fully recovered participation. So job growth has slowed but the unemployment rate now seems to have stabilized after slowly and steadily increasing since mid-2023.
I will be enthusiastically supporting faculty legislation to cap the number of A's at Harvard at 20% (plus a bit). The collective action problem that has driven grades higher & higher over time is increasingly problematic. I hope other institutions consider similar steps.
I've talked to numerous colleagues & students about grade inflation. Almost all of them see it as a a problem. I've also heard about as many different ideas for solutions as I've had conversations. I would tweak this proposal in various ways. But would support it over nothing.
One place the current system fails--and it's not the only place--is honors. I'm on the Committee to recommend honors in the economics department. It's increasingly hard to distinguish excellence with so many A's. I believe that now even two A-'s makes you ineligible for Summa.