Firstly, severing a subsea fiber isnt as simple as it sounds. Breaking a cable is one thing, severing it, is quite another.
Fiber optics are lightweight glass products, but propagating light across oceans requires power, so the cable is more a power cable as it is a fiber cable.
What's worth noting is that as the technology evolves, the form factor of subsea cables start to change.
More fiber cores are being pumped into small cables, means longer cables can be spooled onto cable laying ships.
But that presents a challenge
There is no one size fits all
If a critical legacy cable is broken, & spare cable isn't available on the shelf, a replacement length may need to be custom built to order.
Factor that in to aggressive manufacturing schedules, and you could be talking weeks, if not months to produce.
Then you need a ship that is capable, compatible, & available to collect the cable and deploy it.
These ships are in high demand with equally aggressive installation schedules to work against.
Repairing a cable doesnt always occur at the damage itself.
Diagnosing the fault can offer an indicative distance to the first break, but that is the dist of the cable, not the route.
The ship would bracket the fault over a multi km span, cut out & replace the bad section.
So when you see that 2.5 miles of cable has been removed from a circuit, that is an attack designed to strain the supply chain.
Ireland should take serious note of that and @IRLCoDF will hopefully be making recommendations to support maritime security.
Why is all this important in the context of military targeting?
Because if the cable is deemed an acceptable military target. Then what about the cable laying ship? Or the manufacturer's factories? Or stores? Or the repair crews themselves?
Is the entire supply chain at risk?
Yes, a malicious nation state actor can sever a cable, and temporarily disrupt connectivity, but if they wanted to sustain that impact, they would have to attack the supply chain.
This is where we get into dodgy grounds with the laws of armed conflict.
Could a cable laying ship be considered a military contract vessel?
What if it is a French ship is attacked by a Russian submarine working on a Transatlantic cable landing in the UK, responding to a cable break in Ireland's EEZ?
What are the implications of that?
There has already been reports by @JohnMooneyIRL that Russian spies are conducting reconnaissance on Irish landing points. Suspicious trawlers linked to Russia have been detected in Irish EEZ. Russian submarines are tracked by Royal Navy through our EEZ too.
What are we doing?
If Ireland was cut offline. How long before that results in violence?
Imagine the misinformation campaigns over the mediums that are left accessible. It would be carnage.
The economy would be irreparably damaged, and I couldn't see the big tech attraction to an offline nation
1) Fund the Naval Service so that it is an attractive career 2) Build capability in anti-sub warfare, subsurface surveillance & multi-role vessels. 3) Engage network carriers & offer naval protection within 🇮🇪 EEZ to repair ships during conflict.
How can you help?
Spread the word.
Have a conversation about the impact of Ireland going offline with your colleagues. See where it goes
Advocate for more defence funding. (Defence isn't a dirty word).
Call on your TD to promote investment in the Naval Service.
Lastly, if Ireland does suddenly get cut off from the internet and go offline, don't tune into RT and have them convince you it was a @NATO plot to use trained sharks to bite through cables to reduce the information flow so that they can control the Irish population.
Just don't.
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The Government are going to spend more tax payers money to hide from public view the arrangements that they'll neither confirm nor deny exist in the first place?
This is lose/lose for the DoD no matter how it plays out
1) If the DoD lose the appeal & it is revealed that we surrendered our skies to the British in a secret deal without a referendum, there will be public hell to pay
2) If the DoD succeed in hiding an agreement, it only stands to perpetuate the chronic under-defence of the country
3) If there is no agreement, it will show that we lacked the capability to defend our skies in 2001 & then every subsequent Govt actively chose to negligently not to build an air defence capability since. Politically, Sinn Fein is the only party untouched by this
As we enter another period of reform for the Irish Defence Forces, what can we learn from China's perspective of "Unrestricted Warfare" by Col Qiao Liang and Col Wang Xiangsui?
(Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999)
One theory of interest from the book is :
Firstly, I consistently reminded myself throughout this book that it was written in 1999 as China grappled with the acceptance of US supremacy in the sphere of military technology and affairs.
To revitalise the Reserve Defence Force (RDF), focus on fulfilment.
Currently, the @dfreserve Office of Reserve Affairs (ORA) are running workshops with Reservists regarding the future of the Reserve. A positive development and proactive approach. Regrettably, I missed the opportunity to participate, but it did get me thinking. 🤔
Lately, as I consider my own future in the RDF, I reflect on why I joined & why I stayed. I also think about all the potential applicants I meet, & why they make the choice to volunteer to join the RDF.
Generally, I feel that people join because they're missing something.
Firstly, strategically, delivering a radar system will suddenly expose the Minister to appearing weaker than ever before.
Why?
Because now that we can see the threat, not being able to deal with it highlights the inadequacy of the Minister's power.
There will be scope creep.
Radar is only part of a system, not a system in itself.
Announcing a radar is one thing, but if you deliver it without a fast air intercept or surface-to-air missile capability, it is going to prove pretty useless.
"It wasn’t that long ago that our neighbour was oppressing us. Now it’s our protector, because we took our eye off the ball and effectively surrendered our neutrality by penny-pinching on our own defence."
"A series of deals with the British and EU to protect our seaboard means we are no longer truly neutral, but we can't fight for ourselves either"
"The strict definition of neutrality is contained in the terms of the 1907 Hague Convention. It says that, to call yourself neutral, you are obliged to be able to defend that neutrality."