FBI often drops confidential human sources (CHS) once they become politically controversial. Identification of CHS’s is so closely controlled that it would not be hard for case agents, their supervisors, and the CHS management departments to conceal the records from scrutiny.
When the FBI authorizes a CHS to do something illegal (buy drugs, engage in kidnapping plot, incite someone, etc.), it must be approved at a high level in a field office. This is known as an "Otherwise Illegal Activity," or OAI, which is a strictly managed and recorded process.
The FBI gives OAI approval for a specific CHS to commit specific (authorized) crimes as part of a specific investigation.
There is an established, legal procedure for this as "bait" to entrap or otherwise compromise the target of a criminal or national security investigation.
There is an established, legal procedure for this as "bait" to entrap or otherwise compromise the target of a criminal or national security investigation.
When a former FBI man-turned-lawyer says his client "is" not an FBI "informant," he might technically be telling the truth. Apart from "is" versus "was," an "informant" is only one type of CHS. The client could have been a different type of CHS, such as a "cooperating witness."
CHS: Tricky thing about a "cooperating witness" is that his identity can be exposed during a prosecution, whereas a "confidential informant" is usually, but not always, protected.
Some bad actors might not be prosecuted so as to protect someone else who is a cooperating witness.
Some bad actors might not be prosecuted so as to protect someone else who is a cooperating witness.
Congressional oversight of the FBI historically has been poor, bringing us what we have today.
FBI testified in public about Confidential Human Sources (CHS) in 2007 about improving a deteriorated program. It describes CHS and how it should work. archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/…
FBI testified in public about Confidential Human Sources (CHS) in 2007 about improving a deteriorated program. It describes CHS and how it should work. archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/…
Here are the Attorney General's Guidelines for the FBI's use of Confidential Human Sources (CHS). justice.gov/sites/default/…
A Department of Justice Inspector General report in 2019 found that the FBI was not abiding by the Attorney General CHS Guidelines. oig.justice.gov/reports/2019/a…
The DOJ Inspector General found in November 2019 that the FBI's vetting process for CHS's "did not comply" with the guidelines; that FBI long-term validation reports were full of "deficiencies," the FBI was "inadequately staffed and trained" for the job, and a whole lot more.
Margot Cleveland @ProfMJCleveland of @FDRLST wrote an excellent story about this DOJ report back in 2019.
The FBI moves so slowly that I doubt it addressed the CHS problems by January 6, 2021. thefederalist.com/2019/11/25/blo…
The FBI moves so slowly that I doubt it addressed the CHS problems by January 6, 2021. thefederalist.com/2019/11/25/blo…
@ProfMJCleveland @FDRLST What if, for the sake of argument, FBI had Confidential Human Sources (CHS) among the organizers and perpetrators of J6 violence against our Capitol?
What if FBI's CHS vetting & control practices continued to be poor as DOJ IG found in 2019, so the FBI let an op spin of control?
What if FBI's CHS vetting & control practices continued to be poor as DOJ IG found in 2019, so the FBI let an op spin of control?
@ProfMJCleveland @FDRLST We don't know, because congressional Democrats and Republicans abdicated their responsibility for serious oversight of the FBI many years ago.
FBI has been able to operate free of any significant legislative oversight for decades. And so we have what we have.
FBI has been able to operate free of any significant legislative oversight for decades. And so we have what we have.
(Correction: In an above tweet, I incorrectly referred to the FBI's category of authorized "Otherwise Illegal Activities" as "OAI" instead of "OIA.")
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