Thread by @Stu_Lyle

Excellent article and case study from @SpencerGuardand @JaysonGeroux

Perfectly outlines the counters to many of the misguided arguments and statements that I hear with alarming regularity about urban operations.

mwi.usma.edu/urban-warfare-…

"to assume urban battles will only occur because the objective is to dislodge an enemy force from a city demonstrates a myopic view that ignores the larger picture."

For those who says "we'll just bypass the urban". We rarely get to pick the battles we want. Others get a vote.

"Israeli urban tactics, with swift armor strikes, had been successful in previous conflicts" leading to false confidence.

I got 2003 Baghdad/Basra vibes when reading this. I have heard many extoll the virtues of "Thunder Runs" since, failing to note the poor Iraqi defences.

In urban "relying on speed rather than intelligence is a gamble, not a risk"

This could easily serve as a cautionary "what if..." alternative view of how both those 2003 battles could have turned out.

We need to read history in context, not just on face value.

Urban defence "can delay and even halt a force on the offensive... [and] it can create the time needed for political action."

We're very offensive-focused in the West, but vs. peer adversaries we may need to conduct such delays. We may look to exploit the urban for these reasons

"a major lesson drawn from an analysis of this battle is that armor assets must be used—and protected—in urban combat."
Unfortunately, this is a lesson we seem to have to keep stating over and over again (myself, very recently). When will it stick?

https://mobile.twitter.com/RoyalArmdCorps/status/1479353926667358209

More unfortunately, with the retirement of Warrior, the reduction in numbers of Challenger 3 MBTs and the limited firepower of Boxer, the UK is reducing our armour at the same time as stating that we are more likely to conduct urban ops.

If we don't reverse that trend then we need to massively up-gun our infantry to offset some of this drop in protected firepower. I have a few ideas...

"negative repercussions can occur when a military unit is suddenly grouped together and given an unfamiliar task under hurried circumstances and on a type of terrain for which they are not trained."

Urban ops = combined arms teams at lowest tactical levels, trained in peacetime!

Overall, a great case study and excellent article covering the main lessons. The British Army is small, so we, arguably, have more opportunities and greater incentive to do combined arms teaming. We can't avoid urban ops, but we can learn from the past to be ready in future. End.