Russia's current activities are a continuation of the buildup it conducted in the spring. Units from Siberia were deployed then and never left. Not only was that before the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it occurred before Biden announced the withdrawal. wsj.com/articles/how-t…
If you're going to try to explain why Russia is escalating, you need to address why they decided to conduct a buildup in March and what has happened since. This editorial seems to argue it is all about weakness from Washington, a common and poor foreign policy analysis cliché. 2/
Russian interventions in Ukraine and Syria were primarily driven by events in both countries. Russia was reactive. The POTUS wasn't that relevant, though they did learn from the Bush admin in 2008 that the US wouldn't stop them with force (strange WSJ didn't see that as weakness)
It is easy to argue other countries' foreign policy decisions are mostly shaped by US strength or weakness but it is almost always wrong. Russia is responding to recent events in Ukraine, but their perception of security issues is shaped by decisions made by the previous 4 POTUS.
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In 2021, the Russian MoD received 5k pieces of new or modernized equipment including:
-900 armored vehicles
-3 submarines
-4 surface ships, 10 cutters, 17 support boats;
-151 aircraft (77 planes, 29 helicopters, 45 UAVs)
-Pantsir-S, S-350, S-400
-3 Bastion systems
-4 Tu-95MS
Shoigu said the Army and Navy have 71.2% modern equipment, the Strategic Nuclear Forces is 89.1%, and the serviceability of military equipment is 95%. He said the 1st Avangard HGV regiment is fully equipped, and a MiG-31K regiment with Kinzhals has been formed. 2/
2022 thread on Russian exercises with foreign countries. The Pacific Fleet’s Varyag missile cruiser, Admiral Tributs large anti-submarine ship, and Boris Butoma tanker arrived at the Iranian port city of Chabahar for an exercise with Iran and China. t.me/ChDambiev/12916
The Varyag, Admiral Tributs, and Boris Butoma departed Vladivostok at the end of December. 2/
Russia conducted a joint naval exercise with Iran in the Gulf of Oman and northern Indian Ocean with the Baltic Fleet's Stoikiy Project 20380 corvette last February. 3/
Ryabkov is being quite explicit. Russia believes further negotiations with Kyiv are pointless and neither France nor Germany forced Kyiv to make concessions as part of the Normandy format.
So either 1) the US makes Kyiv concede or 2) Russia uses force to compel Kyiv to concede.
I've heard plenty of people argue that NATO should declare an end to further expansion, but that would not resolve the current crisis and the risk of war would remain. Russia wants a solution to the Donbas on its terms (with only a little wiggle room for compromise).
I think many people are debating inducements to Russia that are peripheral to the main issue. If the US is not willing to coerce Ukraine to accept limitations on its sovereignty, then a Russian military escalation will remain likely. There aren't any easy offramps here.
My argument regarding Russia's behavior: 1) Moscow switched from deterrence to compellence 2) The key issue is Moscow believes Kyiv will remain hostile and is increasing its defensive capabilities 3) the costs of inaction are greater than an escalation fpri.org/article/2022/0…
Ukraine currently lacks a strong long-range fires capability. If they acquire that, they will have stronger conventional deterrence vis-à-vis Russia and could strike Russian cities. So a military escalation would be more costly for Moscow in the future than now. 2/
If they use force, Russia will use it to achieve political goals and inflict pain on Ukraine to alter their incentives. This could be done by destroying military units, inflicting casualties, taking PoWs, and degrading their ability to defend against future escalations. 3/
I previously thought Russia could maintain its heightened presence near Ukraine for much of 2022. With the deployment of Eastern Military District equipment, this has probably changed. Not sure they could keep up this presence through the summer without greater readiness costs.
I'm not sure how problematic the timing of the Olympics is for Russian planning, but they are still moving equipment into place and haven't deployed the VDV yet. So they probably can't escalate before the Olympics and be confident it would be over before they start. 2/
That either means they escalate during the Olympics/joint exercise with Belarus, or they wait until the end of February-early March. The Eastern Military District units will be better prepared after the exercise, which includes a live-fire component. 3/
Even if Russia doesn't use Belarusian territory for kinetic strikes, they can deploy electronic warfare systems in Belarus just 80km from Kyiv to try to disrupt Ukrainian command, control, and communications.
And of course, Russian forces in Belarus, especially in western Belarus, would force Ukraine to spread out its forces to defend another part of its border, which could make it more difficult to defend against Russia's potential main axis of advance.
And this electronic warfare deployment could include deploying Krasukha systems to try to disrupt the operation of US E-8 JSTARS aircraft that have been flying over Ukraine to track the movement of Russian units.