🧵How Barca's switch to 3-4-3 solved the problem of the 4-3-3 against Alaves:
The 1st half was lacklustre and Alaves' disciplined defence controlled spaces both centrally and in wide areas effectively without the ball. How did Xavi's formation switch win the game?
Mendilibar's sides are known for their pressing, and Alaves put up a defensive masterclass in the first half. They set up in a compact 4-4-1-1 shape denying space between the lines with wide midfielders tucking in narrow and the defensive line holding a midblock. #AlavesBarca
Their pressing structure managed to dominate the central spaces and Barca looked out of ideas even in possession. The front 2 create a 2v2 and Busi is closely marked. Pedri is also outnumbered in the inside channel and the wide wingers are marked 1v1. Dest is the only free man.
In wide areas, the defence would shuffle across quickly and efficiently to create an overload. In this instance, they create a 4v3 in the zone d5 which forces Barca to play back. Barca also lack any positional superiority in the centre.
When the pass is played back, Alaves defence pushes up and closes the free players in the middle. The two forwards press with angles to create a 2v2 against the two CBs with no option to break lines with passes through the middle forcing them to go back or around the structure.
In this instance, Araujo builds up through the inside channel and has Frenkie between the lines, Torres high and wide, and Alba deeper. Despite the options, Alaves pressing structure creates a 4v4 numerical equality on the left side of the pitch giving Barca no real advantage.
In the subsequent action, Barca are once again forced back from the left outside channel. Alaves have managed to press them out wide creating an overload and in the zone of intervention they make 3v2 with a 4v4 in the outside channel. A great defensive phase example by Alaves.
70' Xavi brings on Nico for Abde and switches to a 3-4-3. Now they have a double pivot of Busi and Frenkie and two 'interiors' between the lines - Pedri and Nico. Alba and Torres provide amplitude and Luuk (later Jutgla) pins the backline as the centre forward.
The first effect is less pressure on the CBs to dribble out since they have superiority out of the back. You see the Alaves defensive structure more spread out as a 4-2-3-1 because of two pivots and two advanced mids who have more spaces between the lines in the half spaces.
The extra central player in the form of Nico helps Barca gain control of the centre. (Read here:
Having 2 players between the lines in the inside channel creates superiority in the middle and frees up the wide player, Torres to whom the final pass leads.
Although the switch to the 3-4-3 comes at a risk of exposing the back to counter attacks, the extra man in the middle helps immediately apply pressure through superiority and increases chances of winning back possession in the middle.
When Araujo finds space to dribble out, both Alba and Pedri attack the backline, one from outside and one from the inside channel. This gives Frenkie space out wide. An additional CM, Nico between lines also gives Torres the freedom to attack the outside channel on the right.
☝️Compare how positional this attack is to the first half where they were pushed out wide and overloaded on the right, earlier in the thread. The additional player in the middle frees up the wide players and gives more time and space in buildup.
This was the sequence that led to the goal. Despite conceding possession in the progression, they immediately win the ball back through Busquets. You see them having superiority in the middle a4 and b4. Also Torres can hold his position on d5 for Busi to switch the diagonal.
The change of tactic immediately resulted in Barca playing more positional with better rhythm. Although it could be argued the switch came too late, since they were poor for most of the game and Alaves defended well, it happened just in time to secure 3 crucial points in the end.
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Playing in a 4-2-4 with a flat back-4, and wingers requiring to hold the width against KSA's high line, Argentina were outnumbered in the centre with only Paredes and De Paul.
If one of the forwards came short to receive, he was man-marked aggressively.
De Paul wasn't exactly the mid to crack the KSA block by receiving in pockets and opening up passing lanes between the lines. Only Paredes could be trusted with playmaking in front of the defence, and in the 2-half after KSA's lead and Paredes' substitution, ARG ran out of ideas.
Barca's defensive dominance against Napoli:
[visual THREAD]
Barca looked far superior out of possession in comparison to their previous big games yesterday, particularly in the first half because of:
• High press
• Counter-pressing
• High defensive line
In this short thread, I've highlighted multiple instances where their pressing worked to perfection in winning the ball back, closing all the outlets for Napoli to build up and compressing the space required to defend in the middle. Let's examine how it worked: 👇
Counter-press case 1:
• Pass played to Frenkie about to result in loss of possession in zone b5
• Alba, Pedri and Busi positioned close to be able to press and cut passing lanes
• Overload created by numerical superiority, Alba intercepts, possession won back in b4 #Barca
• Using Pedraza more attackingly than defensively
• Moreno and Lo Celso playing between the lines
• Foyth staying back for security to construct as a back-three
Villarreal held a compact structure to deny spaces in the centre while keeping the block high to win back possession higher up
Even when Juventus shifted out wide to try and play around the structure, Villarreal's 4-4-2 would shuffle across as a unit to create a man-oriented overload to try and win the ball back high up in the opponent's half
It relies on the brain's ability to perceive similar patterns of play and situations through experience while correctly adapting to new circumstances that may arise. The skill of predicting what is going to happen gets better through experience.
B for Body.
Body oriented correctly while receiving the ball, playing and in duels makes a big difference to the individual's game and of the team. It buys you time. The 'sword and shield' principle: At any moment, you can either deal with the ball or the pressure, not both.
Interesting perspective by Toni Kroos on the quality of football in different tiers of the pyramid: 'In the long period of pro career, I believe everyone plays where they belong.' (source: Einfach Mal Luppen Podcast)
'The top tier is easier than the lower leagues for some players because the quality of football is much higher, provided they keep up with the intensity and tempo.'
'90% of the game in lower leagues are duels rather than football, and it only gets more physical as you go lower.'
There's a problem with the traditional model of viewing a game of football as four distinct phases of open play - Attack, Defence and Transitions - and set pieces. Instead of looking at a team as a set of 11 players, we view it as one being. I elaborate on some details around it:
The traditional model of breaking down the game into four phases, primarily two - one with the ball, and one without the ball - and the two transitions between them, assumes that the team behaves as a whole in any instant independant of it's individual players.
But each individual player goes through his/her own phase depending on their positioning, the part of the pitch, the profile of the player (attack/defence minded). Thus at any moment, you have a number of players in a particular phase, and you average the team's phase from them.