Let's acknowledge from the outset that for arms control to help, Putin has to want to defuse the crisis. I have no idea whether he does.
But *if* he does, I think arms control can help to address various Russian *and* U.S./Russian/NATO security concerns. (2/n)
It's not clear from the @wsj report exactly what was in the U.S. proposal. The WSJ mentions the Biden admin has given consideration to a reciprocal scale-back of military exercises and new rules governing the back sea.
But I'll focus here on three proposals.
(3/n)
First, Putin has long floated the idea of a moratorium of INF-type missiles in Europe. The proposal includes unspecified verification and covers the 9M729 (even though Russia continues to deny, unpersuasively IMO, that it violated the INF Treaty).
U.S./NATO officials previously dismissed this idea because of the mobility of the 9M729. Plus verification would not be easy. But, under currently circumstances, the U.S. government is rightly interested in the concept again; it'd have benefits for both sides. (5/n)
Second, Putin tied his proposal to inspections of Aegis Ashore facilities in Europe. Significantly, Warsaw is apparently open to this idea (on the basis of reciprocity). (6/n)
Such inspections could demonstrate that Aegis Ashore launchers were not loaded with cruise missiles and that their SM-3 interceptors could not catch Russian ICBMs.
Finally, U.S. officials are reportedly concerned that Russia might move nonstrategic nuclear weapons toward NATO and apparently discussed this general concern in the recent Geneva talks. (8/n)
A second Acton/MacDonald/Vaddi proposal for inspections of *empty* actual or suspected warhead storage facilities to demonstrate the *absence* of nuclear warheads could be useful here. (9/n)
For sure, it's difficult to be optimistic! As I say, Putin may not be looking for a way out and, even if he is, his demands may go far beyond these kinds of technical measures.
(10/n)
That said, be careful about taking certain Russian statements at face value.
*IF* Russia is open to arms control approaches--and again, it may not be!--officials would play down that interest to try and drive harder bargain in negotiations. (11/11)
🧵Initial thoughts on Russia's new nuclear doctrine, based on a machine translation of Putin's comments. (I have not seen the doctrine yet; my assessment may change when I do).
BLUF: It's not tied as directly to the Ukraine war as others think. (1/n)
@ChatGPTapp As has been reported, Putin is saying he might use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state that attacked Russia in concert with a nuclear-weapon state.
This mirror U.S. declaratory policy until 2009 (I think), which contained a similar provision. (3/n)
This thread is a transparent attempt by Colby to foreclose scrutiny of his behavior around the insurrection on Jan 6, 2021. I want to explain what he did and why it shouldn't be ignored.
(Like all my tweets, these are my personal views.)
My criticism of Colby is nothing to do with his conservative views. We were friends—good friends—for years. We regularly had lunch or dinner. I went to Rio for his wedding. He came to mine. Throughout that time, we disagreed a lot about policy—domestic and foreign—but...
(2/n)
… we discussed those disagreements in a good-faith, productive way. We found common ground on nuclear policy and wrote together. I read part of his book manuscript and he thanked me in his acknowledgments.
Ukraine has reportedly attacked the Russian early-warning radar at Armavir. This strike was a bad idea. It provided only limited military benefit to Ukraine and exacerbates nuclear risks.
The Armavir radar is part of Russia's "strategic" early warning system. It is designed to detect an incoming nuclear strike and enable Russia to launch its nuclear forces before they are destroyed.
However, such radars can also contribute to nonnuclear warfighting--not least by detecting nonnuclear ballistic missiles and enabling defenses. I assume that Ukraine hit this radar to help U.S.-supplied ATACMS penetrate Russian defenses. (3/n)
At @CSIS @csisponi yesterday, Frank Miller engaged with my recent essay on targeting. In a collegial spirit, I'd like to respond to him here--he has mispresented me--and accept his offer to a public debate.
I believe the United States should adopt CMI targeting (Conventional Military forces and war-supporting Industry) because it would make us and our allies more secure, whether or not China or Russia changed their targeting policies (which, again, I don't think they would). (3/n)
<THREAD>There's been evidence-free speculation that Prigozhin may try to seize a nuclear weapon or two. I think this fear is misplaced. That said, there is a nuclear risk associated with this insurrection--one that isn't yet being discussed. (1/n)
CAVEAT: The situation on the ground in Russia is clearly very fluid and unpredictable, and I'm certainly not going to try to predict what's going to happen. Here I aim to assess what we should worry about NOT how worried we should be. (2/n)
An armed insurrection in a nuclear-armed state is clearly disquieting (even if its current leader goes around invading his neighbors). But, for two reasons, I don't see Prigozhin (who probably isn't much better BTW) seeking a nuclear weapon. (3/n)
<THREAD>China now appears to have a comprehensive early-warning system against a U.S. first strike, allowing it to operationalize launch-under-attack options.
Stay tuned a new discovery: a new-ish Chinese radar that rotates (no, not Korla).
(1/n)
As Chinese sources and the Pentagon have reported, China has been developing an early-warning (EW) system for a decade-ish so it could launch its nuclear forces before being destroyed by a US first strike (launch under attack). (2/n)
Recent analyses have suggested China’s EW system is not yet complete. According to one news story, the geostationary TJS-2, -5, and -6 satellites are for EW. If so, they'd detect US Trident-D5 launches from the pacific, BUT… (3/n)