Let's acknowledge from the outset that for arms control to help, Putin has to want to defuse the crisis. I have no idea whether he does.
But *if* he does, I think arms control can help to address various Russian *and* U.S./Russian/NATO security concerns. (2/n)
It's not clear from the @wsj report exactly what was in the U.S. proposal. The WSJ mentions the Biden admin has given consideration to a reciprocal scale-back of military exercises and new rules governing the back sea.
But I'll focus here on three proposals.
(3/n)
First, Putin has long floated the idea of a moratorium of INF-type missiles in Europe. The proposal includes unspecified verification and covers the 9M729 (even though Russia continues to deny, unpersuasively IMO, that it violated the INF Treaty).
U.S./NATO officials previously dismissed this idea because of the mobility of the 9M729. Plus verification would not be easy. But, under currently circumstances, the U.S. government is rightly interested in the concept again; it'd have benefits for both sides. (5/n)
Second, Putin tied his proposal to inspections of Aegis Ashore facilities in Europe. Significantly, Warsaw is apparently open to this idea (on the basis of reciprocity). (6/n)
Such inspections could demonstrate that Aegis Ashore launchers were not loaded with cruise missiles and that their SM-3 interceptors could not catch Russian ICBMs.
Finally, U.S. officials are reportedly concerned that Russia might move nonstrategic nuclear weapons toward NATO and apparently discussed this general concern in the recent Geneva talks. (8/n)
A second Acton/MacDonald/Vaddi proposal for inspections of *empty* actual or suspected warhead storage facilities to demonstrate the *absence* of nuclear warheads could be useful here. (9/n)
For sure, it's difficult to be optimistic! As I say, Putin may not be looking for a way out and, even if he is, his demands may go far beyond these kinds of technical measures.
(10/n)
That said, be careful about taking certain Russian statements at face value.
*IF* Russia is open to arms control approaches--and again, it may not be!--officials would play down that interest to try and drive harder bargain in negotiations. (11/11)
The claim that Iran had 60 days to make a deal is disingenuous since the United States was hardly ready, and did not conduct, an intensive, detailed negotiation. (1/n)
For example, there were times when Iran was willing to talk but the United States wasn't (presumably because it needed more time to prepare).
🧵The stated goal of Israel’s military campaign is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. With operations ongoing, it's too early to reach a conclusion.
But I can highlight outstanding questions that will determine whether Israel will achieve its nuclear goal. (1/n)
Let's focus on three areas:
👉Fordow
👉Enriched uranium stockpile
👉Centrifuge components
BLUF: As of now, key facilities, material, and equipment are--or are likely--intact.
CAVEAT: The situation is fluid and uncertain. (2/n)
FORDOW is an enrichment plant buried in a mountain. While there are reports of some strikes against the facility, IAEA DG @rafaelmgrossi reports this morning that no damage is visible. (3/n)
🧵Initial thoughts on Russia's new nuclear doctrine, based on a machine translation of Putin's comments. (I have not seen the doctrine yet; my assessment may change when I do).
BLUF: It's not tied as directly to the Ukraine war as others think. (1/n)
@ChatGPTapp As has been reported, Putin is saying he might use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state that attacked Russia in concert with a nuclear-weapon state.
This mirror U.S. declaratory policy until 2009 (I think), which contained a similar provision. (3/n)
This thread is a transparent attempt by Colby to foreclose scrutiny of his behavior around the insurrection on Jan 6, 2021. I want to explain what he did and why it shouldn't be ignored.
(Like all my tweets, these are my personal views.)
My criticism of Colby is nothing to do with his conservative views. We were friends—good friends—for years. We regularly had lunch or dinner. I went to Rio for his wedding. He came to mine. Throughout that time, we disagreed a lot about policy—domestic and foreign—but...
(2/n)
… we discussed those disagreements in a good-faith, productive way. We found common ground on nuclear policy and wrote together. I read part of his book manuscript and he thanked me in his acknowledgments.