Let's acknowledge from the outset that for arms control to help, Putin has to want to defuse the crisis. I have no idea whether he does.
But *if* he does, I think arms control can help to address various Russian *and* U.S./Russian/NATO security concerns. (2/n)
It's not clear from the @wsj report exactly what was in the U.S. proposal. The WSJ mentions the Biden admin has given consideration to a reciprocal scale-back of military exercises and new rules governing the back sea.
But I'll focus here on three proposals.
(3/n)
First, Putin has long floated the idea of a moratorium of INF-type missiles in Europe. The proposal includes unspecified verification and covers the 9M729 (even though Russia continues to deny, unpersuasively IMO, that it violated the INF Treaty).
U.S./NATO officials previously dismissed this idea because of the mobility of the 9M729. Plus verification would not be easy. But, under currently circumstances, the U.S. government is rightly interested in the concept again; it'd have benefits for both sides. (5/n)
Second, Putin tied his proposal to inspections of Aegis Ashore facilities in Europe. Significantly, Warsaw is apparently open to this idea (on the basis of reciprocity). (6/n)
Such inspections could demonstrate that Aegis Ashore launchers were not loaded with cruise missiles and that their SM-3 interceptors could not catch Russian ICBMs.
Finally, U.S. officials are reportedly concerned that Russia might move nonstrategic nuclear weapons toward NATO and apparently discussed this general concern in the recent Geneva talks. (8/n)
A second Acton/MacDonald/Vaddi proposal for inspections of *empty* actual or suspected warhead storage facilities to demonstrate the *absence* of nuclear warheads could be useful here. (9/n)
For sure, it's difficult to be optimistic! As I say, Putin may not be looking for a way out and, even if he is, his demands may go far beyond these kinds of technical measures.
(10/n)
That said, be careful about taking certain Russian statements at face value.
*IF* Russia is open to arms control approaches--and again, it may not be!--officials would play down that interest to try and drive harder bargain in negotiations. (11/11)
@ForeignPolicy @IgnatiusPost @washingtonpost Ignatius's oped is written as if it's a news story. The "news" in this case is that--SURPRISE!--an Israeli source backed up claims by the Israeli government! (3/n)
🧵How much damage was done to Iran's nuclear program?
An analysis of Friday's reporting of the U.S. government assessment. I'll focus on the @nytimes, which was clearer than the earlier but confused @NBCNews story. (1/n)
U.S. officials continue to argue that it would take Iran years to rebuild the facilities that were hit. That seems right to me.
But a key question is this: How long would it take Iran to build the bomb? (2/n)
Attempts to play down the survival of most or all of Iran's HEU are comical.
It may be true that "only" the HEU at Isfahan is accessible--but that's almost all of it! (3/n)
Here's my proposed U.S. nuclear strategy for managing escalation, arms racing, and proliferation with two nuclear peers, published through @CFR_org.
Health warning: If you like counterforce, take a DEEP breath before reading on. (1/n)
The U.S. faces a security environment that's bad and getting worse. There's an emerging bipartisan consensus that, in response, the U.S. needs more nukes. The justification stems from the current policy of "counterforce" targeting. (2/n)
The logic of counterforce targeting is merciless, however, and will catalyze an expensive, tension-generating, and futile three-ways arms race in which the United States will fail to achieve the nuclear superiority it seeks. (3/n)
The claim that Iran had 60 days to make a deal is disingenuous since the United States was hardly ready, and did not conduct, an intensive, detailed negotiation. (1/n)
For example, there were times when Iran was willing to talk but the United States wasn't (presumably because it needed more time to prepare).