A political economy thread on why the Netherlands has become the main entry point for South American cocaine into Europe.
33 tons of cocaine were seized in the port of Rotterdam in 2019. Last year cocaine amounts with a street value of 5 BILLION EUR were seized. How has it come to this? Let's go to 1980s Colombia. nltimes.nl/2019/11/11/coc…
At first, Colombian drug traffickers would channel cocaine into Miami via the Caribbean, using boats or planes flown by people like Barry Seal (there is a movie about him). But then, the amount of product that could be circulated was limited. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barry_Seal
The US government then clamped down on these routes, and the drug road shifted towards Mexico, via Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez.
With the opening of NAFTA, trade between Mexico and the US skyrockets. The drug trade takes advantage of open trade for large amounts of goods through the border vice.com/en/article/yw7…
At first, the Colombians paid the Mexicans to transport the product while controlling distribution in the US themselves. Progressively, Mexican cartels ask to be paid in product instead, and assume the transport and distribution. The power balance shifts in favor of the Mexicans.
That means that the profit margin for the Colombians diminishes. Moreover, the US government has a lot of leverage in South America; the risk of extradition is high. The costs and risks are high. bbc.com/news/world-lat…
The Colombians look for other markets. They make a business decision: In Europe, the other large rich drug consumption market in the world, the risk of extradition is lower, the retail price is slightly higher, and the grip of EU governments in South America is much smaller.
At first, the obvious partner to get the product to Europe is the Calabrian Ndrangheta, which has direct connections with the Colombian paramilitaries, and has networks through Italy and Spain insightcrime.org/investigations…
But then the main Colombian Ndrangheta contacts are arrested and extradited to the US. The channel dries up. theguardian.com/world/2020/aug…
One route emerges as the main alternative: the Ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, whose importance increases relative to the Spanish-mediterranean route. unodc.org/documents/data…
Rotterdam in particular handles incredibly high volumes of goods and containers. The volume of goods going through it in 2020 was 436.8 million tonnes. Like NAFTA, huge volumes of trade allow for easier illegal drug exports hidden in the mass link.springer.com/article/10.100…
In terms of quantities of cocaine seized, Antwerp and Rotterdam are by far the biggest volumes in Europe. And the the quantities seized are probably only a small portion of those circulating. unodc.org/documents/data…
Of course, the Netherlands also has great logistic and transport networks, combined with a tolerant drug policy. In terms of freight, it is THE entry point for goods into Europe. Not only for drugs, but for everything else.
It also has very developed financial system which allows for the money from the drug trade to flow into the legitimate economy
The sheer volume of goods makes it easy to hide cocaine shipments in the millions of containers. But how do you get the product out of the port? You need the help of local Dutch gangs.
Significant Dutch drug gangs are based in the Moroccan diaspora, which has many young men with limited job prospects. The unemployment rate among people with a Moroccan background in the NL is almost 3x the average cbs.nl/nl-nl/achtergr….
The Moroccan diaspora in the Benelux emerged from the labour migration waves from the Moroccan Rif (the biggest cannabis production area in the world) to the Benelux from the 1960s onwards. In the 1970s and 1980s, economic turmoil causes mass unemployment. journals.openedition.org/bagf/3337
If you combine the production of cannabis in the Rif, Morocco-NL immigration networks, unemployment and the Dutch tolerance policy, you have a supply chain.
Existing networks built around cannabis, just like in Mexico, could be used for the channeling of cocaine. This is what happens from 2008 onwards. Dutch gangs get in contact with the Colombian drug cartels. Controlling Rotterdam and Antwerp = sitting on a goldmine.
We know Dutch gangs are in contact with Colombian cartels to organise the transport from Latin America to Europe. A Dutch kingpin was arrested in Medellin in 2020. panorama.nl/artikel/132486…
After arrival, local Dutch gangs bribe port employees and use young men to hide in "hotel containers" to retrieve the product. insightcrime.org/news/nightfall…
The "extractors" are paid by the kilo. Sometimes they're minors, who risk little in the way of sanctions. rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederla…
The flow of South American cocaine and the huge profits associated has created huge fortunes but also rivalries and a wave of violence. The biggest drug kingpin was arrested in Dubai in 2019 theguardian.com/world/2019/dec…
The violence culminated last summer with the murder of Peter R. de Vries, a crime journalist acting as counsellor for the crown witness in the process against said drug kingpin. nytimes.com/2021/07/15/wor…
Even the prime minister Mark Rutte received extra protection after rumors of an attack from the underworld. nu.nl/amsterdam/6159…
This was partly based on the excellent first episode of season 2 of the podcast Cocainekoorts by @jmeeus12, and notably the great account of the south American connection by @jerrymcdermott.
In the unlikely case that you understand Dutch it's really great nrc.nl/cocainekoorts/
And since you ask, yes there is a Narcos: Amsterdam (sort of):
Useful point from the author of the Mocro Maffia book. Tbh I was also sceptical of the Saviano claim. A cashless economy where tax authorities know everything about everyone, money laundering as such is probably less easy than in other countries
I am writing a book on immigration policy and the welfare state for @OUPPolitics. Here's a thread on how my own existence is due to immigration policy and the welfare state.
Up to the 1960s, Switzerland had satisfied a great deal of its labour needs with immigrant workers from Italy, so that it had become quite dependent on Italian workers. In 1960, 20% of the whole workforce were migrant workers, and two thirds of these were Italian.
But permit conditions were drastic, with limits on family reunification, exclusion from welfare schemes. Given that wages and living conditions in Italy were improving rapidly, Italy used this dependency as leverage.
Based on the projection and earlier polls asking about vote transfers, this is how voter flows in the second round of the French presidential election could look like. If this holds Macron should still win with 54%.
This ignores the small candidates for whom I don't have declared preferences in the second round. It also ignores the "endorsements" for the runoff being made just now. Mélenchon just called not to give a single vote to Le Pen, even if he didn't name Macron explicitly.
We know that a number of radical right (RR) parties in Western Europe have developed substantial (ideological; financial) links with the Russian government over the years. bbc.com/news/world-eur…
But what about their voters? The Pew Research Center periodically asks respondents in 16 countries about their views on a number of global issues, and notably their trust in global leaders, including Putin. The last available wave is from 2021. pewresearch.org/global/2021/09…
I guess it had to happen: I started a substack where I'm going to post some short pieces. You can subscribe here: alexandreafonso.substack.com
The first post is about radical right voters in Western Europe and Vladimir Putin. We know that Le Pen, Salvini and the AfD are very pro-Putin. Was it the case of their voters? alexandreafonso.substack.com/p/1-radical-ri…
I use data from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey collected in 9 countries in 2021 (n=9k). The short answer is that radical right voters were on average 3x more likely than other voters to have confidence in Vladimir Putin to "do the right thing in world affairs".