Portugal votes tomorrow. The decline in electoral turnout since the establishment of democracy has been spectacular {
In fact, Portugal has one of the lowest turnouts in legislative elections of all the countries in the CPDS dataset
One relevant factor for the 2019 elections is that electoral law changed and residents abroad (Portugal has a huge diaspora) are now automatically registered. The electorate abroad expanded from ca. 250'000 to 1.5 million between the 2015 and 2019 elections.
And abstention among Portuguese nationals abroad is extremely high. Abstention among the Portuguese in Portugal has increased too, but the change in the rules also multiplied by 6 and electorate where abstention is almost 90%, bringing total abstention further down.
Talking about turnout, I had looked at the impact of Covid on turnout at the 2021 presidential elections. The municipalities where the incidence of covid was the highest around the election were also those where turnout declined the most.
Obviously legislative and presidential elections are different, but this should affect the level, not the slope.
This is the probability to have voted in Portugal by age and education (ESS 2018). Younger people are less likely to vote, but the difference is mostly due to generational differences among those with lower levels of education.
Important to say that most surveys overestimate turnout. The turnout reported in surveys is always higher than the real one.
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I am writing a book on immigration policy and the welfare state for @OUPPolitics. Here's a thread on how my own existence is due to immigration policy and the welfare state.
Up to the 1960s, Switzerland had satisfied a great deal of its labour needs with immigrant workers from Italy, so that it had become quite dependent on Italian workers. In 1960, 20% of the whole workforce were migrant workers, and two thirds of these were Italian.
But permit conditions were drastic, with limits on family reunification, exclusion from welfare schemes. Given that wages and living conditions in Italy were improving rapidly, Italy used this dependency as leverage.
Based on the projection and earlier polls asking about vote transfers, this is how voter flows in the second round of the French presidential election could look like. If this holds Macron should still win with 54%.
This ignores the small candidates for whom I don't have declared preferences in the second round. It also ignores the "endorsements" for the runoff being made just now. Mélenchon just called not to give a single vote to Le Pen, even if he didn't name Macron explicitly.
We know that a number of radical right (RR) parties in Western Europe have developed substantial (ideological; financial) links with the Russian government over the years. bbc.com/news/world-eur…
But what about their voters? The Pew Research Center periodically asks respondents in 16 countries about their views on a number of global issues, and notably their trust in global leaders, including Putin. The last available wave is from 2021. pewresearch.org/global/2021/09…
I guess it had to happen: I started a substack where I'm going to post some short pieces. You can subscribe here: alexandreafonso.substack.com
The first post is about radical right voters in Western Europe and Vladimir Putin. We know that Le Pen, Salvini and the AfD are very pro-Putin. Was it the case of their voters? alexandreafonso.substack.com/p/1-radical-ri…
I use data from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey collected in 9 countries in 2021 (n=9k). The short answer is that radical right voters were on average 3x more likely than other voters to have confidence in Vladimir Putin to "do the right thing in world affairs".