Thread by @keithmgordon

I have eventually had a chance to look through the recent FOIA disclosures.
whatdotheyknow.com/request/emails…
I have set out some comments in the tweets that follow. Some comments have already been made by me and by others.

I’m sure this e-mail has been disclosed before in another context.
But it is worth remembering that Jim Harra recognised as “principled” the main objection to the loan charge – being its retrospection and its giving HMRC a second bite of the cherry.

Here Jim Harra makes clear his low esteem of the Loan Charge Action Group.
Other disclosures show that that view is shared within HMRC. There is a later e-mail from LCAG to HMRC which should have pacified matters.

This (as was others) was apparently redacted because HMRC considered that the public interest did not justify disclosure of what civil servants had been discussing. I suspect that this approach might be worthy of reference to the ICO for a more independent view.

This suggests a rather misleading response by an HMRC spokesperson. In the vast majority of the cases the workers “were paid” rather than “paid themselves”.

I am not sure, but surely anyone with a burdensome tax debt (on which interest is accruing) is a serious risk of accruing further debt. If so, does that mean that the “bankruptcy as a last result” line is rather meaningless in practice?

It would be unfair to say that HMRC do not treat mental health seriously. Here is an example where it is at the forefront of their concerns. I should note for balance it is the mental health of their staff that they are addressing.

Here the HMRC spokesperson correctly recognises that the schemes paid the users (if we give the word “users” a broad meaning) rather than that the users paid themselves.
But saying the loans are the same as income as there was no intention to repay them is legally flawed.

We can also see HMRC’s acknowledgement that they have been working in this area for more than 2 decades – so really no excuse for letting these schemes fester for so long.

In my view this is an astounding memo. It translates as holding back on looking at the promoters’ role because it might prove that the victims are more blameless than HMRC have portrayed them so far.

There is also the point that HMRC were keen to find an “independent” reviewer acceptable to ministers. This is August 1984, sorry, 2019.

There is some serious animosity within HMRC about the Loan Charge Action Group. This is an example.
I do wonder how much of the problem is based upon this (in my view unjustified) antagonism.

Here (again) is the blueprint of the Morse review – something that can be reasonably described as independent without conceding more than the government is willing to yield.

Interesting the “debate” on loan charge is “fractured”. There are of course many views but many tax pros have no sympathy for promoters and those who knew what risks they were undertaking. But most of tax profession (at least those who understand it) feel LC is disproportionate.

Although a review is meant to be independent, the lead is more of figurehead – most of the work is to be done in-house.
As @paullewismoney said “stunning and blatant”.

https://twitter.com/paullewismoney/status/1485918086930776074

I am curious as to how a total repeal of the loan charge would have the slightest bearing on HMRC’s wider anti-avoidance strategy. I would seriously welcome someone from @HMRCgovuk trying to explain that to me (either privately or in a public forum).

Here is some discussion of potential leads for the “independent” review.

This pair of shots might be of interest to the journalists. Working out how to handle the media once the loan charge review is announced.

The appointment of @MelJStride as chair of TSC gets a mention. This might not be the only recorded incident of the government taking steps to quash criticism.

I am somewhat perplexed why a press statement given to a newspaper justifies complete redaction.

This highlighted statement probably typifies the entire problem. HMRC see loan arrangements as tax avoidance, whereas most affected taxpayers were actually seeking to comply with the tax code. HMRC fail to distinguish between the motives of the promoters and those of the victims.