This truth upsets Washington's sense of its own geopolitical primacy, and Brussels' sense of its own geopolitical non-zero-sum-ness.
It also complicates the "just stop expanding NATO" line, because stopping NATO won't make the problem go away.
It's worth remembering that Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine was sparked *by a trade treaty*, not by a near- or even mid-term threat of NATO expansion.
And no, the EU is not a back door to NATO. If anything, the NATO is a back door to the EU, which is much, much harder to join.
Moscow's problem with the EU is geo-economic, which should not be read as being somehow less salient than geo-politics. Put briefly, the continued expansion of the European geo-economic project poses a threat to the current Kremlin's political survival.
The expansion of EU influence puts insurmountable pressure on the Russian political economy to move from a rent-based, patronal model of wealth creation and power relations, to a system of institutionalized competition.
Having satellite states that are governed in the same patronalist mode as Russia gives Moscow geo-economic breathing space, adding years or decades to the system's viability. Losing those satellites removes those years and decades.
That's why Moscow needs an effective veto not over Kyiv's defense policy, but over its ability to integrate with the EU, to reform its institutions, and to reorient its markets -- a veto that the Donbas war makes possible.
That's also why NATO is a red herring. Yes, a Ukraine that is in NATO -- or greatly supported by NATO -- can resist or even reverse the pressure exerted via the Donbas. But keeping Ukraine out of NATO won't be enough for Moscow, if Kyiv keeps pursuing ties with the EU.
And it's why the 'Finlandization' idea is so pernicious: it means allowing Moscow to dictate not only Ukraine's security relationships, but its economic relationships, too. (Remember that Finland and Austria didn't join the EU until 1995!)
And no, geo-economic 'Finlandization' isn't an option. It is impossible -- as a matter of economic governance, and as a matter of customs law -- to integrate simultaneously with the EU and the EEU. One way or another, Ukraine will be forced to choose a primary trading bloc.
Now, I'm not here to say that Moscow is out to destroy the EU. It isn't, and Moscow profits -- to a degree -- from having the EU as a trading partner. But only to a degree.
Even within its current borders, the EU puts immense pressure on Russia to do things like adapt the natural gas sector -- the country's biggest source of rents -- to fit the Third Energy Package.
Moscow's worst nightmare isn't hypersonic missiles in Ukraine -- it's the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.
Now imagine that mechanism -- and others like it -- extended to Ukraine, and maybe you begin to get my point.
In other words, while NATO is easy to set up rhetorically as a threat to Russian security -- a threat that Moscow knows is highly unlikely ever to materialize -- it is the EU that poses the clearest and most present danger to the Kremlin's ability to maintain power.
It's gratifying to see how much attention this thread has garnered -- almost all of it constructive.
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For six months now, European leaders have confused Trump‘s malleability for an opportunity. What it really means is that US policy is not the foundation on which European and Ukrainian security can be built.
A quick thread
/1
First things first: if we’ve learned anything thus far, it’s that we should give it 12-18 hours before drawing conclusions about anything involving Trump and Putin. Not that that will stop anybody.
Thus, my way too early take is that … I’m nervous.
/2
The apocalyptic scenario—another blowup in the Oval Office—was avoided, and that’s good. But the second worst possible outcome was that the European leaders who accompany Zelenskyy would breathe a sigh of relief, and I’m afraid that may be what we’re seeing.
/3
Putin's cease-fire offer is an attempt to achieve at the negotiating table what he cannot achieve on the battleground: the neutering of Ukraine as a sovereign entity.
TL;DR: It's not about territorial control.
(A 🧵)
/1
Per reporting from the @FT, Putin is "offering" to halt the war at the current line of control (minus the piece of Kursk obl. still controlled by Ukraine). Conditions appear to be recognition of Crimea and other Ru-occupied territories, plus no NATO.
What we learned yesterday: nothing we didn’t know, if we were paying attention.
What we’ll learn this weekend: whether European leaders have been paying attention.
(A 🧵)
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It was abundantly clear that the US administration would be guided by the following “principles” (I use the word hesitantly):
1️⃣🇺🇸 transactional interests trump all others
2️⃣ The velocity of exit from 🇺🇦 trumps the quality of exit
3️⃣ Normalization with🇷🇺 is a priority
/2
Following from these “principles” are 3 logical conclusions:
1️⃣ 🇺🇸 is unperturbed by the geo-strategic consequences of its exit from 🇺🇦
2️⃣ 🇺🇸 feels it has greater leverage over 🇺🇦 than 🇷🇺
3️⃣ the only route to a rapid exit is thus for 🇺🇦 to make maximum concessions
/3
There is very real reason to worry about the dynamic emerging between Washington and Moscow when it comes to Ukraine. But there is also very real reason to believe that Ukraine and Europe can create a better outcome.
(A rather long 🧵, obviously)
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First, let's start with the bad news: The Trump administration is handling the start of this process just about as badly as it is possible to do. There is no way to sugar coat that, nor should anyone try.
I'll focus on three low-lights.
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Low-light 1: After Waltz and Kellogg spent weeks talking up a strategy of "maximum pressure" on Russia and building trust in Europe and Kyiv, POTUS threw that out the window by announcing unconditional bilateral talks with Putin.
/3
Yashin, Kara-Murza and Pivovarov have been abundantly clear that Russia’s war is criminal and that Ukraine should win. They went to jail for that clarity. Criticizing them for not repeating it is disingenuous.
But they need to understand the genuineness of Ukrainian anger.
/1
The nuances of the Russian opposition’s arguments on sanctions and Russian public opinion cannot bring security to Ukraine, and Ukrainians justifiably worry that a focus on dreams of Russian democracy will distract from helping Ukraine win the war.
/2
Indeed, the West has a bad habit of taking shots in the dark on Russian politics rather than focusing on shoring up Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, as I wrote here:
Increasing chatter that we may see a large prisoner exchange--perhaps as early as today--involving a number of the Russian political prisoners who have gone missing in recent days, plus Evan Gershkovich, Paul Whelan and others.
The question is, why now?
/1
I'm on record saying I didn't think an exchange was terribly likely, because I thought the Kremlin would (a) hold out for maximum benefit and (b) avoid giving Biden a win. Obviously, I can be wrong -- I don't know (and have never pretended to know) Putin's inner thoughts.
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On the second, more minor point, with Biden now out of the race, giving him a win may not seem as consequential for the US elections, as a Biden win doesn't necessarily translate into kudos for Harris.
/3