Yashin, Kara-Murza and Pivovarov have been abundantly clear that Russia’s war is criminal and that Ukraine should win. They went to jail for that clarity. Criticizing them for not repeating it is disingenuous.

But they need to understand the genuineness of Ukrainian anger.

/1 The nuances of the Russian opposition’s arguments on sanctions and Russian public opinion cannot bring security to Ukraine, and Ukrainians justifiably worry that a focus on dreams of Russian democracy will distract from helping Ukraine win the war.

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Increasing chatter that we may see a large prisoner exchange--perhaps as early as today--involving a number of the Russian political prisoners who have gone missing in recent days, plus Evan Gershkovich, Paul Whelan and others.

The question is, why now?

/1 I'm on record saying I didn't think an exchange was terribly likely, because I thought the Kremlin would (a) hold out for maximum benefit and (b) avoid giving Biden a win. Obviously, I can be wrong -- I don't know (and have never pretended to know) Putin's inner thoughts.

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I don’t know who needs to hear this, but this is not the end of Trump. To paraphrase Churchill, it’s not even the beginning of the end. And to be honest, I’m not sure that it’s the end of the beginning.

Any jubilation is misplaced, I’m afraid.

/1 Trump’s response to these verdicts is the logical continuation of his response to the election. In that regard, I’m not worried about people storming the courthouse. The capacity of Trumpworld for violence is, I think, overrated.

/2

Posted this here yesterday and stand by it, the key point being that we should expect the Kremlin to seek ways of capitalizing on this attack:

(A quick 🧵)

/1

https://twitter.com/samagreene/status/1771271658860363908

For context and insight, it might be useful to go back to something @gbrunc and I described in "Putin vs the People", about how Putin understands and utilizes crises and tragedies:

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Navalny.

So many thoughts have been expressed in the time that it has taken me to collect my own, that I'm not sure what this is worth. By the key words are Navalny's own: не сдавайтесь. Don't surrender.

/1 Navalny is not the first of Putin's political opponents to die. He will not likely be the last. But it is up to those who care to find a way -- any way -- to keep Russia's other political prisoners alive. The pressure must always be on.

/2

This excellent thread from @DrRadchenko is in part a rebuttal to one aspect of my thread yesterday, in which I argued, inter alia, that Putin needs a forever war. Sergey argues Putin needs victory and would be happy for the war to end. It’s worth unpacking this.

/1

https://twitter.com/drradchenko/status/1740977492499014087

First, I think we both agree that Putin needs the war to continue — in some form or another — through the March 2024 presidential election. The Kremlin has predicated Putin’s campaign on this war continuing and will not want to pivot too quickly.

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Does Vladimir Putin want negotiations? Almost certainly yes.

Does Putin want to negotiate? Almost certainly not.

The difference is not semantic.

(A long-ish 🧵)

/1 We have all, by now, read the reporting in the @nytimes about "quiet signals" evidently being sent from the Kremlin to Washington. We have all, I imagine, also seen the criticism of that reporting on this website and elsewhere.

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nytimes.com/2023/12/23/wor…

More than anything else, I’m struck in this video by Putin’s reference to ideology.

“They don’t have their own industrial base or their own ideology, and so they don’t have a future — but we do.”

It sounds like a throwaway line, but it isn’t.

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https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1733826361897136303

I’d ignore the bluster about weapons production. Yes, of course Russia makes more than Ukraine. We already knew that. And so did the people Putin’s talking to.

But why throw ideology into the mix?

Because it’s ideology, not artillery, that wins the war at home for Putin.

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A senior European diplomat told me (amongst others) last night that this (👇) would be the stance taken by the Allies in Vilnius.

He wasn't wrong.

/1 On the face of it, what NATO did in its communiqué wasn't too bad. It said, in essence, that Ukraine has done everything it needs to for accession, except for winning (or otherwise ending) the war. Moving beyond MAP is genuine progress and shouldn't be minimized.

/2

Putin is hoping -- through a series of set-piece events, like last night's security meeting and today's address on Cathedral Square -- to rewrite the narrative of Prigozhin's putsch as one of consolidation and consensus. That may be a difficult hill to climb.

/1

https://twitter.com/holodmedia/status/1673639228289187840

The fact that the Kremlin's new through-line is that the mutiny was defeated by the unwavering support of Russians suggests, I think, that Putin's advisers share my analysis. Rhetoric isn't accidental. They're trying to solve the problem they think they have.

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My main thought, as Prigozhin sends his men back to base, is that this isn’t over yet.

I’m not suggesting that Prigozhin will try again. But my strong sense is that Putin’s challenges are only beginning.

/1 From the first hours, Prigozhin’s uprising made Putin look weak, unable to control his own hinterland and the forces fighting his war. As Wagner troops got closer to Moscow, that only deepened.

/2

Ok. Time for a bit of political analysis.

What happens if Prigozhin’s adventure ends up bringing down Putin? Without trying to predict the future, it is possible to map out some plausible scenarios.

(A 🧵, duh)

/1 From a political analysis point of view, who is in power is less important than how he (or she) gets into power, and the incentives that accrue once power has been obtained. Thus, the first question is the manner in which Putin leaves office — chaotically, or smoothly.

/2

I will admit that I don’t know what Prigozhin is playing at. Honestly. And I won’t guess.

None of the available explanations stand up to the evidence.

(A quick 🧵)

/1 I’ll start with the most absurd: the idea that Prigozhin is attacking Putin. That story got slightly less absurd with today’s video, which seemingly protects Putin but undermines so much of what Putin has said that it still feels like an attack.

It’s still absurd, though.

/2

As Russia's propagandist-in-chief Margarita Simonyan broaches the idea of ending the war, ostensibly because Ukraine is getting too strong to counter without an attack on the West itself, it's worth taking a moment to reflect on how Russian propaganda works.

(A 🧵)

/1 First, the facts of the matter: Simonyan said on TV that Ukraine now has the capability to strike deep inside Russia, and that will grow with F16s, and the only way to reduce that threat is to hit the Western infrastructure that supplies Ukraine.

meduza.io/feature/2023/0…

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A few thoughts on the "drone attack" on the Kremlin.

TL;DR: Leaving aside all the things we cannot know, we should expect Moscow to milk this for all it's worth -- but that's probably not much.

(A quick and probably ill-advised 🧵)

/1 Thought 1⃣: I don't care who launched these drones, where they came from, and whether they were capable of killing Putin. I don't care because I cannot know, and as an analyst I don't want to waste my time worrying about things that are not subject to empirical investigation.

/2

Russia's decision to turn the screws on military mobilization -- and to make fleeing much more difficult -- appears to be provoking anger at the elite, whose kids bask on tropical beaches, and at the military, for being so hungry for troops.

(A quick Sunday 🧵)

/1 For fuller analysis, see yesterday's TL;DRussia (and subscribe for free, in case this website turns into a pumpkin).

tldrussia.substack.com/p/tldrussia-we…

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Since my Twitter feed is still maddeningly redolent of pundits angry with Macron, I'm afraid I can't help myself: Macron wasn't wrong.

More specifically, he's probably not wrong on China (though he may not be right, either). And he's certainly not wrong on Europe.

/1 First things first: Don't read the headlines or the Tweets. Go back and read Macron's actual interview (in French, if you can, or with Google Translate): lesechos.fr/monde/enjeux-i…

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The argument has never been that those who pushed for diplomacy sought to help Putin. The argument was -- and is -- that those who would force Ukraine to negotiate away its territory and sovereignty fail to understand the nature of this war. And that, inadvertently, helps Putin.

https://twitter.com/tparsi/status/1639689831466008576

If anyone has an idea for a diplomatic solution that would involve a full withdrawal of Russian troops from territory to which it has no right and a recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty, please put it on the table.

If you're looking for the TL;DR on Xi's visit with Putin, it is this: China's domination of Russia is complete.

(a 🧵)

/1 I'm generally skeptical about official statements from summits -- especially between unaccountable autocrats -- but even so, the statements coming from the Xi-Putin summit in Moscow are remarkable, mostly because they are so one-sided.

kommersant.ru/doc/5888092?fr…

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My two kopecks on the ICC's indictment of Putin:
For policymakers in Europe, the “global south” and Russia’s own commanding heights, the inescapable new reality is this: there is no future with Putin.

cepa.org/article/putin-… The decision puts paid to conversations about returning to the status quo ante for as long as Putin reigns. That should have an immediate impact on the approach to the war: with no prospect of doing business with Putin, there is no reason to hedge. Putin has no face left to save.

"You remind us that freedom is priceless," @POTUS said when he went to Kyiv this week. "It’s worth fighting for for as long as it takes."

I agree with that -- and I don't.

(A 🧵)

/1 Before I get started, a note: I'm breaking with tradition and summarizing here this morning's TL;DRussia Weekend Roundup. For the full argument, context, readings and more, see the (free) newsletter here:
tldrussia.substack.com/p/tldrussia-we…

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