In my research into the history of #SCOTUS’s shadow docket, I’ve long been puzzled at why, circa 1980, the Court stopped formally adjourning over the summer — and instead simply “rose” for its recess, preserving its ability to rule without formally returning for a “Special Term.”
With a big assist from superstar RA @bonnie_e_d, we now have the answer: It was a response to the sharp rise in emergency applications related to impending executions — which (unsurprisingly) ticked up sharply starting in 1979, as states began to carry out post-Gregg executions.
Why did that require the Court to remain in session? Before 1972, individual Justices routinely handled execution-related applications.
The problem by 1980 is that the Court was bitterly divided over the death penalty, so there were reasons to not give one Justice the last word.
This will be fully fleshed out in the book, but the moral of the story is how so much of the Court’s modern (and problematic) shadow docket practice has its roots in the explosion of death penalty litigation in the late 70s and early 80s — an explosion the Court *itself* caused.
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Memorializing my earlier tweet on the UNC affirmative action case, here's a chart on how much more often #SCOTUS is granting certiorari "before judgment":
3 grants from June 1988–August 2004;
0 grants from August 2004–February 2019; and
*14* grants from February 2019–present.
These are cases in which the Court is bypassing the courts of appeals to expedite plenary merits review.
And I chose June 1988 because that's the last time Congress meaningfully altered the Court's appellate jurisdiction (including with respect to certiorari "before judgment").
Two things that my earlier tweet got wrong:
I had counted *15* recent grants because I wrongly included a companion case that was *not* before judgment; and
I had suggested the cutoff was January 2018 not February 2019 because I had miscoded an interim order in the Census case.
Certiorari "before judgment" is supposed to be an exceptionally rare practice through which #SCOTUS bypasses courts of appeals to expedite full review of merits cases. From Aug. 2004–Jan. 2018, #SCOTUS granted *0* such petitions. Today’s grant in the UNC case is the *15th* since.
This is not an indictment of any one of those 15 grants. But it certainly seems worth trying to get at *why,* all of a sudden, there are so many cases that the Justices believe meet the historically onerous criteria of Rule 11—when, for the better part of 14 years, there were 0.
List of the 15 CBJ grants since 1/18:
UNC
ZF Automotive
Alix Partners
U.S. v. Texas
Whole Woman’s Health
Gish
Higgs
Robinson v. Murphy
High Plains Harvest Church
Harvest Rock Church
McAleenan v. Vidal
Trump v. NAACP
Ross v. California
Dep’t of Commerce v. NY
DHS v. Regents U-Cal
The Supreme Court's 1908 ruling in Ex parte Young was a judicial expansion of remedies to enforce the Constitution that came in direct response to efforts by a state (Minnesota) to thwart the enforcement of a controversial constitutional right by exploiting prior #SCOTUS rulings
Against that backdrop, the outrage at the possibility that the current Supreme Court might revisit the core principles underlying that decision in response to similarly deliberate efforts by a state to frustrate the enforcement of constitutional rights is rather ... ahistorical.
Ex parte Young got around Hans v. Louisiana—which held that states can’t be sued in federal court without their consent (by reading the word “another” out of the Eleventh Amendment)—by holding that suits against state officers *aren’t* against the state, at least under the 11A.
This prediction is worth what you paid for it, but it sure *feels* like this is heading toward a very narrow, 6-3 ruling holding that Ex parte Young *doesn't* preclude injunctive relief against court clerks in these specific circumstances — and remanding for further proceedings.
And that holding might be enough to convince a broader majority to punt the federal government's case (and deny DOJ's application to vacate the Fifth Circuit's stay on mootness grounds).
One big clue will be how many Justices during the U.S. v. Texas argument ask about what happens to the DOJ suit if they rule for the providers in the first case...
A day later, I’m still quite puzzled by the Barrett/Kavanaugh concurrence in the Maine case.
If there’s a “discretionary judgment” about whether #SCOTUS should grant emergency relief to a party that meets the statutory standard, what considerations cabin/inform that discretion?
Emergency relief isn’t certiorari; this isn’t about whether the Justices *want* to decide the case. And yet, here are the two most important Justices (at least on this) saying they’ll pick and choose who satisfies the standard (which they get wrong) based on unspecified criteria.
That’s what’s so puzzling to me: This opinion certainly *appears* to be a response to mounting criticisms of the “shadow docket.” But I don’t see how saying “we’ll pick and choose who gets relief based upon unspecified considerations” is *actually* responsive to those critiques.