1/I presented my paper "World War II Expeditionary Logisitics and Support in the Pacific" at the 2022 Virtual Expeditionary Warfare Conference.
The focus was on early WWII Pacific naval logistics, specifically oil and repair from Dec 41 to Feb 43...
2/Most histories - @navy1944 & #IanToll - focus on the exploits of the fast carrier task forces and the six @USNavy carriers: Enterprise, Lexington, Saratoga, Yorktown, Hornet & Wasp.
Yet, behind the scenes, these fast carriers required an extensive logistics network...
3/Built for commercial service under Merchant Marine Act of 1936, these tankers included national defense features: high speed, twin screws & provisions for guns/comms.
Six of them served as fast oilers in the Pacific: Neosho, Cimarron, Platte, Kaskaskia, Guadalupe & Sabine...
4/The Acadia Conference set the concept of Germany First and required @USPacificFleet to defend the area of Hawaii-Midway-Johnson Island and the vital sea line of communication to Sydney from SF (7600nm), Panama (7100nm) & Hawaii (5100nm).
Ops of fast carrier task forces in the south Pacific demo the need for both fast oilers & civilian tankers...
6/The bulk of the @USNavy & @Australian_Navy operated in the Guadalcanal campaign. To initially support the op, tenders, repair, store & ammo ships were forward deployed to Tonga, then Noumea. The need for more extensive support became clear after Savo Island...
7/The campaign resulted in a large number of ships sunk (red) & damaged (blue). All of the ships sunk were replaced by new builds, some in the course of the war. Ships damaged received assistance in theater and then sailed to drydocks and yards in Australia, Hawaii & US...
8/Case in point USS Minneapolis (CA36). She was hit in her engine room and lost her bow to Type 93 torpedoes at the Battle of Tassafaronga. She received ad hoc repair at Tulagi from CBs and then sailed to Pearl Harbor for a new bow.
Damaged in Nov 42, she was back in Apr 43...
9/Fast forward, could the US protect an extensive sea line of communication, provide sufficient logistics to sustain ops across Pacific & do we have the capability to repair ships in theater and shipyards to build and repair?
The lessons from early WWII logistics resonate today.
10/@CSBA_ study on Maritime Logistics makes the case for what is required in a modern sea projection mission across the Pacific. One if the areas of deficiencies is in oilers, commercial tankers and repair facilities.
1/It is time to discuss a Tale of Two Carriers, @usnavy @CENTCOM Edition.
The @DeptofDefense just showcased the return of the @TheCVN69 strike group and the award of the Combat Action Ribbon to the ships (although they omitted the ships of the @MSCSealift.)
2/At the time of the #Houthi attacks on shipping, USS Ford Carrier Strike Group was in Med and IKE was in the Persian Gulf, with the destroyer USS Carney making its dramatic appearance by shooting down missiles and drones heading to Israel.
3/With the #Houthi seizure of MV Galaxy Leader (they still hold the ship and crew hostage), @CMF_Bahrain allocated reinforcements to plus up CTF 153 in the Red Sea and initiated Operation Prosperity Guardian.
1/I have been receiving a great deal of info on the #GazaPier and this is what I have been able to put together
1️⃣Weather was a major factor. A Sea State 5 storm necessitated the crews to evacuate to Benavidez and locally hired tugs. The offshore pier broke loose.
It took 5 hours to chase down the RRDF platform after it drifted 2 miles off.
2️⃣ Much of the equipment had not been fixed or refurbished from Exercise Talisman Saber 23. There was a dry run before the execution of Gaza and took 3 days. The test found deficiencies in the LSVs.
3️⃣ Most of the NCOs had little hands-on experience with the system beyond ops to resupply McMurdo Station since the cutback in the Army Watercraft program. Additionally, the Army Causeway Company lacks Warrant Officers. Many mid & junior officers lack similar knowledge.
1/The latest is that a portion of the Trident pier - the section that is grounded in #Gaza - broke loose while being towed to Israel due to high sea states.
2/ As I discussed in my video yesterday, if the US wanted to deliver aid to Gaza The best way to accomplish this 3was to use existing ports in Israel and Egypt and ship it overland into Gaza.
The least efficient is airdrops and then over the shore.
3/If the administration directed the @DeptofDefense @SecDef to conduct aid shipments by sea, there were several options available instead of a Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) using the assets currently in place.
1/The @Heritage has released Project 2025 which is entitled Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise. Basically it would be the next Trump administration policy guide. In it is a section on Maritime Policy (p.637-638). Let's take a moment and digest it.
2/A little short on history as MARAD came from the US Shipping Board created in 1916 and then via the US Maritime Commission.
What is also omitted is that MARAD was originally under the Commerce Dept and included @FMC_gov it is purview.
3/This statement is 💯% the wrong choice. While they are correct that MARAD does not regulate its industry, it makes no argument to transfer it to @DHSgov.
MARAD should be reorganized into an entity that has oversight of all maritime aspects, akin to the FAA over aviation.
A temporary jetty was constructed from concrete and landfill to extend out from the shore.
It was done under the supervision of the IDF.
2/The Spanish-flagged tug Echo 1 Open Arms delivered the barge of 200 tons of food from @WCKitchen via Cyprus.
Due to the shallow draft off the jetty the tug could not push the barge alongside.
This is why the US Army Trident pier will extend approximately 1800 feet out.
3/The barge was maneuvered by the use of two small RHIBs.
This is extremely difficult and danger due to the mass of the barge and the power of the RHIBs. Any current or wind would have precluded this operation.