Two things I’d like to see more of:
1) Those arguing that the West offered a “pledge” to forego NATO expansion grapple with the fact that Yeltsin and Putin both openly flirted with joining NATO in the 1990s/early 2000s.
1) Those arguing that the West offered a “pledge” to forego NATO expansion grapple with the fact that Yeltsin and Putin both openly flirted with joining NATO in the 1990s/early 2000s.
2) Self-proclaimed realists digest the clear reality that the (post-colonialist) Kremlin’s designs on Ukraine go far, far beyond the simple question of Ukrainian NATO membership.
+1 Not nearly enough grappling with what would have happened if NATO actually *had* stopped expanding. (Polish nuclear program? Hungarian irredentism? A far, far, far worse security landscape on Russia’s western flank?)
https://twitter.com/CherylRofer/status/1492565436247986178?s=20&t=KAFTgTvG9Ou4D-ovsQqtnA
One of the best threads on the latest Russian crisis, and the red herrings being spun:
https://twitter.com/samagreene/status/1491847072324141058?s=20&t=i3_ukUQbcbJQm7whvOFYNQ
One way to disabuse ourselves of the idea that the latest Russia crisis is only about "Ukraine joining NATO" is to revisit all the historic importance Moscow placed on the Eurasian Union circa 2011-13—and how Ukraine imploded those hopes: foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/05/vla…
(Hot take: Moscow's initial plans for the Eurasian Union—and the obvious failure of those initial goals—remain severely overlooked in the West.)
https://twitter.com/cjcmichel/status/1492602538381688834
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