2/ Suppoman is a crypto YouTuber who has been in the space since 2017.
In that period he has promoted many projects undisclosed stemming everywhere from rugs to ponzi’s to cash grabs.
TMG did a YT series on him in 2018.
3/ TLDR on Bluezilla:
>”incubates” copy paste launchpads & Uni v2 forks on every chain.
>projects never list the team, tokenomics, and other basic docs
>tokenomics have very short vesting periods (hence why they don’t display it)
>always promoted heavily through Suppoman
4/ $BSCPAD - Not displayed on their website but 4 months total of vesting for private rounds. Why even have vesting then?
5/ Let’s get into the Suppoman 2021 shills:
$GHSP
-Starting mkt cap $50k? Oof
6/ $ASTRO - Supposed to be a Cardano DEX but is listed on BSC?
-Tokenomics not found
7/ $ETHPAD - tokenomics not displayed on website.
8/ $KCCPAD - tokenomics not listed on website & token is on BSC?
9/ $TRONPAD - tokenomics not listed on website & token is on BSC?
10/ $ADAPAD - tokenomics not listed on website & token is on BSC?
11/ $METAV - tokenomics not on website; little to no vesting
12/ $BITORB - little to no vesting
13/ $PLSPAD - tokenomics not listed on website & token is on BSC?
14/ I could keep going but I think my point has been made.
>Suppoman gets private sale allocations to shill undisclosed scams to his audience
>Bluezilla’s scheme is to keep copy and pasting launchpads to pump and dump on them for $$$
15/ I would advise you avoid anything with Bluezilla’s name on it.
Search “Bluezilla scam” on Twitter to see all the people who have been rekt.
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1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.
1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”
1/ An investigation into how @cryptobeastreal scammed followers by lying they were not behind the $190M -> $3M $ALT market cap crash where 45+ connected insider wallets sold $11M+ on July 14, 2025.
2/ Earlier this month Crypto Beast began aggressively promoting $ALT on X and TG.
On July 14, 2025 ALT crashed from 0.19 to 0.003 after insiders sold a large percent of the total supply.
All of these posts promoting the token. have since been deleted.
3/ Crypto Beast previously shared a public wallet on X & TG in now deleted posts.
1/ My recent investigation uncovered more than $16.58M in payments since January 1, 2025 or $2.76M per month has been sent to North Korean IT workers hired as developers at various projects & companies.
To put this in perspective payments range from $3K-8K per month meaning they have infiltrated 345 jobs on the low end or 920 jobs on the high end.
2/ Here’s a look into one of the six clusters I have been monitoring and was able to attribute 8 different DPRK ITWs that obtained roles at 12+ projects.
I traced out the payment addresses from the table to two consolidation addresses.
1/ Multiple projects tied to Pepe creator Matt Furie & ChainSaw as well as another project Favrr were exploited in the past week which resulted in ~$1M stolen
My analysis links both attacks to the same cluster of DPRK IT workers who were likely accidentally hired as developers.
2/ On Jun 18, 2025 at 4:25 am UTC ownership for ‘Replicandy’ from Matt Furie & ChainSaw was transferred to a new EOA 0x9Fca.
Jun 18, 2025
6:20 pm UTC: 0x9Fca withdrew mint proceeds from the contract
Jun 19, 2025
5:11 am UTC: 0x9Fca unpauses the mint
The attacker then minted NFTs and sold into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.
3/ On Jun 23, 2025 the attacker transferred ownership from the ChainSaw deployer to 0x9Fca for Peplicator, Hedz, Zogz.
Similarly the attacker minted NFTs and sold them into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.