2/ Suppoman is a crypto YouTuber who has been in the space since 2017.
In that period he has promoted many projects undisclosed stemming everywhere from rugs to ponzi’s to cash grabs.
TMG did a YT series on him in 2018.
3/ TLDR on Bluezilla:
>”incubates” copy paste launchpads & Uni v2 forks on every chain.
>projects never list the team, tokenomics, and other basic docs
>tokenomics have very short vesting periods (hence why they don’t display it)
>always promoted heavily through Suppoman
4/ $BSCPAD - Not displayed on their website but 4 months total of vesting for private rounds. Why even have vesting then?
5/ Let’s get into the Suppoman 2021 shills:
$GHSP
-Starting mkt cap $50k? Oof
6/ $ASTRO - Supposed to be a Cardano DEX but is listed on BSC?
-Tokenomics not found
7/ $ETHPAD - tokenomics not displayed on website.
8/ $KCCPAD - tokenomics not listed on website & token is on BSC?
9/ $TRONPAD - tokenomics not listed on website & token is on BSC?
10/ $ADAPAD - tokenomics not listed on website & token is on BSC?
11/ $METAV - tokenomics not on website; little to no vesting
12/ $BITORB - little to no vesting
13/ $PLSPAD - tokenomics not listed on website & token is on BSC?
14/ I could keep going but I think my point has been made.
>Suppoman gets private sale allocations to shill undisclosed scams to his audience
>Bluezilla’s scheme is to keep copy and pasting launchpads to pump and dump on them for $$$
15/ I would advise you avoid anything with Bluezilla’s name on it.
Search “Bluezilla scam” on Twitter to see all the people who have been rekt.
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1/ Meet the threat actor John (Lick), who was caught flexing $23M in a wallet address directly tied to $90M+ in suspected thefts from the US Government in 2024 and multiple other unidentified victims from Nov 2025 to Dec 2025.
2/ Earlier today John got into a heated argument with another threat actor known as Dritan Kapplani Jr. in a group chat to see who had more funds in crypto wallets.
In 'The Com' this is known as a band for band (b4b).
However the entire interaction was fully recorded.
3/ In part 1 of the recording Dritan mocks John however John screenshares Exodus Wallet which shows the Tron address below with $2.3M:
TMrWCLMS3ibDbKLcnNYhLggohRuLUSoHJg
1/ Meet Haby (Havard), a Canadian threat actor who has stolen $2M+ via Coinbase support impersonation social engineering scams in the past year blowing the funds on rare social media usernames, bottle service, & gambling.
2/ On Dec 30, 2024 Haby posted a screenshot in a group chat showing off a 21K XRP ($44K) theft from a Coinbase user.
rN7ddvk4DrGHZUrBfNARJEEAbPkky9Mwcz
3/ On Jan 3, 2025 Haby posted a screenshot from his Exodus wallet showing his Telegram & IG accounts.
I matched up the historical balances to the screenshot and found the XRP address linked to two other Coinbase user thefts for ~$500K total.
1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.
1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”