1/ Examining how @ashwsbreal has mislead thousands of people to build up an 8 figure crypto portfolio.
2/ Our story begins with Ash’s Telegram group.
Well what’s wrong with the TG group?
a) pumping & dumping lowcaps on CEXs.
b) Insider paid group to receive picks before main TG channel.
c) Undisclosed IDO promotions
d) Links to a sketchy VC
3/ All messages of pumping & dumping lowcaps have been deleted but I’ve recovered a few instances from people on Twitter complaining.
4/ Here’s two other instances:
5/ Ash claimed it wasn’t intentional and they would refund people.
Yet there’s people complaining on Twitter they never were reimbursed for the P&D.
There’s also zero mention of the VIDT P&D either.
6/ Here’s a breakdown of the paid group:
In the public TG group Ash would market a paid private group to its members.
-Blatantly saying they get buy signals & insider info before the main public channel
-I’ve attached the payment address courtesy of a former member
7/ On 03/06/21 a buy signal was made in the paid group to buy $ROYA
Guess what? The address in the photo above (0X43) was making large buys a few days prior.
The paid group is told it will be shilled shortly in the public group.
8/ As of now all is going well and it gets posted in the public group.
Immediately after Ash says in the paid group “who the f is selling”
*hint it’s the address from above sending to a different wallet to sell*
Ash acts mad saying everyone messed up the pump (the irony).
9/ Here are all the undisclosed shills that tie between the public Telegram & Twitter account:
AIOZ is down 93%
GS is down 97%
10/ Most shills in the Public Telegram get deleted. Here are a couple more Twitter ones.
BLES down 99%
EQZ down 97%
KPAD down 99%
MNY down 94%
Just a quick scroll through Ash’s feed shows all the undisclosed shills. It’s clear they will promote any IDO.
11/ Here’s where things get even more interesting I messaged the same account to try and join the “paid TG group” and now instead of Ash the account says Jazz @EverseHQ
12/ What remains unclear is if the Ash account is ran by that VC or they are just working together.
The fact the TG account matches the Public TG leads me to believe Ash is owned by Everse.
13/ I glanced over all the related addresses (giveaways, dumping, paid group).
Both show a transaction history filled with IDO allocations with outflows to the main wallets (don’t appear to be CEXs)
Also further leads me to believe Ash is Everse.
14/ It’s interesting to see how large this operation is and how they have no morals to disclose to followers.
Hopefully some more information about this relationship can come to light. It’s clear whatever is happening is making these people millions at the expense of others.
Update: I’ve received multiple DMs from people that in fact confirm Ash & Everse Capital are ran by the same person
1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.
1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”
1/ An investigation into how @cryptobeastreal scammed followers by lying they were not behind the $190M -> $3M $ALT market cap crash where 45+ connected insider wallets sold $11M+ on July 14, 2025.
2/ Earlier this month Crypto Beast began aggressively promoting $ALT on X and TG.
On July 14, 2025 ALT crashed from 0.19 to 0.003 after insiders sold a large percent of the total supply.
All of these posts promoting the token. have since been deleted.
3/ Crypto Beast previously shared a public wallet on X & TG in now deleted posts.
1/ My recent investigation uncovered more than $16.58M in payments since January 1, 2025 or $2.76M per month has been sent to North Korean IT workers hired as developers at various projects & companies.
To put this in perspective payments range from $3K-8K per month meaning they have infiltrated 345 jobs on the low end or 920 jobs on the high end.
2/ Here’s a look into one of the six clusters I have been monitoring and was able to attribute 8 different DPRK ITWs that obtained roles at 12+ projects.
I traced out the payment addresses from the table to two consolidation addresses.
1/ Multiple projects tied to Pepe creator Matt Furie & ChainSaw as well as another project Favrr were exploited in the past week which resulted in ~$1M stolen
My analysis links both attacks to the same cluster of DPRK IT workers who were likely accidentally hired as developers.
2/ On Jun 18, 2025 at 4:25 am UTC ownership for ‘Replicandy’ from Matt Furie & ChainSaw was transferred to a new EOA 0x9Fca.
Jun 18, 2025
6:20 pm UTC: 0x9Fca withdrew mint proceeds from the contract
Jun 19, 2025
5:11 am UTC: 0x9Fca unpauses the mint
The attacker then minted NFTs and sold into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.
3/ On Jun 23, 2025 the attacker transferred ownership from the ChainSaw deployer to 0x9Fca for Peplicator, Hedz, Zogz.
Similarly the attacker minted NFTs and sold them into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.