1/ Examining @1goonrich and how he pumped and dumped lowcap scams on his audience to profit millions.
Luckily tons of evidence exists on-chain so let’s dive in.
2/ On 12/21/21 Messiah posted about the MAYC he owns.
a) purchased by 0x78 on 12/16/21 for 7.39 eth
b)wallet was funded by 0x8e earlier that day
c)0x78 routinely received inflows from 0x8e (confirming it’s his main wallet)
d)0x78 transaction history: etherscan.io/txs?a=0x78587A…
3/ Now that we see 0x8e is Messiah’s address let’s check out the transactions on BSC.
4/ This time with TRTN and also sells into his followers pump.
4/ Will share a few more examples:
Here we have PDOG
5/ Here we have FSA
6/ Now we have MBANK
7/ I could keep going with examples but I think my point has been made. A quick look at his feed will show you all the meme coins.
What I wanted to determine next was how much personal risk he was taking on these coins.
8/ From looking through the transaction history of 0x8c and 0x78 (he has more related wallets as well) there seems to be a mix of:
>Presale allocations
>DEX trades
Okay but how does he find these coins?
9/ I reached out to a few meme coin traders and they shared Messiah is indeed compensated to Tweet ($4k) about coins (Messiah never has disclosed once)
10/ Okay now that we know he’s paid to tweet about these meme coin tokens and there is almost ZERO risk taken on his side
>receives money to promote
>uses to buy early or in presale
>pockets rest
11/ His tweets when they aren’t promos consist of constant hopium:
12/ It seems he has the constant need to flex as well. From a video posted it appears he’s located in the US.
13/ It’s only a matter of time before the US gov’t starts cracking down on people like this for promoting constant scams.
1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.
1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”
1/ An investigation into how @cryptobeastreal scammed followers by lying they were not behind the $190M -> $3M $ALT market cap crash where 45+ connected insider wallets sold $11M+ on July 14, 2025.
2/ Earlier this month Crypto Beast began aggressively promoting $ALT on X and TG.
On July 14, 2025 ALT crashed from 0.19 to 0.003 after insiders sold a large percent of the total supply.
All of these posts promoting the token. have since been deleted.
3/ Crypto Beast previously shared a public wallet on X & TG in now deleted posts.
1/ My recent investigation uncovered more than $16.58M in payments since January 1, 2025 or $2.76M per month has been sent to North Korean IT workers hired as developers at various projects & companies.
To put this in perspective payments range from $3K-8K per month meaning they have infiltrated 345 jobs on the low end or 920 jobs on the high end.
2/ Here’s a look into one of the six clusters I have been monitoring and was able to attribute 8 different DPRK ITWs that obtained roles at 12+ projects.
I traced out the payment addresses from the table to two consolidation addresses.
1/ Multiple projects tied to Pepe creator Matt Furie & ChainSaw as well as another project Favrr were exploited in the past week which resulted in ~$1M stolen
My analysis links both attacks to the same cluster of DPRK IT workers who were likely accidentally hired as developers.
2/ On Jun 18, 2025 at 4:25 am UTC ownership for ‘Replicandy’ from Matt Furie & ChainSaw was transferred to a new EOA 0x9Fca.
Jun 18, 2025
6:20 pm UTC: 0x9Fca withdrew mint proceeds from the contract
Jun 19, 2025
5:11 am UTC: 0x9Fca unpauses the mint
The attacker then minted NFTs and sold into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.
3/ On Jun 23, 2025 the attacker transferred ownership from the ChainSaw deployer to 0x9Fca for Peplicator, Hedz, Zogz.
Similarly the attacker minted NFTs and sold them into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.