Andrew Small Profile picture
Feb 19 9 tweets 4 min read
The messaging from various European governments to China on how it handles the crisis with Russia has sharpened up in the last few days, increasingly making it clear that it will have an impact on the relationship. Clearest was @ABaerbock yesterday: 1/8
Today one of the toughest characterizations of China from a European Commission president, based on the joint Sino-Russian statement: 2/8
And the NATO Secretary General, also responding to the NATO-specific sections of that Sino-Russian joint statement: 3/8
A couple of days ago, the UK: "the world is watching [China] to see whether their actions contribute to peace and stability, or to fueling aggression" - 4/8
None of this prejudges the outcome; it's important precisely because the extent of Chinese support is still not fully determined, as this article lays out: wsj.com/articles/beiji… 5/8
But it signals that if Beijing continues to cross thresholds that it didn't in 2014, the net effect will not be that Europe simply refocuses on Russia, it will - at least for many prominent European figures - be to treat China as part of that threat continuum 6/8
Scholz did notably duck the chance today to give at least a "we are watching" message despite @noahbarkin teeing him up; though there was a bit of a save later with his extended listing of the "great nations of Asia" that would resist Chinese domination...
Also, FWIW, much of this is what @BonnieGlaser and I advocated last week. Our argument will look differently-nuanced depending on precisely what Russia and China actually do but this was the window to signal some of the ramifications to Beijing: foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/14/chi… 8/8
Putting China under some pressure to say this - at a minimum - will, I suspect, be an ongoing effort. Xi did not state this to Macron... elysee.fr/emmanuel-macro… The whole Wang Yi answer here - - is worth watching: (at c. 1:09:13)

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More from @ajwsmall

Sep 17, 2021
It was hard this week not to think back to the CAI drama in December, when Germany/France jammed the agreement through in the window before the Biden administration took office, taking advantage of Xi's interest in pre-emptively spiking US coalition-building on China 1/
It was characterized by its advocates as a victory for "strategic autonomy". In numerous meetings at the time, the suggestion that waiting for consultations with the new US administration might be mutually beneficial was treated almost as an affront to European sovereignty 2/
I raise this not in the spirit of whataboutism, nor to suggest that the CAI and AUKUS are remotely like-for-like, nor to suggest that the manner in which the latter was handled stemmed at all from the former 3/
Read 17 tweets
Sep 16, 2021
A few snippets from the background briefing on AUKUS last night from senior US administration officials, specifically with reference to France, Europe and the Indo-Pacific 1/5
Considerable emphasis was placed on this being about bridging European and Asian allies and combining efforts in the Indo-Pacific. UK was framed as a European power... "The only states pivoting to the Indo-Pacific faster than the US are in Europe" 2/5
It was framed as a unique set of circumstances facing an Australia that felt "isolated". That it was an independent Australian decision to move away from the French program and to explore this capability with US/UK, not something DC/London initiated at the expense of Paris 3/5
Read 6 tweets
Aug 18, 2021
A lot of China-Taliban questions have come up this week. An incident worth highlighting (with excerpts) that may help to illustrate why China will remain nervous about security around their economic projects even with Taliban assurances 1/4
There was a pervasive belief back in the 2000s that the Chinese projects in Afghanistan had a protected status. Then this attack took place. 2/4 ImageImage
The Taliban did actually stage a pro-Chinese demonstration to show that they were not behind the attack, which was ultimately attributed to Hekmatyar 3/4 ImageImage
Read 4 tweets
Aug 15, 2021
I can't post the full chapter from the book but a few disconnected snippets in this thread below capture the early China-Taliban interactions when they were last in power, and I hope provide some helpful context. Some of the central issues have not changed since. 1/4
2/4
3/4
Read 4 tweets
Aug 15, 2021
Whatever schadenfreude China may be experiencing around the way the withdrawal from Afghanistan has been handled by the US, this is not the outcome that China wanted. I give context here: china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/episo… and here: ecfr.eu/article/after-… 1/5
Yun Sun gives a good feel for recent thinking in Beijing on Afghanistan / Taliban: warontherocks.com/2021/08/a-relu… though it doesn’t capture how far back these exchanges go (I wrote about this way back in 2013: foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/21/why… and longer history here: amazon.com/China-Pakistan… 2/5
China wants “sustainable stability” in Afghanistan *before* moving forward with investments . Whatever political theatrics we may see on this, watch whether developments on the ground bear it out. Recent CPEC security issues have only increased wariness: wsj.com/articles/gunma…
Read 5 tweets
Sep 24, 2020
We - @gmfus and @GeorgetownLaw - have a new report out today on CPEC and the BRI. A few summary points from it in this thread, along with some of the photos for anyone who just wants to look at them instead… gmfus.org/publications/r… 1/17
The report tries to tell a story rather than just giving a single analytical snapshot, given that CPEC has been, and remains, a moving target. Significant momentum from launch to late 2017; then a major stalling and slowdown; now a modest revival 2/
Scored against the original objectives set by the Chinese and Pakistani governments, CPEC is a disappointment. It hasn’t been a “game-changer”, and it has been years since anyone on the Chinese side seriously talked about it in such transformative terms 3/
Read 17 tweets

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