Nine years ago, I enrolled in the Master’s program in Russia, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe Studies from Columbia’s @HarrimanInst.
At the time, I remember conversations about whether we should even have a Russia studies program. (Thankfully, we still do!)
One of the best courses there was called “Ukrainian Foreign Policy.” There were three of us total (plus @Argemino!) in the fall of 2013.
Each week, we met to dissect the latest on Yanukovych’s government, Orange Revolution legacies, the potential EU Association Agreement, etc.
And each week, things got slowly less hopeful. Yanukovych started to stall. The potential for signing the Association Agreement slowly got further and further away.
It was a bit like watching a slow-motion car crash, week in, week out.
The course ended before EuroMaidan, and everything—the invasion, the war, the sanctions, the 2016 interference, more sanctions, Trump’s first impeachment, and now this—that followed.
And that was only one course, in addition to everything else.
Anyway, this thread isn’t much more than an appreciation for @HarrimanInst. My work on kleptocracy, foreign influence, and trans-national money laundering stems directly from my time there.
And it’s a reminder of why regional studies programs remain so ludicrously important.
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Way too many people still think the latest Russia crisis is only (or even primarily) about Ukraine potentially joining NATO.
Does Ukrainian membership in NATO play a role in Russia’s security posture/threats of invasion? Sure. Is it the primary motivator? Hardly—otherwise a simple question of Ukrainian security neutrality would abnegate the bulk of the current/forthcoming crisis.
This remains the best thread on why the Kremlin’s designs—colonialist, revanchist, geo-economic—on Ukraine go far, far beyond NATO membership.
And why the solution of a “neutral Ukraine” is somewhere between myopic and a dangerous canard.
Gerhard Schröder is arguably Putin’s greatest lobbyist. But he’s no longer unique.
Former British and French PMs, Polish presidents, US senators, an entire range of Austrian leaders—all have raced to become shills for kleptocrats after leaving office.
The first step: a joint Western statement announcing that the practice of former officials working for authoritarian or kleptocratic regimes or their related proxies after leaving office must end.
Announce—publicly and jointly—that the norms have changed.
A false flag attack. A revanchist dictatorship in the Kremlin. An unprompted invasion of a western neighbor—and a bloody failure for the entire world to see.
The most striking statistic from the Soviet-Finnish Winter War:
The Soviet Union—which planned the time and place of the invasion—still had over *five times as many casualties as the Finns*, with a higher casualty-per-day rate than later battles like *Stalingrad*.
Stalin thought grabbing territory from tiny, prone Finland would be easy. He thought invasion would be a cakewalk.
Great read from @Russian_Starr on why progressives (especially in the U.S.) should be fully on board with supporting the defense of Ukraine from Russian neo-imperialism: foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/11/pro…
One thing that *feels* different from 2014 is that the U.S. left seems far more unified on backing Ukraine—and that differences are relegated only to policy (i.e. certain arms packages, certain sanctions crafting, etc).
Both the Jill Stein wing of US-as-root-of-all-evil foreign policy and the Chapo-style version of cynicism over everything seem effectively dead on the U.S. left, at least in terms of any influence on foreign policy and Ukraine. (Which are both fantastic developments.)
1) Those arguing that the West offered a “pledge” to forego NATO expansion grapple with the fact that Yeltsin and Putin both openly flirted with joining NATO in the 1990s/early 2000s.
2) Self-proclaimed realists digest the clear reality that the (post-colonialist) Kremlin’s designs on Ukraine go far, far beyond the simple question of Ukrainian NATO membership.
+1 Not nearly enough grappling with what would have happened if NATO actually *had* stopped expanding. (Polish nuclear program? Hungarian irredentism? A far, far, far worse security landscape on Russia’s western flank?)