One thought about what Russia's exit from the Minsk agreements — aka recognition of DNR/LNR — tells us about what is to come. Thread 1/x
Minsk was a mechanism for Russia to cement its influence over Ukraine by returning the Donbas on its terms -- a constitution renegotiated with its proxies and an asymmetric confederal structure with hyper-empowered pro-Russian regions. 2/x
By recognizing the republics' "independence," Moscow has given up on ever getting that mechanism. But the Kremlin has certainly not given up on its objective of cementing its influence over Ukraine. 3/x
Therefore we can expect Russia to use other tools to enforce its influence over Ukraine... As it turns out, Putin has a tool in his hands right now in the form of nearly its entire combat-ready military that just happens to be arrayed around Ukraine. 4/x
In other words, the strategic rationale for launching a major offensive is greater than it was before today. The Kremlin just swallowed its other bargaining chip. END.
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We make three points: "U.S. policy toward post-Soviet Russia has never come close to the extreme accommodationism that Vindman describes. Washington did try to forge a partnership with Moscow, but those efforts were carefully circumscribed." 3/x
I see there's a lot of renewed interest on twitter in pre-war predictions about how Russia would fight. The bottom line is that no one I'm aware of predicted how (badly) Moscow would mess up the initial invasion. THREAD 1/
here's one pre-war analysis: "The Russian military would likely open its campaign with airstrikes targeting command-and-control systems, logistical centers, airports, air defenses, and other critical infrastructure. To carry them out, Moscow could use hundreds of bombers ... 2/
" as well as ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles...The main effort of Russia’s ground campaign would be to create a pincer movement from the north that encircled Kyiv and enveloped the bulk of Ukraine’s ground forces in the eastern part of the country... 3/
This critique has gotten a fair amount of attention and I have a lot of respect for Ruth's scholarship but she consistently mischaracterizes our article.. 1/
We don't argue "support for Ukraine has resulted in an escalation of the war". We do argue that the west's support has "escalated". the path from stingers to HIMARS is clear. everyone should agree that there has been an increase in quality and quantity of weapons provided 2/
we never wrote that "assistance = escalation". Nor did we write that assistance should cease. quite the opposite! "[the US and allies] should certainly continue providing Ukraine with the matériel it needs" 3/
A couple of points of information on security guarantees. First, the Budapest Memorandum was not a security guarantee. It was an assurance about the intentions of the signatories, not a commitment to come to Ukraine’s defense if it were attacked.1/4
Nowhere in Budapest does it say that the US or UK would respond to an armed attack by taking action other than by calling for a UNSC meeting. Russia violated Budapest — no question. The other signatories did not. 2/4
Second, Ukraine had a law declaring its “non-bloc” status from 2010-2014. That law, quickly repealed after the Maidan Revolution, was never acknowledged by other states as a matter of international law. The Istanbul communique, by contrast… 3/4
I analyze the Istanbul Communique of March 29, the document that both Ukraine and Russia more or less endorsed at the time. Text here: faridaily.substack.com/p/ukraines-10-…
According to that proposal, Kyiv would renounce its ambitions to join NATO and embrace permanent neutrality in return for receiving security guarantees from both its Western partners and from Russia.